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ABSTRACT
This dissertation investigates the constraints on referential dependency relations that can hold
between epithets and their antecedents under c-command. The initial observation, presented here
in (1), is that epithets can be c-commanded by an antecedent, as long as it is not the closest c-
commanding element.
(1) a. * Nero, thinks that [the damn traitor] will be invited to the reception.
b. OK Nero, thinks that they 2 will invite [the damn traitor] to the reception.
C.?OK John convinced the panel2 that [the idiot], is smart.
Upon closer inspection, the difference between (la) and (lb) seems to involve a subject-object
asymmetry in the complement clause of think. Similarly, the contrast between (la) and (lc)
suggests that the matrix predicate plays a part in the reduced acceptability of (la). The first part
of this dissertation (chapter 2) concerns the syntax of epithets. I argue that epithets are null
pronouns modified by a nominal appositive. This argument is based two core pieces of
evidence: (i) I will present cross-linguistic evidence illustrating that epithets can be syntactically
bound by a quantifier (ii) a series of diagnostics from Den Dikken (2001) and Kayne (2005).
Chapter 3 and 4 of this thesis address the semantics of epithets. Following Potts (2005), I argue
that epithets must be evaluated from the perspective of a given individual, the evaluator. In
chapter 3, I argue that the difference between thinks and convince (cf. Stephenson (2007))
reflects constraints on the judge parameter in an embedded clause that contains an epithet. In
chapter 4, I refine my proposal in the spirit of Percus and Sauerland (2003a), (2003b), and argue
that cases in which the judge parameter is shifted to the matrix subject have the property of
selecting a de se LF. I argue that epithets that adjoin inside such a de se LF cannot refer to the
attitude holder, as the nominal appositive would have to adjoin to an uninterpreted anchor. I
derive the (la)-(lb) difference by arguing that epithets can undergo LF movement from a
position within the embedded object to the antecedent in the matrix clause, but not from a
position in the embedded subject. Chapter 5 concludes with a discussion of the role of epithets
for general theories of locality.
Thesis Supervisor: Noam Chomsky
Title: Professor of Linguistics
Thesis Supervisor: Sabine Iatridou
Title: Professor of Linguistics
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Chapter 1: Introduction
This dissertation is about epithets, a type of DP, for which we can give the following working
definition. First, epithets contain noun phrases that are used in a non-literal, 'emotional' way.
Second, epithets are anaphoric, i.e. they refer back to another DP, or a contextually salient
referent. To illustrate, fascist can be used as an epithet. In (l a), we see the literal use offascist,
referring to a member of a nationalist political group; in (1 a), fascist(s) is neither emotive nor an
epithet. Examples (lb-c) exhibit the emotive use of fascist, where fascist is used pejoratively,
roughly equivalent in meaning to bully. They differ with respect to anaphoricity (and stress); in
(1 b), some fascist is not anaphoric (and thus not an epithet); it introduces a new referent and
characterises this person as unpleasant. In (lc), an example of an epithet, the fascist is
anaphoric; it refers to John, who was previously introduced; it is also obligatorily unstressed.
(1) a. non-emotive, non-epithet
Mussolini brought the fascists to power.
b. emotive, non-epithet
Some fascist asked for you on the phone.
c. emotive, epithet
I went out on a date with John. The fascist spent the whole evening interrupting me.
Most examples in this dissertation use epithets like the idiot, as these seem to be the most
familiar ones cross-linguistically; however, we will see other DPs, like the teacher can also be
used as epithets. The reader should bear in mind that the non-emotive reading ('an uneducated
person') is less salient with the idiot, than the non-emotive reading of other epithets.
The literature on epithets explores their syntactic properties on the one hand (cf. Lasnik
(1976), Dubinsky and Hamilton (1998), Aoun and Li (2000), and Aoun, Choueiri and Hornstein
(2001)), and their semantic properties on the other (cf. Hom (2008)). More recent approaches
attempt at unifying both their semantic and syntactic behaviours, e.g. Beller (2011), Schlenker
(2005, 2007), and Potts (2005, 2007). Most of the work in the literature investigates the
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behaviour of epithets in a single language (e.g. English, or Arabic); I am not aware of any cross-
comparison research of epithets in different languages. This dissertation explores a particular
unexplored behaviour of epithets, namely the possibility of an epithet being referentially
dependent on a c-commanding antecedent. I will show that this observation is not just a quirky
phenomenon found in English; in fact, we will see that an epithet can be referentially dependent
on a c-commanding antecedent in a number of languages, and that that it is more frequent then
previously assumed.
1.1 The Distribution of Epithet Coreference under C-Command
1.1.1 The Components of Epithets
There is a dispute in the literature regarding the precise definition of epithets. The common
assumptions shared by most, are that an epithet consists of an NP or DP, which is accompanied
by a detenninerl. Furthermore, it is also commonly assumed that epithets tend to be expressive
and bear a [+evaluative] feature (often descriptively assumed), which can be positive or negative.
The English examples below illustrate these two assumptions. Example (2a) illustrates a case of
negative evaluativity (i.e. the speaker does not think highly of John), whereas (2b) illustrates
positive evaluation in an epithet2 . In both examples, the epithet takes the shape of a definite
description, i.e. it contains the determiner the.
(2) a. OKYesterday John1 bumped into a fan who really loves the idiot1.
b. . Yesterday John1 bumped into a fan who really loves the great mani.
Although it is typically assumed that epithets preferably consist of a nominal component plus a
determiner, it seems as though the determiner is in fact obligatory3 . Consider the Russian
example in (3). Russian does not have an overt definite determiner analogous to the English
'Cf. Aoun & Choueiri (2001), Schlenker (2005), and most recently Potts (2005) and Harris (2009).
2 Cf. Schlenker (2005) for additional examples of this nature.
3 Unless of course, if the language simply does not have determiners; Croatian and Kutchi Gujarati are such
languages.
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determiner the. Although Russian does have bare determinerless noun phrases, this strategy does
not seem to apply to epithets. In order to derive the correct reading, a proximal demonstrative,
etot4 is required.
Russian
(3) OK John1 ubedil sovet 6to etot idioti umjon.
John.nom convinced panel that this idiot.nom smart
'John convinced the panel that this idiot is smart'.
Furthermore, it appears that the determiner that occurs with the epithet must be obligatorily
overt. This requirement is illustrated by the Japanese example in (4). In Japanese it is typically
assumed that noun phrases are accompanied by a null determiner; however the example in (4)
shows that the epithet requires an overt determiner, in this case, sono.
Japanese
(4) OK kinoo John-wa [sono baka-o hontooni aisiteiru] fan-ni atta.
yesterday John-wa that idiot-acc really love fan-dat met
'Yesterday, John, bumped into a fan who really loves the idioti'.
The data in (5) shows that Hindi patterns like Japanese; the data replicate the requirement for a
demonstrative epithet as opposed to an unmarked epithet.
Hindi
(5) OK Kal Rohit1 ek fan-se milaa jo ki *(us) bewakuuf1 -ko bahut chaahtaa hai
yesterday Rohit a fan-with met.pfv Rel that that stupid-Acc lot want.hab is
'Yesterday Rohiti met a fan who wants that stupidi a lot'.
The discussion above suggests that epithets require an overt determiner; however more must be
said regarding the nominal part. I would like to point out that in principle, anything or anyone
could be an epithet, if the corresponding world view is constructed. For example, the janitor
4 Pavel Rudnev (p.c.) points out that in Russian, etot is not often used anaphorically: typically, the demonstrative tot
is used, sometimes to mark coreference with a non-subject.
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could refer to an honest, respectable position of employment, or, if we alter the world view, a
degrading, low life, dirty occupation. This is true of more subtle epithets, for which examples
are given in (6)5. Another observation that the reader should be aware of is that in order for a
noun to be interpreted as an epithet, it must be unstressed. For example, a dancer, with regular
stress can be understood non-evaluatively. However, if we unstress it, and construct the
corresponding world view, then dancer can be understood evaluatively (i.e. it becomes an
epithet).
(6) a. O' Yesterday John1 bumped into a fan who really loves the whistle blower 1 .
b. OK Yesterday John1 bumped into a fan who really loves the Naxalitei.
Other examples of a reinterpretation of regular R-expressions as epithets involve the German
Oberlehrer (or Schulmeister) 'schoolmaster', which originated as an occupation, but nowadays is
mainly used in its epithet reading Oberlehrer (or Schulmeister) 'pedant', with the adjective
oberlehrerhaft (and schulmeisterhaft) 'pedantic, 6.
To briefly summarise, I propose that epithets are made up of a nominal part plus an
obligatory determiner. In principle, most DP's can be epithets depending on the world view that
is constructed, and the data seem to suggest that they can be positively or negatively evaluated.7
This dissertation focuses on cases where epithets co-occur with a c-commanding antecedent, and
is concerned with how their distribution is constrained in such cases. In the following section I
would like to discuss a striking observation made by Dubinsky & Hamilton (1998), namely that
5 Thanks to Noam Chomsky (p.c.) for these examples.
6 Thanks to Patrick Grosz (p.c.) for the German examples.
7 There may be restrictions on more complex DPs used as epithets. Out of the blue, (ii) and (iii) seem less
acceptable than (i). Thanks to Martin Hackl (p.c.) for the examples and for pointing this out.
i. OK Have you seen Johni? The idiot, is late again.
ii. " Have you seen John,? The idiot who forgot the broom in the basement1 is late again.
iii. Have you seen John,? The greatest idiot in the world1 is late again.
In this dissertation, I propose an appositive structure for epithets, where the idiot has a structure like he, the idiot.
The examples in (ii) and (iii) indicate that the nominal appositive has to be suitable as a predicate, as in he is an
idiot, but not *he is a greatest idiot in the world. In the examples above, one restriction that may hold here is the
difficulty of destressing a long phrase.
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epithets cannot freely co-occur with a c-commanding antecedent. I will show that this
observation can surprisingly, be found in many languages.
1.1.2 Epithets in Relative Clauses
Classical Condition C (of the Binding Theory, (cf. Chomsky (1981)) is a constraint that rules out
constructions where an R-expression is coreferent with a c-commanding antecedent, or rather, is
referentially dependent on a c-commanding antecedent. Evans (1980) observes that there are
several types of relationships that fall under the umbrella term of coreference. He introduces the
concept of referential dependency (see also Reinhart (1983b)). Referential dependency holds
between two DPs if the meaning of one is dependent on the meaning of the other. For
coreference in the broader sense, no such dependency is necessary, as it can be accidental (see
also Lasnik (1976)) if both DPs denote the same entity due to the context. Consider the classical
illustration of Condition C in (7).
Here, (7a) (where Harry Wormwood c-commands the actor) is ungrammatical, as it
violates Condition C (with the intended reading where the actor refers back to Harry
Wormwood, i.e. where the actor is referentially dependent on Harry Wormwood). Contrastively,
(7b) (where Harry Wormwood does not c-command the actor) is grammatical, as it does not
violate Condition C.
(7) a. * [Harry Wormwood]i thinks that the actorI is popular.
b. OK [Harry Wormwood's mother] thinks that the actor, is popular.
The difference between referential dependency and accidental coreference is illustrated by (7a)
versus (8); example (8) is acceptable under a reading where Harry Wormwood sees an actor on
TV without recognising him, and where that actor happens to be Harry Wormwood himself.
Here, Harry Wormwood and the actor on TV end up accidentally coreferring (given that both
refer to the same individual), but neither is referentially dependent on the other (indicated by
different indices).
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(8) 0' [Harry Wormwood]1 thinks that [the actor on TV]: is popular.
A classical example of such accidental coreference is illustrated in (9), from Higginbotham
(1985), who attributes this type of example to Nancy Browman. The idea is that he and John
corefer in the first sentence in (9), as becomes clear in the following sentences. Yet, this
coreference is accidental, and no Condition C violation occurs.
(9) OK He put on John's coat; but only John would do that; so he is John.
(Higginbotham 1985:570)
As we will see, the Condition C obviation effects that occur with epithets involve referential
dependencies and not accidental coreference.
First, Dubinsky & Hamilton (1998) observe that epithets can obviate Condition C in certain
contexts. One of the examples that they provide contains an epithet in a restrictive relative
clause; an illustration is provided in (10). The intended reading is one where the epithet's
meaning is referentially dependent on the antecedent.
(10) OK Johni ran over a man (who was) trying to give the idioti directions.
(Dubinsky & Hamilton 1998:687)
The above observation is a specific observation about epithets, and not a general observation
about R-expressions. This becomes obvious when we contrast (11 a) with (1 Ib). As indicated,
only (11 a), which contains the epithet the idiot, exhibits the relevant "Condition C obviation"
effect, whereas (1 1b) still seems to violate Condition C.
(11) a. OK Harry Wormwoodi ran over a man who was trying to give the idioti directions.
b. * Harry Wormwoodi ran over a man who was trying to give the actori directions.
8 Evidence that this is referential dependency rather than accidental coreference is given in chapter 2, where it is
shown that epithets can be syntactically bound.
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A question that naturally arises here, is why does (1 Ib) not allow for the relative clause to be late
merged after Quantifier Raising of a man (cf. Lebeaux (1988))? The answer to this question is
that such movement is not unconstrained; for instance, Fox (1999) discusses the examples in
(12), which are ungrammatical even though QR should give rise to the LFs in (13).
(12) a. */?? You bought him1 every picture that Johni liked.
b. * Hei bought you every picture that John, liked.
(Fox 1999:181)
(13) a. [every picture that Johni liked] [you bought himi t].
b. [every picture that Johni liked] [hei bought you t].
(Fox 1999:181)
One possible factor that facilitates QR with late merge is Antecedent-Contained Deletion (ACD).
In ACD, illustrated in (14a), a relative clause such as that John, expected you would contains an
elided VP. Furthermore, the antecedent of this elided VP contains the DP that the relative clause
modifies; this is illustrated in (14b), where the bracketed phrase is the apparent antecedent VP
for the elided VP. In other words, the VP ellipsis appears to be contained in its own antecedent
VP. Authors such as Fox (1999) argue that ACD requires QR, with the result that the elided VP
is no longer contained in its own antecedent; this is sketched in (14c).
(14) a. "" You sent him1 the letter that John1 expected you would.
(Fox 1999:185)
b You [antecedent VP sent himi the letter that Johni expected you would <elided VP>]
c [the letter that John expected you would <elided VP>]2 [you [antecedent VP sent himi t 2]]
As a result, ACD creates configurations that may involve QR with late merge; this fact is
illustrated by the contrast in (15) versus (16). Example (15) involves ACD and is acceptable,
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whereas (16) does not involve ACD and is unacceptable; this is an observation that goes back to
Fiengo & May (1994). The examples in (11) do not involve ACD, which accounts for the
unacceptability of (11 b) and leaves the acceptability of (11 a) as a puzzle. Observe that the
examples in (1 7a-b) differ from the examples in (1 6a-b) in the same way; if we replace the R-
expression John by the epithet the idiot, the utterance becomes acceptable.
(15) a. OK You sent himi the letter that Johni expected you would.
b. OK You reported himi to every cop that John1 was afraid you would.
(Fox 1999:185)
(16) a. ??/* You sent himi the letter that Johni expected you would write.
b. ??/* You reported himi to every cop that Johni was afraid of.
(Fox 1999:184)
(17) a. OK You sent him the letter that the idioti expected you would write.
b. OK You reported him to every cop that the idiot was afraid of.
This dissertation focuses on precisely these cases, and other cases where epithets co-occur with a
c-commanding antecedent, and is concerned with how their distribution is constrained in such
cases. In this thesis I will not provide an analysis for the syntax of relative clauses, but focus on
predicates that take clausal complements. Dubinsky & Hamilton (1998) observed constraints on
epithets when they co-occur with a c-commanding antecedent; for instance, examples like (18)
are ungrammatical. In the remainder of this chapter, I show that this observation is not unique to
English, and can be reproduced cross-linguistically.
(18) * Harry Wormwood thinks that the idiot is popular.
Data that involve epithets are typically not evaluated cross-comparatively. The majority of
research on the topic focuses on English, Thai and Arabic. Even here, the data have not been
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contrasted from one language to the next in a way that allows us to make stronger, cross-
linguistic generalisations. The reason for this is as follows. Epithets are an interface issue; they
concern syntax, but also have a strong semantics and pragmatics component, due to the
evaluativity property they possess; and it is this evaluativity component that contributes to fine
grained judgments. In addition to "fuzzy data", it is imperative that the individual languages'
syntax, semantics and pragmatics be taken into account when constructing stimuli for
informants. In this dissertation, I will attempt to provide a cross-linguistic investigation of the
distribution of epithets with a c-commanding antecedent, which is why I draw on a variety of
languages throughout this dissertation. The reader should bear in mind that there is considerable
variation amongst speakers as to whether they accept certain statements with epithets or not. In
general, the data that I report are based on surveys that involved multiple speakers per language
(where possible), and I focus on data that could be reproduced across speakers, as well as across
languages. This is also a good place to point out that some interesting differences between
languages emerge, which I will document, but they are not in the focus of this dissertation; for
instance, Dutch speakers generally seem to accept a wider range of examples than speakers from
other languages - it is a topic for future research to see how this kind of seemingly parametric
variation can be explained.
Before I propose an analysis for the distribution of epithets with a c-commanding
antecedent, I want to show that examples like (11 a) are not specific to English. In fact, the same
pattern first observed by Dubinsky & Hamilton (1998) can be found in many languages. In the
following overview, I present cases where the antecedent is a pronoun, as Schlenker (2005)
claims that these are less acceptable than cases where the antecedent is an R-expression (given in
(19a) vs (19b)). What we find is that for most languages, no such difference can be attested, i.e.
(19b) is equally acceptable to (19a); however the reader should observe that even in English
there is inter-speaker variation (for example, there are speakers who do not get a contrast
between (19a) and (19b), and accept both equally well), suggesting that this contrast is subtle.
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(19) a. OK Johni ran over a man (who was) trying to give the idioti directions. (= (10))
b. How about John?
? Hei ran over a man who was trying to give [the idiot]; directions.
(Schlenker 2005:396)
To start with, consider the Czech data in (20). In this language, epithets in relative clauses can
be referentially dependent on a c-commanding antecedent, whether it is a pronoun or an R-
expression; this is illustrated by the data given in (20).
Czech
(20) a. OK Veera Honza narazil na fanouska, kter toho idiota 6iplne zbozinuje.
yesterday Honza bumped on fan who that idiot totally adores
'Yesterday, Johni bumped into a fan who really loves the idiot 1'.
b. OK Zrovna jsem mluvil s Honzou. Veera pro narazil na fanouska,
just aux.pst.lsg talked with Honza yesterday bumped on fan
ktery toho idiota 6iplne zboI'iuje.
who that idiot totally adores
'Just talked to John1. Yesterday, he, bumped into a fan who really loves the idiot1 .'
Languages as diverse as Croatian, Dutch, French, Hindi, Hungarian, Russian and Slovenian
behave the same as Czech; the data are given in (21)-(27). Identical to the contrast between
(20a) versus (20b), these languages do not draw a difference between an R-expression antecedent
and a pronominal antecedent.
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(21) a. ?OK Juder je Johni naletio na oboiavatelja
yesterday aux.3sg John bumped.ptcpl on fan
Croatian
koji stvarno
who really
oboiava tog idiota1
adores that idiot
'Yesterday, Johni bumped into a fan who really loves the idiot1'.
sam razgovarao
aux.lsg talked
s Johnomi.
with John.
Ju'er je
yesterday aux.3sg
naletio na oboiavatelja koji
bumped.ptcpl on fan who
stvarno
really
oboiava tog idiota1 .
adores that idiot,.
'Just talked to Johni. Yesterday, he1 bumped into a fan who really loves the idioti.'
Gisteren kwam Jan1 een fan
yesterday met Jan a fan
'Yesterday John met a fan who is
tegen die helemaal dol
prt who entirely fond
really fond of the idiot.'
is
is
Dutch'
op de idiooti
of the idiot
Heb net
have just
met Jan gesproken. Gisteren kwam hiji
with Jan spoken. yesterday came he
een fan tegen
a fan prt
die helemaal dol is op de idiooti.
who entirely fond is of the idiot
'Just talked to John,. Yesterday, he1 bumped into a fan who really loves the idiot1 .'
French
Hier, John est tomb6 sur un fan qui adore
yesterday John is fallen onto a fan who loves
'Yesterday John bumped a fan who loves the idiot.'
cet imbecile.
the idioti.
9Other translations pattern the same, as shown in (i) and (ii), indicating that this is not due to a particular phrase or
idiom.
i. OKGisteren liep Jan tegen een fan op die echt van die gek houdt. Dutch
'Yesterday, John, bumped into a fan who really loves the idioti.'
ii.OK Net met Jan gepraat. Gisteren liep hij tegen een fan op die echt van die gek houdt.
'Just talked to John,. Yesterday, he1 bumped into a fan who really loves the idiot1.'
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b. ?OK Upravo
Just
pro
(22) a. OK
b. OK
(23) a. OK
juste de parler i John.
just from talking to John
Hier,
yesterday
il est tombe sur
he is fallen on
qui adore cet
who adores this
imbecile.
idiot
'Just talked to John1. Yesterday, hei bumped into a fan who really loves the idiot1 .'
Hindi'
(24) a. OK kal
yesterday
Rohit ek fan-se milaa jo
Rohit a fan-with met.Pfv Rel
ki
that
us
that
bewakuuf-ko
stupid-Acc
chaahtaa hai
want.Hab is
'Yesterday Rohiti met a fan who wants that stupidi a lot'.
Rohit-se baat
Rohit-with talk
kii. kal vo ek fan-se milaa
do.Pfv.f yesterday he a fan-with met.Pfv
jo ki us
Rel that that
bewakuuf-ko bahut chaahtaa hai
stupid-Acc lot want.Hab is
'I just talked to Rohit. Yesterday hei met a fan who wants that stupid a lot'.
Tegnap Jinos belebotlott egy
yesterday Janos stumbled.into a
'Yesterday, Janos1 bumped into a fan
Hungarian
rajong6ba, aki tenyleg szereti az idi6tit.
fan.with who really loves the idiot
who really loves the idiot1 .'
4 The examples in (i) and (ii) show that different translations of the same sentence behave the same way in Hindi.
i. OK kal Johni acaanak ek fan se Takraa gayaa jo muurkh, ko sac meiM pyaar kartaa hai / caahtaa hai / pasaMd
kartaa hai
'Yesterday, Johni bumped into a fan who really loves the idiot,.'
ii. John, se abhii abhii baat kii. kal vo ek fan se acaanak Takraa gayaa jo muurkhi ko sac meiM caahtaa hai.
'Just talked to John,. Yesterday, he, bumped into a fan who really loves the idioti.'
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b. OKJe viens
I come
un fan
a fan
bahut
lot
b. OKmE-ne bas
I-Erg just
abhii
now
(25) a. OK
b. OK Epp most
I just
beszeltem JAnossal.
spoke Janos.with
Tegnap pro belebotlott egy
yesterday stumbled.into a
aki szereti
who loves
az
the
idi6tit.
idiot
'Just talked to John,. Yesterday, he, bumped into a fan who really loves the idioti.'
Russian"
(26) a. OK John veera vstretil poklonnicu, kotoraja bogotvorit
John yesterday met fan.fem who.fem adores
'Yesterday, John bumped into a fan who really loves the idiot.'
etogo
this
idiota.
idiot
b. OK Tolko eto zvonil John.
just now rang John
On veera vstretil
he yesterday met
poklonnicu, kotoraja
fan.fem who.fem
bogotvorit etogo
adores this
idiota.
idiot
'Just talked to John on the phone. Yesterday, he bumped into a fan who really loves
the idiot'
Slovenian
Veraj je
yesterday, cl
John
Johni
naletel na obozevalca, ki res
bumped into fan who really
obozuje tega idiota.
loves the idioti.
'Yesterday, John bumped into a fan who really loves the idiot.'
"Again, we find that different translations show the same pattern, given in (i) and (ii).
i. ?O Vchera Ivani vstreti-l fanat-a, kotor-yj po-nastojaschemu lubi-t idiot-ai Russian
yesterday, John, meet-PST-M fan-ACC who/which-M really love-PRS.3SG idioti-ACC.
ii. OK Tol'ko chto govori-l s Ivan-omi.
only that talk-PST.M.SG with Johni-INSTR.
Vchera on, vstreti-l fanat-a, kotor-yj po-nastojaschemu lubi-t idiot-a1 .
Yesterday, he, meet-PST-M fan-ACC who-M really love-PRS.3SG idiot1-ACC.
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rajong6ba,
fan
(27) a. OK
b. O' Ravnokar sem govoril z
just talked to
Veeraj je pro naletel na
yesterday, cl bumped into
obolevalca, ki res obozuje tega idiota.
fan who really loves the idiot1 .
'Just talked to John. Yesterday, he bumped into a fan who really loves the idiot'
For completeness' sake, it is worth pointing out that languages that exhibit the pattern that
Schlenker (2005) observes, include Flemish, Japanese and Spanish; these data are given in (28)-
(30).
Flemish
(28) a.?O' Gisteren ei
yesterday has
Jef
Jef
een vrou gezien da
a woman seen that
al juire volgt.
already years follows
'Yesterday, Jefi bumped into a fan who has been following the idioti for years.'
b.?? Kern just
L.have just
me Jef geklapt. Ij ei gisteren
with J spoken he has yesterday
een
a
vrou
woman
gezien da
seen that
stoemerik al juire volgt.
idiot already years follows
'Just talked to Jef1. Yesterday, he1 bumped into a fan who really loves the idioti.'
Japanese
kinoo John-wa [sono
yesterday John-wa that
'Yesterday, Johni bumped
baka-o hontooni aisiteiru] fan-ni
idiot-ace really love fan-dat
into a fan who really loves the idiot1.'
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Johnom.
John,.
daue
that
stoemerik
idiot
daue
the
90K(29) a. atta.
met
b.?? Ima John-to hanasita. Kinoo kare-wa [sono baka-o hontooni aisiteiru]
now John-with talked. yesterday he-top that idiot-ace really love
fan-ni atta.
fan-dat met
'Just talked to Johni. Yesterday, hei bumped into a fan who really loves the idioti.'
Spanish
(30) a. OK Ayer, Juan se encontr6 con un admirador que adora a ese idiota.
yesterday Juan self met with an admirer who adores to this idiot
'Yesterday, Juan bumped into a fan who loves the idiot.'
b. ?? Acabo de hablar con Juan. Ayer, pro se encontr6 con un admirador
finished of speak with Juan yesterday self met with an admirer
que adora a ese idiota.
who adores to this idiot
'Just talked to Juani. Yesterday, he1 bumped into a fan who really loves the idiot1 .'
I conjecture that this contrast reflects a subtle preference in how speakers utilise pronouns. The
idea is that speakers try to introduce evaluative information as early as possible. In the examples
in (28b), (29b) and (30b), the deviance is due to the fact that speakers prefer a variant where the
first pronoun is realised as an epithet. In other words, Schlenker's (2005:396) example in (31a),
repeated from (19b), is deviant due to a preference for (3 1b).
(31) a. How about John?
? Hei ran over a man who was trying to give [the idiot]; directions.
b. How about John?
OK [The idiot]; ran over a man who was trying to give himi directions.
I assume that this is a universal, but subtle preference, and not a grammatical restriction. The
fact that some speakers exhibit this contrast whilst others don't may reflect variation amongst
speakers. This is supported by the fact that in Spanish, some of my informants find the version
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where the antecedent is a pronoun, (30b) above, less acceptable than the alternative, (30a), but
other informants find both variants equally acceptable. To conclude this discussion, the question
should be addressed why Dubinsky & Hamilton's (1998:687) example in (32a), repeated from
(10), does not compete with an example like (32b) in the same way. This seems to be due to the
fact that (32b) is marked, as indicated. I attribute the markedness of (32b) to the fact that in (32)
John introduces a new referent, which seems to clash with modification by the idiot.
(32) a. O' Johni ran over a man (who was) trying to give the idioti directions.
b.? [John, the idiot,]; ran over a man (who was) trying to give himi directions.
Based on the above data, we can safely conclude that Dubinsky & Hamilton's (1998)
observation for English can be reproduced in many languages. In this section we have seen that
epithets in a (restrictive) relative clause can be c-commanded by antecedents outside this relative
clause, which they are referentially dependent on, suggesting that they are not subject to
Condition C in such contexts, or at least they obviate Condition C. It is worth pointing out, that
in the acceptable examples we have seen so far, there is often material between the epithet and
the antecedent; for example in (17b), the colleague occurs between the epithet and the
antecedent.
One question that arises here is whether we are truly dealing with restrictive relative
clauses (as opposed to appositive relative clauses); in other words, we want to know whether the
antecedent truly c-commands the epithet (which may not be the case in appositive relative
clauses (cf. Safir (1986))12. The examples in (33) and (34) indicate that in restrictive relative
clauses, the antecedent does c-command the epithet. We know that the relative clause is
restrictive, since the relative clause serves to identify its head noun.
12 This is shown by the examples in (i) versus (ii), quoted from Safir (1986:672), which Safir attributes to Luigi
Rizzi. The pronoun in the restrictive relative clause in (ii) can be bound by the subject, but the pronoun in the
appositive relative clause in (i) cannot.
i. * Every Christiani forgives John, who harms himi.
ii. OK Every Christiani forgives a man who harms himi.
26
Russian
(33) A: Kogo John povjol v operu?
who.ACC John.NOM take.PERF to opera
'Whom did John take to the opera?'
B: John1 povjol kollegu, kotoraja dejstvitel'no ijubit etogo idiotai
John took colleague.ACC who.NOM really loves this idiot.ACC
'John took the colleague who really loves the idiot.'
Russian
(34) A: S kem John xodilv operu?
with whom John went to opera
'Who did John go to the opera with?'
B: Johni xodil s kollegoj, kotoraja dejstvitel'no ljubit etogo idiota1
John went with colleague who really loves this idiot
'John went with the colleague who really loves the idiot'
The same point can be made by the following examples from Czech, Dutch, Croatian and French
in (35)-(38); here, the restrictive relative clause introduces new information that contrasts with
the old information provided in the previous clause and serves to determine the referent of
somebody. In other words, of the possible people that the subject (Karel, Jan, ...) may have met,
the speaker uses the restrictive relative clause to single out the one who really loves the subject.
Czech
(35) Karla vetsinou kaidf nenhvidi. Ji' ho taky nemiuu vystit.
Karel mostly everybody hates I him also not.can stand
'Usually everybody hates Karel. I can't stand him either.'
OK Ale nedaivno potkal Karel3 nekoho, kdo mi toho idiota 3 fakt rid.
but recently met Karel:nom somebody:acc who has that idiot really glad
'But recently Karel 3 bumped into someone who really LOVES that idiot3 .'
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(36) Normaliter haat iedereen Jan.
usually hates everyone Jan
'Usually everybody hates John. I
Ik kan hem ook niet uitstaan.
I can him also not stand
can't stand him either.'
Maar onlangs liep
but recently ran
'But recently John3
Jan tegen iemand op die
Jan against somebody on who
bumped into someone who really
echt van die idioot
really of the idiot
LOVES that idiot3.'
(37) Nitko ne voli Johna.
noone Neg loves John.acc.
'Usually everybody hates John.
OK
Ni ja ga ne
Neither I him.acc Neg
I can't stand him either.'
mogu
can
Ali nedavno je John naletio na nekega
but recently Aux John.nom bumped.part.m on someone.acc
VOLI tog
loves that
podnijeti.
stand.
tko
who.nom
stvarno
really
idiota.
idiot
'But recently John3 bumped into someone who really LOVES the/that idiot3 .'
(38) D'habitude, tout le monde deteste John. Je ne peux pas
usually all the world hates John I not can neg
'Usually everybody hates John. I can't stand him either.'
OK Mais recemment
but recently
bien cet
well this
John
John
est
is
tomb6 sur
fallen on
le sentir
him stand
quelqu'un qui aime
someone who loves
French
moi non plus.
me neither
VRAIMENT
really
imbecile.
idiot
'But recently John3 bumped into someone who really LOVES the/that idiot3.'
The first observation presented in this section can be summarised as follows: In many
languages, epithets can be c-commanded by an antecedent that they are referentially dependent
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OK
Dutch
HOUDT.
loves
Croatian
on, across clause-boundaries, if they are located in a restrictive relative clause. We now move on
to another observation that will be at the core of this dissertation.
1.1.3 Epithets in Complement Clauses
If we look beyond relative clauses, we find that epithets can also occur in complement clauses,
e.g. with the matrix predicate convince. To start with, I provide a Croatian example in (39a) and
a Hindi example in (40a); in both cases, the epithet is c-commanded across a clause-boundary by
an antecedent that it is referentially dependent on. In the examples under discussion, the epithet
is in a complement clause and its antecedent is the matrix subject. We will see examples from
more languages throughout this dissertation of this nature. What the contrast between (39a) and
(39b) shows us, is that once again, epithets differ from other R-expressions; only the former are
acceptable in such configurations.
Croatian
(39) a. ?O Peteri je uvjerio predstavnike da de prokleti izdajniki
Peter aux.3sg convinced.ptcpl representatives that will.3sg damn traitor
rijesiti problem.
solve problem.
'Peteri convinced the representatives that the damn traitori would solve the problem.'
b. * Billi je uvjerio predstavnike da de podvorniki rijesiti
Bill aux.3sg convinced.ptcpl representatives that will.3sg janitor solve
problem.
problem
'Bill convinced the representatives that the janitor, would solve the problem.'
The same observation can be found in Hindi; this is illustrated by the data in (40a) versus (40b).
The epithet vo deshdrohii 'that traitor' can be referentially dependent on a c-commanding
antecedent, (40a), but the R-expression vojamaadaar 'that sweeper' cannot, (40b).
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(40) a."' Samir-nei pratinidhiyoN-ko 2 samjhaa diyaa hai ki
Samir-Erg representatives-Dat explain GIVE.Pfv is that
un-kaa kaam
they-Gen work
Hindi
vo deshdrohii
that traitor
kar de-gaa
do GIVE-Fut
'Samiri has convinced the representatives that that traitor1 will do their job.'
b. * Samir-nei pratinidhiyoN-ko 2 samjhaa diyaa hai ki vo jamaadaari
Samir-Erg representatives-Dat explain GIVE.Pfv is that that sweeper
un-kaa
they-Gen
kaam
work
kar de-gaa
do GIVE-Fut
'Samiri has convinced the representatives that that sweeper, will do their job.'
We may now be led to believe that epithets can freely occur with a c-commanding antecedent,
but this is not correct either. As shown in (41), epithets cannot refer to c-commanding
antecedents in the same clause. This is illustrated by the Croatian and Hindi data below.
(41) a. * Peter
Peter
'Peteri
je uvrijedio majku prokletog
AUX.3sg insulted mother.ACC damn.GEN
insulted the damn traitor's1 mother.'
izdajnikai.
traitor.GEN
b. * Rohit-nei us
Rohit-Erg that
'Rohit, insulted
Hindideshdrohii-kiii maaN-kaa apmaan kiyaa.
traitor-Gen.f mother-Gen insult do.Pfv
the damn traitor'si mother.'
Similarly, it appears that the nature of the matrix predicate also seems to play a role. Consider
the examples in (42); here we see that epithets are less acceptable in complements to think than
in complements to convince. This observation is illustrated by the following examples; example
(42a) contrasts with (39a), and (42b) contrasts with (40a).
(42) a. * Peter
Peter
'Peter,
misli da je prokleti izdajniki
thinks that AUX.3sg damn traitor
thinks that the damn traitori is smart.'
pametan. Croatian
smart
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Croatian
b. * Rina, soc-tii hai ki vo deshdrohii, buddhimaan hai. Hindi
Rina think-Hab.f be.Prs.Sg that that traitor intelligent be.Prs.Sg
'Rina, thinks that the damn traitori is smart.'
This dissertation aims at explaining the distribution of epithets in contexts where they occur with
a c-commanding antecedent; i.e. I aim at deriving contrasts such as the ones between (42) and
(39a)/(40a).
1.2 Sneak Peek
This section provides an overview of the core questions that this dissertation addresses.
Alongside these questions, I will discuss (briefly) my own approach to the issues at hand. In
Chapter 2, I start by discussing a long-standing debate in the literature as to whether epithets are
pronouns or R-expressions. This will become crucial later, for whether an epithet is a pronoun or
an R-expression will partially determine the locality constraints that apply to it (i.e. Principle B
of the Binding Theory 3 if it is a pronoun, and Principle C of the Binding Theory if it is an R-
expression). In Chapter 2.1, I outline the controversy present in the literature, and I side with the
camp that claims that epithets are pronouns. In addition to various forms of evidence from the
literature, I present cross-linguistic empirical evidence of my own in Chapter 2.2, which is
perhaps the strongest observation that favours the argumentation that epithets are indeed
pronouns: I will show that epithets can be syntactically bound (as opposed to only semantically
bound, which is the case with e-type readings) by a quantifier. A first illustration of such
quantifier-variable binding is given in (43) (where the assumption holds that speaker B hates
artists). Moreover, the binding relationship that we see in (43) illustrates that in the case of
epithets, we find referential dependency and not accidental coreference, because the meaning of
the epithet is dependent on the meaning of the DP that binds it (here: every artist). One new
observation that this dissertation makes is that when epithets appear to violate Condition C, this
violation happens in spite of a referential dependency between the epithet and its antecedent, and
"3 Here I refer to Chomsky's (1981) Binding Theory.
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is not due to accidental coreference, which underlies other types of Condition C obviation14 (cf.
(9) above).
Russian
(43) A: Kakuju devusku privjol na prazdnionyj prijom kaidyj xudoinik iz
which girl brought to festive reception each artist from
tvoego goroda?
your town
'Which girl did each of the artists from your town bring to the festive reception?'
B: OKSamo soboj, kaidyj xudoiniki privjol tu (samuju) devusku,
naturally each artist brought that very girl
kotoraja po-nastojasbemu ljubit etogo idiota1
that really loves this idiot
'Naturally, each/every artist brought the one woman who really loves the idiot'
Having argued that epithets have the properties of pronouns, in Chapter 2.3 I will argue that
epithets are nominal appositives that have a null anchor. I draw on diagnostics from Kayne
(2010) and den Dikken (2001) which substantiate this claim. This new observation and the
argumentation based on diagnostics from Kayne (2010) and den Dikken (2001) give rise to the
following question: if epithets are pronouns, why do they appear to trigger Condition C
violations at all? This is addressed in Chapters 3 and 4.
In Chapter 3, I introduce my semantic analysis for epithets and argue that they can be
treated according to a two-dimensional semantics that is compatible with the views of Potts,
(2003), (2005), (2007), Schlenker (2007) and Sauerland (2007); a summary of the basic idea is
presented in (44). Consider the answer given in (44a), where the idiot is an epithet referring to
Fritz. The analysis I argue for is given in (44b), where the epithet involves a nominal appositive,
the idiot, that modifies a null anchor, pro. Assuming (in the spirit of McCawley 1982, Schlenker
2010, to appear) that appositives are interpreted in conjunction with their host clause, I assume
that (44b) is interpreted as in (44c), which gives rise to the presupposition (in Schlenker's (2007)
14 thank Noam Chomsky (p.c.) for pointing this out to me.
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and Sauerland's (2007) view) or conventional implicature (in Potts's (2003), (2005), (2007)
view) in (44e) (which contains the evaluative content of the epithet) and the (main) assertion in
(44d). I discuss the details in section 3.3.3.
(44) a. Do you know Fritz,? John just met the idiot1 .
b. syntactic analysis: John just metproi(,) the idiot.
c. interpretation of appositive: John just met pro I(,) and he1 is the/an idiot.15
d. assertion: John just met Fritzi(, and he1 is the/a (salient) person).16
e. presupposition: The speaker/John/a salient person believes that Fritz, is stupid.
A prediction that arises from the claim that epithets are pronouns (namely nominal appositives
with a null anchor) is that epithets and pronouns should pattern alike in all environments. In
other words, they should have the same distribution. However this is not what we see in (45).
The data show that when epithets are in complement clauses, they do not pattern like pronouns,
but R-expressions (45a)/(45d) vs (45b)/(45c). This raises the following question: If epithets are
pronouns, why are they unacceptable in cases where pronouns are acceptable? In other words,
we know that R-expressions cannot be referentially dependent on a c-commanding antecedent,
which is why (45d) is ungrammatical. Contrastively, pronouns can be referentially dependent on
15 It is unclear at this point whether a nominal appositive the idiot is interpreted as he is the idiot or he is an idiot.
One possible view is that the remains uninterpreted, as in Potts (2003, 2005), so the resulting interpretation is
equivalent to the copula construction he is an idiot. By contrast, Aoun, Choueiri & Hornstein (2001) use the variant
he is the idiot in their rendering of similar appositives in Lebanese Arabic. We have seen in an earlier footnote that
(ii) and (iii) seem less acceptable than (i) (Martin Hackl, p.c.).
i. OK Have you seen John,? The idiot, is late again.
ii. " Have you seen Johni? The idiot who forgot the broom in the basement1 is late again.
iii. " Have you seen John,? The greatest idiot in the world1 is late again.
This supports the interpretation as he is an idiot versus he is the idiot, as we cannot say *he is a greatest idiot in the
world, but we can say he is the greatest idiot in the world.
16 , consider the possibility that an epithet, such as idiot, also introduces the (vacuous) assertion 'he is the/a (salient)
person', based on Schlenker's (2007) analysis of honky, see chapter 3.3.3, in particular (160) and (161). As we will
see, this may be necessary to account for statements such as some idiotjust askedfor you on the phone.
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their antecedent, which is why (45b-c) are grammatical. If epithets (as a type of pronoun) can be
referentially dependent on a c-commanding antecedent, why is (45a) ill-formed?17
(45) a. * Johni thinks that the idioti is smart. Epithet
b. OK Johni thinks that hei is smart. Pronoun
c. OK Johni thinks that he, the idiot,, is smart. Pronoun + Nominal Appositive
d. * John, thinks that the teacheri is smart. R-expression
This core question is addressed in Chapter 3, where I hone in on the distribution of epithets in
complement clauses, and focus particularly on the role of the matrix predicate. In order to set the
stage for the answer to the question under discussion, consider the English example in (46).
Notice that the difference between think and convince (and possibly the presence of the second
DP Peter) is relevant for the acceptability/unacceptability of an embedded epithet with a c-
commanding antecedent.
(46) a. * Johni thinks that the idiot, is smart.
b. ?OK John convinced Peter that the idiot, is smart.
Observe that in (46a) and (46b), the antecedent John c-commands the epithet the idiot. If we
contrast (46b) with (47), we notice that (47) is also acceptable. However, this is less surprising,
as there are contrasts such as (48a) versus (48b), which involve R-expressions that are not
epithets, and indicate that the object of convince does not c-command material inside the
complement clause.
(47) OK Peter convinced Johni that the idioti is smart.
(48) a. * The director convinced John that the director is smart.
b. OK John convinced the director that the director is smart.
17 See the discussion around (275)-(278) for an explanation of the difference between (45a) and (45c).
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In the remainder of Chapter 3, I present my solution, accounting for the contrast between the
complement of think and the complement of convince. The basic idea is that epithets are
evaluated from the perspective of a given individual, which I will call the evaluator; this seems
to make epithets sensitive to the so-called judge parameter, which enters the meaning
computation of predicates of personal taste. Importantly, Stephenson (2007) argues that in the
case of think, the judge corresponds to the matrix subject, whereas in the case of convince, it
corresponds to the matrix object.' 8 To account for the difference between think and convince
with respect to epithets, I argue that when an epithet is in an embedded clause, the antecedent
cannot be the judge of that embedded clause.
I refine this proposal in Chapter 4, where I focus on the contrast between (49a) and (49b).
More striking than (46), the example in (31) exhibits a subject-object asymmetry in complements
of think; the data show that if an epithet is in the complement of think, it can be c-commanded by
its antecedent from the matrix subject position when the epithet is in the embedded object
position, but not when it is in the embedded subject position.
(49) a. * Nero, thinks that [the damn traitor] will be invited to the reception.
b. OK Nero, thinks that they will invite [the damn traitor] to the reception.
To account for this subject/object asymmetry, I argue that complements of think have a de se LF
in the spirit of Percus & Sauerland (2003a), (2003b). This entails that a pronoun inside the
complement clause that 'refers' to the matrix subject is actually uninterpreted. Assuming that
nominal appositives cannot attach to an uninterpreted anchor (cf. Demirdache & Percus (2011)),
we can thus argue that the epithet must be interpreted in the matrix clause and LF move into the
matrix clause from the embedded clause, where it is pronounced. In Chapter 4, I pursue
precisely this idea and propose that epithets can only move from an (embedded) object position,
not from an (embedded) subject position.
18 For completeness' sake, it is worth pointing out that convince also occurs as an object control verb, which raises
the question of whether a verb like promise (which also occurs as a subject control predicate) behaves differently.
Complements of promise typically do not describe a belief state or knowledge state, so it is less clear who would be
the judge. Intuitively, promise does not differ from convince in examples like (46b).
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Chapter 2: The Syntactic Structure of Epithets
2.1 The Distribution of Epithets
In addition to the dispute discussed in the previous chapter regarding what epithets are (i.e.
pronouns vs R-expressions), there is an additional controversy regarding what types of locality
constraints they are subject to. Jackendoff (1969, 1972) observed cases of intrasentential co-
reference between an epithet and a non-local NP. Based on examples such as those in (50), he
proposed that epithets are a type of pronoun.
(50) a. OK I wanted Charlie; to help me, but the bastardi wouldn't do it.
b. OK Irvingi was besieged by a horde of bills and the poor guyi couldn't pay them.
c. OK Although the bumi tried to hit me, I can't really get too mad at Harryi.
Jackendoff (1972:110)
Jackendoff (1969, 1972) suggests that although epithets are pronouns, they have a narrower
distribution than pronouns; they can only occur in a subset of environments where
pronominalisation can be found (though he does not discuss this claim further, nor state the
environments in which epithets are pronoun-like).
Lasnik (1976) argues against such a view, and proposes that epithets are R-expressions.
Lasnik's (1976) reasoning is that epithets pattern like canonical R-expressions, meaning that they
resist binding. He observes that examples such as (50) contrast with those in (51) in that the
latter are ungrammatical' 9 .
19 Earlier than Lasnik (1976), Postal (1972) also observes, in a brief discussion of Jackendoff (1969), that whenever
epithets can occur in the same environment as pronouns, the respective environments lack c-command between the
epithet and its antecedent, as shown in (i). However, Postal still maintains the possibility that epithets are pronouns.
i. * Melvini claims that the bastardi was honest.
Postal (1972:247)
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(51) a. *John/*He/*The sissyi realizes that the sissyi is going to lose.
b. *Johni thinks that I admire the idioti.
Lasnik (1976:11)
Lasnik argues that the contrast between the examples in (50) and (51) is the same contrast that
we find between (52a), (53a), (54a) and (52b), (53b), (54b). The examples in (52a), (53a) and
(54a) are acceptable, for in these cases the R-expression is free (as there is no c-command). In
contrast the bound R-expressions in (52b), (53b) and (54b) which do involve c-command, result
in unacceptability (with R-expressions unlike with pronouns). Lasnik (1976) concludes that the
behaviour of the epithets is in accordance with the behaviour of R-expressions. Thus he
concluded that epithets are R-expressions and subject to Condition C of the Binding Theory20 .
(52) a. That Oscar was unpopular was finally realised by Oscar.
b. Oscar finally realised that he/*Oscar is unpopular.
Lasnik (1976:11)
(53) a. That John is well liked proves that we ought to hire John as public relations director.
b. It surprised John that he/*John is so well liked
Lasnik (1976:11)
(54) a. That Harry won the race really surprised Harry.
b. Harry was really surprised that he/*Harry lost the race.
Lasnik (1976:11)
In later work Lasnik (1989) developed his claim, and further argued that although epithets are R-
expressions, they may also be pronominal, on the basis of data comparison from English and
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20 Cf. Chomsky (1981).
Thai. Lasnik (1989) observed that Thai does not exhibit Condition C effects, however the
language does appear to observe Condition B of the Binding Theory. Based on examples such as
(55), Lasnik illustrates that in Thai, epithets parallel the behaviour of pronouns; they must not be
bound in a local domain. Given the empirical scope, Lasnik (1989) concluded2 ' that given the
observations present in English and Thai, epithets are pronominal R-expressions.
Thai
(55) a. Cx:n chx)p Cnan.
Johni likes Johni
'John likes John'
b.* Cn chx:p khaw
Johni likes himi
'John like him' (where him refers to John)
c.* Cxan chx:p ?aybaa
Johni likes the nuti
'John likes the nut'
L asnik (1989:153)
The debate regarding the status of epithets as either (i) R-expressions, (ii) pronouns or (iii) both,
has been further probed in recent literature. Dubinsky and Hamilton (1998) challenge the claim
that epithets are R-expressions. They observe acceptable examples (given in (56)), where a
referent structurally binds an epithet under c-command. Recall that the claim that epithets are R-
expressions was based on Lasnik's (1976, 1989) observation that epithets, like R-expressions
cannot be structurally bound by a c-commanding antecedent (see also footnote 19). However,
Dubinsky and Hamilton (1998) show that this is not the case. Their (new) data seems to favour
Jackendoff s (1969, 1972) initial proposal that epithets are in fact, pronouns.
21 Dubinsky & Hamilton (1998) point out that in both works, Lasnik (1976, 1989), Lasnik is assuming that epithets
behave the same across languages - despite the fact that the two languages under discussion clearly have different
locality constraints.
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(56) a. OK Johni ran over a man (who was) trying to give the idioti directions.
b. OK Through an accumulation of slipups, Johni (inadvertently) led his students to
conclude that the idioti couldn't teach.
Dubinsky & Hamilton (1998:687)
Given the acceptability of the examples in (56), and the fact that the epithet is bound by a c-
commanding antecedent, Dubinsky & Hamilton (1998) argue that the constraint that governs
epithets cannot be c-command (as originally suggested by Postal (1972)). If it were, we would
expect the examples in (56) to be unacceptable. However, given this observation, it is not
immediately clear what gives rise to the unacceptable examples given above (Cf. (51)), if c-
command is not the relevant constraint. Dubinsky & Hamilton (1998) argue that given the data
in (56), the unacceptability of the examples in (51) is not due to Condition C of the Binding
Theory, but due to the fact that epithets are anti-logophoric; I will come back to this proposal in
Chapter 3 and discuss it explicitly in Chapter 4.3.1.
2.2. Evidence for Treating Epithets as Pronouns
2.2.1 Evidence from the Previous Literature
We have seen that there is a long-standing debate as to whether epithets are best classified as
pronouns or R-expressions. I agree with Jackendoff's original claim that epithets are pronouns;
this section reviews some evidence from the literature that favours this claim. In addition, I will
also present new, additional arguments that lean towards this view.
First, I would like to discuss an observation from Lebanese Arabic. Aoun & Choueiri
(2000) argue that epithets22 in Lebanese Arabic consist of a rigid structure. This is illustrated by
the examples in (57). The example in (57a) illustrates that the epithet habile 'idiot' / fimaar
'ass' consists of a definite noun phrase, which contains an article or a demonstrative. The
example given in (57b) shows that it is not possible to use this particular structure for non-
22 In Lebanese Arabic, the expressive component of epithets is typically negative. Cf. Aoun & Choueiri (2000) for
further discussion and data.
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modified DP's or NP's. (However, Aoun & Choueiri (2000) point out that this structure is not
restricted to epithets, but it is also used for modified nouns, as shown by (57c)).
Lebanese Arabic
(57) a. OK ha-l-habiile / maasTuul / fimaar Saami
this-the-idiot idiot ass Saami
'this idiot/ass Saami'
b. * ha-I- fiakiim Saami / mudiira
this-the-doctor Saami / director
'this doctor Saami / this director'
c. OK ha-z-zakiyye Nadjia
this-the-smart Nadjia
'this smart Nadjia'
Aoun & Choueiri (2000:2-3)
The question is how to best analyse the construction in (57a). Aoun & Choueiri (2000) observe
that there are two classes of pronominal elements in Lebanese Arabic. The first type of bound
variable, ha- 'this', functions as bound variables or resumptive pronouns; these are the ones that
occur in epithets and have the structure [ha- + NP]. The authors argue that in the example in
(58a), where an epithet seems to be bound by a quantifier, it is actually the ha- morpheme that is
being bound by wala walad (no boy), and not the nominal plus determiner combined (ha-1-
mal?uun 'the damned devil'). In contrast, the I- 'the' morpheme in (58b) is not a pronominal
element of the type that can be bound, in other words, it is not a pronoun. This second type of
pronominal element can only be used deictically. I will not discuss Aoun and Choueiri's deictic
pronoun further, since they are irrelevant for our discussion at hand; I refer the reader Aoun &
Choueiri (2000) for further discussion regarding this matter.
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Lebanese Arabic
0( l-malle ma ba?atit
the-teacher neg sent.3.f.sg
wala walad 7end -mudiira
no boy to the-principal
7abl ma tnabbih ha-i- mal?uun ?an 1-?aSaaS
before warn.3.f.sg this-the-damned about the-punishment
'The teacher didn't send any boy to the principal before warning
about the punishment'
the damned devil
b. * l-malle
the-teacher
ma ba?atit wala walad ?end
neg sent.3.f.sg no boy to
1-mudiira
the-principal
?abl ma tnabbih 1-1- mal?uun ?an 1-?aSaaS
before wam.3.f.sg this-the-damned about the-punishment
'The teacher didn't send any boy to the principal before warning
about the punishment'
the damned devil
Aoun & Choueiri (2000:14)
What is important for the purpose of this dissertation is the fact that (58a) involves an epithet ha-
]-mal?uun 'the damned devil', which is c-commanded by its antecedent wala walad 'no boy',
i.e. it occurs in the kind of configuration that we are interested in. The fact that it must contain
the pronoun ha- and cannot occur with the determiner 1- indicates that epithets have a
pronominal component, at least when they are c-commanded by their antecedent. This can be
taken as preliminary evidence that epithets have the distribution of pronouns.
Moving away from the internal structure of epithets and turning to their distribution, the
fact that epithets have the distribution of pronouns can be found when we look at the behaviour
of NPs and DPs modified by a post-nominal (attributive) adjective phrase (cf. Baker (2003),
Radford (2004)). The following data from Alexiadou et al. (2007) illustrate my point: pronouns
cannot be modified by such adjectives (Cf Abney (1987), Bhat (2004)). This contrast between
definite noun phrases and pronouns is given in (59a-b) versus (59c-d).
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(58) a.
(59) a. OK the students [Ap present at the meeting]
b. OK the student [AP aware of the problems]
c. * he [AP present at the meeting]
d. * he [AP aware of the problems]
Alexiadou et al. (2007:289)
The question that arises at this point is whether epithets pattern like the definite description the
student, or like the pronoun he. In other words, can epithets be modified by a post-nominal
adjective phrase? The examples in (48), which I have constructed, based on the data from
Alexiadou et al. (2007), seem to suggest that the answer to this question is no. The examples in
(60) show that epithets, in this case the idiot, pattern like a pronoun as opposed to the definite
description. The example in (60a) is acceptable under a reading where the manager (being an R-
expression) cannot refer to Bill. In contrast, the example in (60b), containing an epithet that is
modified by a post-nominal adjective phrase, is unacceptable; the example in (60c) shows that an
epithet that is not modified by a post-nominal adjective is acceptable in the same construction,
and allows for referential dependence on a c-commanding antecedent. Examples (60b) and (60c)
have the structure where the antecedent c-commands the epithet; the same pattern holds in cases
where the epithet is not c-commanded by its antecedent, as shown in (61). The data suggest that
epithets cannot undergo adjectival modification, and thus pattern like pronouns.
(60) a. OK Billi later discovered a problem that [the manager present at the meeting]k had
overlooked the day before.
b. * Billi later discovered a problem that [the idiot present at the meeting]; had overlooked
the day before.
c. OK Billi later discovered a problem that [the idiot]; had overlooked the day before.
(61) a. OK I just talked to Billi. Yesterday, [the manager present at the meeting]k overlooked this
problem.
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b. * I just talked to Billi. Yesterday, [the idiot present at the meeting]i overlooked this
problem.
c. 0K I just talked to Billi. Yesterday, [the idiot]i overlooked this problem.
Evidence from Dubinsky & Hamilton (1998), Aoun & Choueiri (2000) plus the argument based
on Alexiadou et al. (2007), appears to favour the view that epithets are pronouns, as originally
proposed by Jackendoff (1969, 1971). In addition to this evidence, recent work by Beller (2011)
suggests that prosodically, epithets pattern like pronouns as well. The data in (62) show the
prosodic patterning of pronouns; (62a) illustrates a case where there is broad focus, in contrast,
(62b) shows that a sentence final pronoun results in the stress shifting to the prefinal word.
Finally, when the sentence final pronoun is stressed, Beller (2011) observes that it results in
narrow focus; this is illustrated by the example given in (62c).
(62) a. O' [Susan slapped JIM]F
b. OK [Susan SLAPPED him]F
c. OK Susan slapped [HIM]F
(adapted from Beller 2011:1)
Given the data in (63), Beller (2011) concludes that epithets pattern like pronouns with respect to
prosody. Beller's observation can be illustrated by the Ladd example given in (58). Here, we
observe a sentence-final epithet (63a), where the surgeon is referred to as the butcher, triggering
stress shift, as in (62b) above, which contains a sentence-final pronoun. By contrast, if the stress
is on butcher, as in (63b), the only possible reading is a literal (non-epithet) reading of butcher.
These observations of Beller (2011) support a view where epithets are (in some sense) pronouns,
or at least have the syntactic distribution of pronouns.
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(63) How was your operation?
a. Don't ask me about it. I'd like to STRANGLE the butcher (butcher = surgeon)
b. Don't ask me about it. I'd like to strangle the BUTCHER (butcher = butcher)
(Beller 2011:1, attributing it to Ladd 2008)
2.2.2 New Evidence from Quantifier-Variable Binding
In addition to the above evidence that appears to suggest that epithets are pronouns, I would like
to present further argumentation, possibly the strongest, for this claim. Since the birth of
contemporary Binding Theory (cf. Chomsky (1981)), it is common knowledge that R-
expressions must be free, whereas pronouns can be bound. In the example in (64), the pronoun
he is a bound variable that co-varies with the quantifier every man under c-command. In other
words, in (64) the pronoun is syntactically bound by the quantifier. The example in (65)
illustrates that an R-expression, in this case, the man, cannot co-vary with a quantifier in the
same construction, and thus cannot be syntactically bound under c-command. In the remainder
of this section, I will show that epithets can co-vary with a quantifier under c-command, parallel
to pronouns, and not to R-expressions24 .
(64) OK[Every man]; thinks hei is intelligent.
= For every x such that x is a man, x thinks that x is intelligent
(65) * [Every man]; thinks [the man]; is intelligent.
(intended:) For every x such that x is a man, x thinks that x is intelligent
It is important here to control for c-command, as R-expressions can co-vary with some
quantifiers (such as the existential quantifier in (67)) without being bound, even if there is no c-
command relation; this is illustrated by the example in (66). However, note that this context
23 Cf. Reuland (2011) for a complete overview of Binding Theory.
24 See also the recent work of Demirdache & Percus (2011 a, 2011 b), who also argue that epithets can behave as
bound variables in certain contexts.
44
does not involve syntactic binding (as there is no c-command) and is typical for so-called e-type
pronouns, as in (67)25.
(66) OK [Every woman who loves [a man];] thinks [the man]; is intelligent.
= For every y such that y is a woman and there is an x such that x is a man, if y loves x,
then y thinks that x is intelligent
(67) OK [Every woman who loves [a man];] thinks hei is intelligent.
= For every y such that y is a woman and there is an x such that x is a man, if y loves x,
then y thinks that x is intelligent
In what follows, I will argue that epithets can be syntactically bound under c-command. This
evidence for treating epithets as pronouns (at least for the purposes of syntax) is perhaps the most
convincing for two reasons. First, it draws on a broader empirical, cross-linguistic scope than
previous arguments. Second, it avoids the following pitfalls: On the one hand, coreference
between an R-expression and an antecedent may be possible if binding is blocked26; however on
the other hand, an apparent binding (or rather covariance) relationship between a quantifier and a
variable can sometimes be established without c-command, e.g. with donkey anaphora. Thus
focusing on quantifier variable binding with c-command allows us to eliminate these confounds
for the argumentation that epithets are indeed pronouns, and they can be syntactically bound. I
will now discuss different examples of syntactic binding that involve a bound epithet.
Turning to languages other then English, in the Russian examples in (68), the DP that
contains the relative clause is presented as the answer to a who-question, suggesting that the B
response in (68) contains a restrictive relative clause (who really loves the idiot); as the relative
clause serves to single out a set of girls, it must be restrictive, for appositive relative clauses
cannot be used to identify a referent. In the example, the phrase etogo idiota 'this idiot' co-
varies with the quantifier kaidyj xudoinik 'every artist', which c-commands it, and is thus
syntactically bound by it under c-command.
25 Another type of example consists of telescoping, where a pronoun covaries with a universal quantifier that does
not c-command it; see Roberts (1986).
26 This was first observed by Reinhart (1983a).
45
(68) A: Kakuju
which
devusku privjol na prazdni~nyj prijom
girl brought to festive reception
tvoego goroda?
your town
'Which girl did each of the artists from your town bring to the festive reception?'
B: O'Samo soboj, kaidyj
naturally each
xudoiniki privjol tu (samuju) devusku,
artist brought that very girl
kotoraja po-nastojaskemu jubit
that really loves
6togo
this
idiotal
idiot
'Naturally, each/every artist brought the one woman who really loves the idiot.'
Further examples from Russian that seem to involve binding of an epithet by a quantifier are
given in (69) and (70).
(69) OKkaidyj artist veera
every artist yesterday
'Yesterday, every artist
vstretil
met
bumped
poklonnicu, kotoraja bogotvorit
fan.FEM who.FEM adores
into a fan who really loves the idiot"
etogo
this
Russian
idiota
idiot
In Russian, example (70a), with the epithet etot pridurok 'this idiot' seems to be equally
acceptable to example (70b), which uses a pronoun on 'he' in the same place.
Russian
Na prijome
At reception
kaidyj professor
every professor
vstretil kakogo-to studenta-otlienika,
met some excellent.student
etot pridurok kogda-to zavalil.
this idiot some.time.ago failed
'At the reception, every professor3 bumped into some excellent student (or other) who
the idiot 3 had failed.'
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kaidyj
each
xudoinik
artist
Russian
iz
from
(70) a. 0' kotorogo
whom
b. OK Na prijome kaidyj professor vstretil
at reception every professor met
on (kogda-to)
kakogo-to studenta-otlionika, kotorogo
some excellent.student whom
zavalil.
he some.time.ago failed
'At the reception, every professor3 bumped into some excellent student (or other) who
he3 had failed.'
Other examples that illustrate syntactic binding of an epithet by a quantifier can be found in
Slovenian, (71), and Dutch, (72); here the epithet is also as acceptable in the intended reading as
the pronoun. The example in (71) from Slovenian again shows that the epithet prekleti izdajalec
(damn traitor) is bound by the quantifier vsak elan (every member) under c-command,
that epithets pattern like pronouns - at least for the purposes of syntax.
Unsurprisingly, we see the same thing in Dutch.
(71) a. OK Na recepciji je vsaka profesorica 3 naletela na kaksnega
at reception aux each professor met
studenta, ki
with some
Slovenian
odlicnega
excellent
ga je pro3 vrgla na izpitu.
student who cl aux pro3 failed in exam
'At the reception, every professor3 bumped into some excellent student (or other)
who she3 had failed.'
b. OK Na recepciji je vsaka profesorica3 naletela na kaksnega
at reception aux each professor met with some
studenta, ki ga je neumnica 3 vrgla na izpitu.
student who cl aux stupid failed in exam
'At the reception, every professor3 bumped into some excellent student (or other)
who the idiot3 had failed.'
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suggesting
odlionega
excellent
Dutch
(72) a. OK Tijdens de receptie liep iedere docent 3 tegen een of andere briljante
during the reception ran every teacher into one or other brilliant
student aan die ze3 had laten zakken.
student prt who she had let fail
'At the reception, every professor3 bumped into some excellent student (or other)
who she3 had failed.'
b. OK Tijdens
during
student
student
de receptie liep iedere docent3 tegen een of andere briljante
the reception ran every teacher into one or other brilliant
aan die die idioot 3 had laten zakken.
prt who the idiot had let fail
'At the reception, every professor3 bumped into some excellent student (or other)
who the idiot3 had failed.'
Examples in which epithets located in a restrictive relative clause are bound by a c-commanding
antecedent outside the relative clause can also be found in Czech, as shown in (73a). In Czech,
we observe that the variant with the epithet (in (73a)) is less acceptable than the variant with a
pronoun (in (73b)). We will see in a moment that this does not jeopardise the general
observation that epithets can be bound by a c-commanding quantifier. On the one hand, there are
examples that strengthen the intuition that (73a) involves syntactic binding, cf. the discussion of
(75) and (76); on the other hand, there are reasons to assume that the contrast between (73a) and
(73b) may simply exhibit a subtle preference for simpler forms (such as the null pronoun) when
the use of the more complex form (the evaluative epithet) is not contextually licensed. It is not
clear why such a preference surfaces more in Czech than in the other data, but I would now like
to elaborate on this point, in my discussion of a similar contrast, in (74).
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Czech
(73) a.?? Kaidi profesorka 3 potkala na recepci nejakeho vynikajiciho studenta,
every professor met at reception some excellent student
kterdho ta kriva3 vyhodila ze zkousky.
who that cow threw.out from exam
'At the reception, every professor3 bumped into some excellent student (or other)
who the idiot 3 had failed.'
b. OK Kaidi profesorka3 potkala na recepci nejakeho vynikajiciho studenta,
every professor met at reception some excellent student
kterdho pro3 vyhodila ze zkousky.
who pro threw.out from exam
'At the reception, every professor3 bumped into some excellent student (or other)
who she3 had failed.'
I would like to point out that it seems as though sometimes, 'weakly expressive' epithets (as in
(73a)) may be dispreferred for pragmatic reasons, as follows. For instance, in Russian,
consultants report that (74a) is less acceptable than (74b) even though the two examples have an
identical structure. The difference seems to be that (74a) involves the 'weakly expressive' etot
pridurok 'this idiot', whereas (74b) contains the 'strongly expressive' etot dolbanyj pridurok
'this damn idiot'. The contrast between (74a) and (74b) can be explained as follows. Definite
descriptions such as this idiot are generally ambiguous between the evaluative epithet reading
'this person, who I dislike' and the non-evaluative reading 'this ignorant, uneducated person'.
Only the former reading allows for the Condition C obviation effects that we observed. The
contrast between (74a) and (74b) then seems to be due to the fact that damn disambiguates
towards the latter reading, which is dispreferred out-of-the-blue. This suggests that the use of a
DP as an epithet must be sufficiently motivated (e.g. by the context). Therefore, we should not
over-interpret contrasts such as (73a) versus (73b). However, much more research is needed to
determine the precise factors involved that give rise to the kind of contrasts between Czech and
Dutch/Slovenian that we observed above.
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Russian
(74) a. * Bill ubeidaet predstavitelej, -to etot pridurok resil ix problemy.
Bill convince.prs representatives that this idiot solved their problems
'Bill is convincing the representatives that the idiot has solved their problems.'
b.oK Bill ubeidaet .predstavitelej, oto etot dolbanyj pridurok resil ix problemy.
Bill convince.prs representatives that this damn idiot solved their problems
'Bill is convincing the representatives that the damn idiot has solved their problems.'
Let me now review further arguments that (73a) can involve syntactic binding of an epithet by a
quantifier. It is a familiar observation that quantifiers cannot bind into appositive relative
clauses. This observation gives rise to the sharp contrast between (75) and (73b). In (75), we are
dealing with an appositive relative clause, whereas (73b) involves a restrictive relative clause.
Czech
(75) ?* Kaidi' profesorka3 potkala na recepci toho genia Karla, kterdho
every professor met at reception that genius Karel who
pro3 vyhodila ze zkousky.
pro threw.out from exam
'At the reception, every professor3 bumped into the genius Karel who she3 had failed.'
What is more is that we find the same contrast between (76) and (73a). The parallel of (73a)
versus (76) and (73b) versus (75) confirms that (73a) involves a restrictive relative clause and
that (73a) involves syntactic binding of the epithet by the quantifier (rather than an e-type
relationship). Epithets behave on a par with pronouns with respect to their ability to have bound
variable readings when located in relative clauses.
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(76) ?* Kaidi profesorka 3 potkala
every professor met
ta krava3 vyhodila ze
that cow threw.out fr
na recepci toho genia Karla, ktereho
at reception the genius Karel who
zkousky.
om exam
'At the reception, every professor3 bumped into the genius Karel who the idiot3 had
failed.'
The same contrast between restrictive relative clauses and appositive relative clauses can be
observed for Dutch. First, consider example (77), which shows that pronouns can be bound in
restrictive relative clauses, (77a), but not in appositive relative clauses, (77b).
Dutch
Bij de receptie
at the reception
uitmuntende student
excellent student
is iedere professor 3 wel een
is(AUX) every professor AFF a
tegengekomen
met
die ze3
who she
(66n of andere)
one or other
had laten zakken.
had let fail
'At the reception, every professor3 bumped into some excellent student (or other)
who she3 had failed.'
b. * Bij de receptie
at the reception
is
is
iedere professor3 die
every professor that
geniale
genius
Jan tegengekomen die
Jan met who
ze3 had laten
she had let
zakken.
fail
'At the reception, every professor3 bumped into the genius John who she3 had failed.'
As shown in (78), the same contrast can be observed for epithets. An epithet can be syntactically
bound by a c-commanding quantifier if it is located in a restrictive relative clause, (78a), but not
in an appositive relative clause, (78b).
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Czech
(77) a. OK
Bij de receptie
at the reception
is
is
iedere professor3 wel een
every professor AFF a
(66n of andere)
one or other
tegengekomen die de idioot3 had
met who the idiot had
laten
let
zakken.
fail
'At the reception, every professor3 bumped into some excellent student (or other)
who the idiot 3 had failed.'
b. * Bij de receptie
at the reception
is
is
iedere professor3 die
every professor that
geniale
genius
Jan tegengekomen
Jan met
de idioot3 had
the idiot had
laten zakken.
let fail
'At the reception, every professor3 bumped into the genius John who the idiot3 had
failed.'
The same facts can be reproduced for French, as shown in (79) for bound pronouns and in (80)
for bound epithets.
French
la reception,
the reception
qu'elle
who'she
avait
had
chaque
every
recal6
failed
enseignante a crois6
teacher has crossed
un 6tudiant excellent
one student excellent
'At the reception,
she3 had failed.'
every professor3 bumped into some excellent student (or other) who
b. * A la reception,
at the reception
avait
had
chaque
every
enseignante a croise
teacher has crossed
ce genie de Jean, qu'elle
that genius of Jean who'she
recald
failed
'At the reception, every professor 3 bumped into the genius John who she3 had failed.'
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(78) a. 0'
Dutch
student
student
die
who
(79) a. 0' A
at
(80) a. 0K A la reception, chaque enseignante a crois6 un etudiant excellent
at the reception every teacher has crossed one student excellent who
l'idiote avait recald.
the'idiot had failed
'At the reception, every professor3 bumped into some excellent student (or other) who
the idiot 3 had failed.'
b. * A la reception, chaque enseignante a crois6 Jean le genie / ce genie
at the reception every teacher has crossed Jean the genius / that genius
de Jean que l'idiote avait recald
of Jean who the'idiot had failed
'At the reception, every professor3 bumped into the genius John who the idiot 3 had
failed.'
Another example where an epithet is bound inside a restrictive relative clause by a quantifier in
the matrix clause is given in (81) for German. Notably, in German the pronoun denjenigen
'those' can only be modified by a restrictive relative clause and not by an appositive relative
clause".
NPO-Politikeri schickt denjenigen, die
German
den Idioteni Offentlich unterstutzen,
every NPO-politician sends those who the idiot publicly support
eine Kornblume.
a corn.flower
'Every NPO politician sends a cornflower to those who publicly support the idiot.'
Having thus argued that epithets in restrictive relative clauses can be syntactically bound by a
quantifier located above the relative clause, it is worth asking whether epithets can also be bound
in complement clauses.
27 1 thank Patrick Grosz for pointing this out.
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French
que
(81) Jeder
Example (82) shows data from Dutch indicating that epithets can be bound in complement
clauses. This corroborates the generalisation from above, i.e. that epithets can co-vary with a
quantifier, and be bound under c-command. In the example in (82), die idioot (the idiot) seems
to be bound by iedere uitvoerderer (every performer)28 .
Dutch
(82) OK Iedere uitvoerderi overtuigde het paner ervan dat die idiooti slim is.
every performer1  convinced the panel of.it that the idioti smart is.
'Every performer convinced the panel that the idiot is smart'
Furthermore, in addition to epithets that are bound in restrictive relative clauses, we also find
epithets that are bound inside a complement to a noun phrase in Czech; in (83) and (84), the
variant with the epithet (83a) and (84a) is possible, even if it is slightly more marked than the
variant with the pronoun, in (83b) and (84b). What is remarkable about the examples in (83a)
and (84a) is that the epithet is bound by a negative quantifier, which further supports the view
that we are dealing with syntactic binding (rather than an e-type relationship).
Czech
(83) a. O zAdnf 6len strany3  se nesnaff zjistit vic o tech
no member party:gen refl not.tries find.out more about those
pomluvich, ze volidi toho idiota3 nenhvidi.
rumors that voters that idiot hate
'No party member, is investigating the rumors that the voters hate the idiot1 .'
28 Examples like (82) where an epithet can be bound inside a complement clause by a quantifier in the matrix clause
are difficult to construe; the null hypothesis is that all languages in which epithets can ever be bound do allow for
such constructions in their grammar. However, there are many factors that contribute to acceptability, such as the
question of how well a context can be construed, in which it is presupposed, as in (82), that a speaker thinks that all
performers are idiots. it is not clear why speakers of Dutch more readily accept constructions like (82), whereas
speakers of English do not. In other words, the question that arises here is: What are the properties that are absent in
the English translation of (82), but present in Dutch? In order to answer this question, further empirical probing is
essential; since this is orthogonal to the questions this dissertation addresses, I will not discuss this issue further, and
leave it open for future research.
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b. 0 fidnf elen strany3  se nesnazi zjistit vic o tech
no member party:gen refl not.tries find.out more about those
pomluvich, ie ho3 voli'i nenividi.
rumors that him voters hate
'No party memberi is investigating the rumors that the voters hate himi.'
Czech
(84) a. OK fadnf clen strany3 se nesnati zjistit vic o pomluvich,
no member party:gen refl not.tries find.out more about rumors
ie volioi toho idiota3 nenavidi.
that voters that idiot hate
'No party member is investigating rumors that the voters hate the idioti.'
b. K iidnf elen strany 3  se nesnazi zjistit vic o pomluvich,
no member party:gen refl not.tries find.out more about rumors
ie ho 3 volidi nenividi.
that him voters hate
'No party memberi is investigating rumors that the voters hate him1 .'
So far, we have seen that epithets can be bound by a universal quantifier such as every professor,
in (68)-(82), and we have seen that epithets can be bound by a negative quantifier such as no
party member, in (83)-(84). Further research is needed in order to shed light on whether other
quantifiers can bind epithets. One possible confound consists of the fact that many other
quantifiers are plural, e.g. some/most/few professors.
Finally, we find that epithets can be bound by an antecedent in the same clause, as
illustrated by the Dutch example in (85). Under the present analysis, the possibility of the data in
(85) can be explained as follows: In general, an analysis that treats epithets as pronouns predicts
that such local cases should be grammatical in a language in which pronouns in possessor
position are not subject to Principle B of the Binding Theory. Therefore, we expect such
examples to be acceptable in languages like Dutch, English and German, but not in languages
like Czech or Russian, which have possessive reflexives.
55
(85) a. ?0K [Ieder
every
'Every
lid van de PVV]I beledigde [de verrekte idiooti zijn
member of the PVV insulted the damned idiot his
member of the PVV1 insulted the damn traitor's1 mother.'
Dutch
moeder]
mother
b. ?0K [Leder
every
'Every
c. ?OK ledere
every
'Every
lid van de PVV]; nodigde [de eikeli z'n
member of the PVV invited the jerk his
member of the PVV invited the jerk's mother.'
uitvoerder beledigde [die idioot z'n moeder].
performer insulted the idiot his mother
performeri insulted this idiot's mother.'
A question that arises here is the following. Whilst Dutch allows for the examples in (85), the
translations into English or German seem less acceptable at first sight. However, this fact seems
to involve other confounding factors that are difficult to capture; for instance in English, native
speakers report contrasts such as (86a) versus (86b), indicating that own in (86b) fulfills a role in
making the epithet more acceptable. The epithet in (86b) would then pattern alike with the
pronoun in (86c). As these judgments are subtle, I will not spend much time discussing such
local cases and focus on the less local cases, where judgments are much clearer and cross-
linguistically consistent.
(86) a. ?* Every boyi insulted the bastard'si mother.
b. ?OK Every boy1 insulted the bastard'si own mother.
c. OK Every boy1 insulted hisi (own) mother.
To briefly summarise, the data in this section strongly favour the claim first proposed by
Jackendoff (1969, 1972), that epithets are pronominal in nature. More recent evidence from the
literature (Aoun & Choueiri 2000 and Beller 2011, discussed in section 2.2.1) seem to reinstate
Jackendoff's claim. My own findings (in section 2.2.2) show that pronouns can be bound by a
quantifier under c-command and co-vary with it; in contrast to R-expressions, which cannot.
The cross-linguistic data from Russian, Slovenian and Dutch show that epithets pattern like
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moeder]
mother
uit
PRT
pronouns, in the sense that they can be bound by a quantifier under c-command. Based on the
argumentation from the literature and my own empirical findings, I conclude that epithets, at
least for the purposes of syntax, behave like pronouns.
2.3 Epithets as Nominal Appositives with a Null Head
2.3.1 The Proposal
In this section I will outline a series of arguments which favour epithets as nominal appositives
with a null head. The structure that I propose is illustrated by the example in (87) below.
(87) [pro [the idiot]]
which corresponds to [he, [the idiot]]
To elaborate on the structure given in (87), an epithet such as the idiot, given in (88a), would
have the same structure as he, the idiot, in (88b), and John, the idiot, in (88c). The difference
between (88b-c) and (88a) is that the NP that is modified by the idiot in (88a) is null, whereas in
(88b) the NP consists of an overt pronoun, he, and in (88c) the NP consists of a proper name,
John (Note that the fact that the epithet is necessarily unstressed may be related to the fact that
the evaluativity is backgrounded, (cf. Beller (2011), and see also Chapter 3).
(88) a. Do you know John? The idiot came to my party.
b. Do you know John? He, the idiot, came to my party.
c. John, the idiot, came to my party.
The idea of treating epithets as appositives is not a new one, and was first proposed by Postal
(1972)29. Postal argues that examples such as (89b) and (90b) have the underlying structure in
29 Postal (1972) in a snippet, suggests on the basis of the data in (79) and (80), perhaps epithets are underlyingly
appositive constructions. He does not explicitly discuss the appositive structure.
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(89a) and (90a). In other words, both epithets in subject position, (89b), and epithets in object
position, (90b), consist of a pronoun that is modified by an appositive.
(89) a. OK [I wanted Harry; to help me but hei, whoi is a bastard, wouldn't do it].
b. OK I wanted Harry; to help me but the bastardi wouldn't do it.
(Postal 1972:247)
(90) a. OK [I have never met Melvini but Joan says she has met himi, whoi is a bastard].
b. OK I have never met Melvini but Joan says she has met the bastardi.
(Postal 1972:247)
Since Postal (1973), others have followed in the same vein (cf. Umbach (2002)0, Potts (2003,
2005, 2007) and Beller (201 1))31; however the internal structure of the 'appositive epithet'
remains controversial. In this section, I will first discuss arguments in favour of treating epithets
as appositive constructions headed by a null pro32 ; then in chapter 3, I discuss the semantics of
epithets, which is followed by chapter 4, which discusses how the syntax of epithets interfaces
with their semantics.
An example of a nominal appositive is given in (81). Nominal appositives consist of an
anchor (in this case the anchor is Poppy) which is the head of the appositive, and the apposition,
the linguist and political scientist. These two things combined form a nominal appositive
construction.
(91) Poppy, the linguist and political scientist, defended her dissertation in 2012.
30 In a similar vein to Postal (1973), Umbach does not go into details about the structure of the appositive, but on the
basis of data she suggests that epithets are appositive.
31 Beller (2011) inherits the claim that epithets are appositive constructions from Potts (2005).
32 I analyze epithets as having the structure pro, the idiot (where pro is the null anchor and the idiot the appositive),
contra Potts (2005), (2007) who argues, following Huddleston and Pullum (2002) that epithets have the structure
that idiot x/John, where the anchor x/John is a name that can be replaced by a free variable.
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While there are authors (cf. Heringa (2011, 2012)), who assume that appositives must have an
overt anchor, den Dikken (2001), Kayne (2010) and Taylor (2009) have argued that there are
nominal appositives which have a null anchor. Illustrations from Kayne (2005), based on den
Dikken (2001), are given in (92). The basic idea is that so called pluringulars or committee
nouns that can trigger plural agreement (given in (92a)), actually involve a singular nominal
appositive (the committee) with a plural null anchor (the null pronoun THEY in (92b)). Kayne
observes that such committee nouns can combine with a floating quantifier all, which a singular
antecedent cannot, (92c).
(92) a. OK The committee have all voted yes.
b. THEY the committee have all voted yes.
(where they is the true antecedent of all in (92a)).
c. * It have all voted yes.
Kayne (2010:133, footnote 5)
In the section that follows, I will apply Den Dikken's (2001) and Kayne's (2010) diagnostics to
epithets and argue that epithets are indeed appositive constructions headed by a null pronoun. I
will also provide additional argumentation of my own which also supports the main claim I wish
to make in this section: epithets are nominal appositives with a null anchor.
2.3.2 Arguments for Treating Epithets as Nominal Appositives with a Null Anchor
Den Dikken observed that in British English, certain collective noun phrases headed by a
singular noun, trigger plural agreement. He refers to this construction as a pluringular; an
illustration from Den Dikken is given in (93b). Example (93b) contrasts with (93a), which is
more common in American English.
(93) a. OK The committee has decided.
b. OK The committee have decided. pluringular
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Den Dikken treats the pluringular as an appositive construction headed by a null DP. He
provides several diagnostics, two of which I will discuss here. The first diagnostic concerns the
various readings that arise depending on whether the committee is the subject of the sentence, or
the predicate. Den Dikken's basic idea is that if we place appositives with null anchors into a
copula construction, they can only serve as subject and not as predicate33 . To illustrate the
subject/predicate difference, consider the examples in (94). In (94a), a picture of the wall is the
subject, whereas the cause of the riot is the predicate.
(94) a. O' A picture of the wall (= subject) was the cause of the riot (= predicate)
b. 01 The cause of the riot (= predicate) was a picture of the wall (= subject)
(Moro 1997:35)
Den Dikken (2001) argues that nominals modified by appositives can only occur as the subject
and not as the predicate. To see how this argument works, consider the example in (95). The
example in (95a) has two possible readings, in (95b-c). The first reading arises as a result of the
best committee being the subject, whereas the second reading arises as a result of the best
committee being the predicate. When the best committee is in subject position, we derive a
reading along the lines of they own the best committee. When the best committee is in predicate
position, the reading that arises is one where their particular committee is the best one. Note that
den Dikken is not concerned with an equative reading (e.g. the best committee is identical to
their committee), which may be possible for independent reasons. He focuses on the reading, in
which belonging to them is predicated of the best committee (in (95b)), and on the reading, in
which surpassing other committees (i.e. being the best) is predicated of their committee (in
(95c)).
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Cf. Moro (1997).
(95) a. The best committee is theirs.
b. reading 1 = they have the best committee / the best committee belongs to them
=> The best committee (= subject) is theirs (= predicate).
c. reading 2 = their committee is the best one
= The best committee (= predicate) is theirs (= subject).
(simplified, based on Den Dikken 2001:30)
In (96a), we have the pluringular example. Parallel to (95a), we may expect two possible
readings; however unlike (95a), where both readings are possible, den Dikken reports that one of
those readings is unacceptable in the pluringular case. When the best committee acts as the
subject of the clause, (96b), we derive exactly the same reading as in (95b), and it is acceptable.
When the best committee is in predicate position in the pluringular, (96c), the expected reading
(the same as (95c)) is unacceptable. Given that the second reading is not possible, den Dikken
argues that the pluringular is an appositive headed with a null pro, for the best committee cannot
serve as the predicate of the copula construction, in the same way in which a pronoun cannot be
a predicate.
(96) a. The best committee are theirs.
b. reading ] = they have the best committee / the best committee belongs to them
=> The best committee (= subject) are theirs (= predicate).
c. # reading 2 = their committee is the best one
=> * The best committee (= predicate) are theirs (= subject).
(simplified, based on den Dikken 2001:30)
This diagnostic can be applied to epithets, and the results indicate that epithets indeed have the
same structure as a pluringular, namely a nominal appositive with a null pronominal head. First,
we need to find a way of testing for the two readings. To do so, consider the baseline examples
in (97) and (98). These examples show which questions we may use to elicit the relevant
readings; we can thus use similar questions in the examples containing epithets in order to apply
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the den Dikken diagnostic. In order to elicit the subject-predicate reading, as in (94a), the
question in (97a) is introduced. The response given in (97b) illustrates the best committee in
subject position, which means that they (a salient group or individuals) own the best committee,
or that the best committee belongs to them.
(97) To elicit subject-predicate readings
a. Whose committee is the best committee?
b. [pointing gesture] The best committee (subject) is theirs (predicate).
In order to derive the predicate-subject reading, as in (94b), we again introduce an interrogative,
(98a). The response, given in (98b) shows that in the elicited response, the best committee is in
predicate position, and derives a meaning along the lines of their committee is the best
committee.
(98) To elicit predicate-subject readings
a. Which committee is their committee?
b. The best committee (predicate) is theirs (subject).
Now consider the epithet case. The examples in (99) and (100) parallel den Dikken's examples,
the only difference being, that I have added context and an interrogative to trigger the relevant
responses and readings. The example in (99) shows that the epithet the idiot in subject position
in a copular construction is acceptable, however, it is unacceptable in the predicate position of a
copula, as is illustrated by the data in (100). The results seem to mirror den Dikken's, who
argues that if the epithet is a nominal appositive headed by a null pro, it should not be able to
appear in the predicate position of a copula construction: This is exactly what we find.
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(99) Context: Over there, there's a man called David. Everyone hates David. David's the head
of the British Nationalist Party (BNP).
Eliciting subject-predicate reading:
a. I just met a guy called David. What does he/the idiot do for a living?
b. OK The idiot (subject) is the head of the BNP (predicate).
(100) Context: I just met a guy called David. He is such a jerk.
Eliciting predicate-subject reading34' 35:
a. Now tell me: Which of the guests at this convention is the head of the BFP?
b. # The idiot is the head of the BFP.
The second argument that can be made for treating epithets as appositives with a null pronominal
head stems from plural marking in such constructions. Den Dikken observes that it is possible to
have plural agreement outside the committee nouns (e.g. between the finite verb and the
committee noun), however the agreement on the determiner inside the noun phrase must be
singular. An example from den Dikken in given in (101). He notes that in (101b), we have
plural verb agreement, but it is impossible to have a plural demonstrative inside the committee
NP; thus Den Dikken concludes that it is not possible for plural to occur within the maximal
projection of an overt pluringular; he takes this to motivate the structure where this committee is
a nominal appositive on a plural null pronoun equivalent to they36
3 As a control, we can show that it is possible to use the idiot anaphorically. The example in (i) below is an
acceptable response to (100a), if the hearer chooses to ignore the question in (100a), and rather addresses the
previous linguistic context, given in the context line.
i. OK The idiot was just weird? He's a disaster.
3 The relevant reading in which (100b) is judged unacceptable is one where the idiot is used to refer back to David,
and unstressed.
36 Note that alternative analyses are conceivable, where the plurality of this committee in (101a) is introduced in a
higher functional projection of the noun phrase. However, what is crucial for the present purposes is that the analysis
of such nouns as appositives with a null anchor directly predicts such mismatches without further stipulations, i.e.
we do not need to stipulate that one noun phrase is singular in a lower extended projection whereas it is plural in a
higher extended projection.
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(101) a. O' This committee has/have decided.
b. * These committee have decided.
(den Dikken 2001:30)
In den Dikken's analysis, the pluringular variant of (101a) is equivalent to example (102a),
which is also a well-formed example. The unacceptability of (101b) follows from the
unacceptability of (1 02b)".
(102) a. 0' They, this committee, have decided.
b. * They, these committee, have decided.
We reach exactly the same conclusion with epithets, as is illustrated by the example below in the
German example (103). Here, the epithet Drecksau 'filth pig' being feminine is intended to refer
to a male person (e.g. Fritz); while it can trigger masculine pronoun agreement on seine 'his', the
determiner inside the noun phrase must be feminine, i.e. die 'the.fem' rather than der 'the.masc'.
German
(103) Die/*Der Drecksau hat seine Schmutzwaesche bei mir liegengelassen.
The.fem/*masc filth.pig.fem has his.masc dirty.laundry with me left
'The filth pig has left his dirty laundry lying around here.'
We also find similar effects in English for reflexives. This is illustrated by the example in
(104)38. In other words, when the anchor mismatches the nominal appositive, we expect to see
3 Another example is given in (i), which is equivalent to (ii) under this analysis.
i. OK The committee weren't particularly friendly.
ii. OK They, the committee, weren't particularly friendly.
The same holds for (iii), which would have the structure in (iv).
iii. OKJohn introduced me to the committee.
iv. OK John introduced me to them, the committee.
It is worth pointing out that for reasons that we currently do not understand, appositive modifiers on an overt object
pronoun are sometimes more marked than modifiers on an overt subject pronoun; this was observed by Postal
(1972).
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the anchor's features in agreement outside the DP, but the nominal appositive's features inside
the DP.
(104) I just met John. The bitch is so full of OKhimself / *herself.
It is easy to show that this is not an isolated fact. For German, many examples like (103) can be
constructed, which exhibit the same pattern. Some examples are given in (105)-(107), which
show that a pronoun with the most recent antecedent das Arschloch 'the asshole' must exhibit
the natural gender of its antecedent, rather than the grammatical gender (which would be neuter).
Note that under standard assumptions (going back to Reinhart 1983a), we can assume that in
each of the cases in (105)-(107) the relevant pronoun is bound by das Arschloch 'the asshole',
due to a preference for binding over coreference when the resulting readings are identical, so it is
unlikely that the pronoun gets its gender directly from Anna39 . Under my analysis, das
Arschloch 'the asshole' has the structure of a nominal appositive with null anchor, i.e. she, the
asshole. Therefore, a pronoun will get its gender features from she and not from the asshole.
German
(105) Gestern habe ich Annai gesehen.
yesterday have I Anna seen
'Yesterday I saw Anna.'
Das Arschloch hat gerade ?OK ihrei / ?*seinei Seminararbeit eingereicht.
the asshole.neut has just her its term.paper handed.in
'The asshole1 just handed in her term paper.'
38 Of course, because in English, adjectives and determiners do not agree for gender, we do not see feminine gender
marking inside the DP. Therefore the German examples are more telling.
39 The judgments do not seem to change when we have an elliptical structure, where a sloppy reading is intended, as
given in (i). Such readings are generally assumed to require binding, which follows from the parallelism
requirement on ellipsis, cf. Sag (1976).
i. 'Yesterday I saw Anna'
Das Arschlochi hat schon ?OKihrei /?*seine1 Seminararbeit eingereicht, und der Otto auch.
the asshole.neut has already her its term.paper handed.in and the Otto too
'The asshole1 just handed in heri term paper, and Otto (did) too.'
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German
(106) Gestern habe ich Anna1
yesterday have I Anna
'Yesterday I saw Anna.'
Das
the
'The
gesehen.
seen
Arschlochi glaubt, ?OK sie1 / ??esi ist intelligenter
asshole.neut believes she it is more.intelligent
asshole, believes she1 is more intelligent than me.'
als ich.
than I
German
(107) Gestern habe ich Anna1  gesehen.
yesterday have I Anna seen
'Yesterday I saw Anna.'
Arschlochi hat Peter davon Uberzeugt, dass ?OK sie / ??
asshole.neut has Peter there.of convinced that she
asshole1 convinced Peter that she1 is talented.'
esi talentiert
it talented
We find analogous facts with a feminine epithet (Drecksau 'filth pig') that refers to a male
referent. Once again, a pronoun that is bound by the epithet exhibits agreement in natural gender
and not in grammatical gender, supporting a view where the epithet has the structure of a
nominal appositive with a null anchor: he, the filth pig.
German
(108) Gerade habe ich Ottoi
just have I Otto
'I just met Otto.'
getroffen.
met
Drecksau hat gerade
filth.pig.fem has just
filth pig1 just handed in hisi
?OK seine, /
his
term paper.'
??ihrei Seminararbeit
her seminar.work
eingereicht.
handed.in
(109) Gerade habe
just have
'I just met Otto.
Das
the
'The
ist.
is
Die
the
'The
ich Otto1
I Otto
getroffen.
met
German
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Die Drecksaui glaubt, ?OK eri / ?? sie, ist intelligenter als ich.
the filth.pig believes he she is more.intelligent than me
'The filth pig, believes he, is more intelligent than me.'
The third piece of evidence which supports the view that epithets are nominal appositives can be
found in languages with gender agreement on participles. In these languages where epithets are
concerned, we see that the agreement tends to be for natural gender. The example in (110) from
Slovenian illustrates that the participle agrees for natural gender, but not for morphological
gender40.
Slovenian
(110) Ali se spomnis Ivana?
Do refl remember Ivan?
'Do you remember Ivan?'
Tista neumna svinja je OKodpotoval/??odpotovala v Indijo v nedeljo.
that(f.sg) stupid(f.sg.) pig(f.sg) is travelled(OKm.sg/??f.sg) to India on Sunday.
'The stupid pig (= Ivan) traveled to India on Sunday'
Finally, the fourth diagnostic is from Kayne (201 0)41, and is concerned with structural relations,
in the sense that certain phenomena require an associate (e.g. there-constructions, cf. den Dikken
2001). One such example consists of floating quantifiers, which typically associate with a noun
phrase; the relevance of floating quantifiers is observed by Kayne (2010). The examples in (111)
illustrate that in non-appositive constructions, the quantifier can float or be a part of the DP.
Kayne (2010) argues that in appositive constructions however, although quantifier float is
possible, the quantifier cannot be a part of the DP; this is illustrated by the examples in (1 l2a)
versus (1 12b). Kayne argues that (1 12a) has the structure in (1 12c), where THEY is a null plural
pronoun; the reason for the ungrammaticality of (112b) then consists of the fact that floating
quantifiers can be licensed by a pronoun (as in (112c)) but cannot directly combine with a
40 For Croatian/Serbian, these intuitions could not be reproduced; there, agreement has to be feminine across the
board, suggesting that agreement may work differently in these languages.
41 I would like to point out that Kayne (2010) arrives at the argumentation for committee nouns as appositives with
null anchors independently from Den Dikken.
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pronoun, as shown in (1 12d).
(111) a. The politicians have all voted yes. / All the politicians have voted yes.
b. The politicians have both voted yes. / Both the politicians have voted yes.
(112) a. 0- The committee have all voted yes.
b. * All the committee have voted yes.
c. O' THEY the committee have all voted yes.
d. * All they, the committee, have voted yes.
(based on Kayne 2010:133, footnote 3)
If epithets were regular DPs, we would expect them to pattern like the examples in (111), where
the quantifier can either float or be a part of the DP; alternatively, if epithets consist of nominal
appositives with null anchors, we would expect to find a pattern as in (1 12a) and (1 12b). I will
test examples with the floating quantifier all and examples with the floating quantifier both. In
order to apply Kayne's diagnostic, we need to change our epithet. Throughout this dissertation I
have largely been using the idiot and the damn traitor; this was largely due to the fact that they
exist in a large number of languages that this dissertation investigates, and informants find it
easier to use the idiot or traitor as opposed to the fool, the terrorist42 . However, if we were to
use the idiot for this diagnostic, it is hard to determine whether the epithet patterns like a regular
DP or an appositive, for in the case of idiot, both/all is not possible at all, and in the case of idiots
(e.g. both/all idiots, both/all the idiots) both/all could simply be a part of the appositive.
Thus, for this example I use scum (which is grammatically singular, but can refer to more
than one individual), for then both/all cannot be a part of the appositive because both/all the
scum is ungrammatical due to a number mismatch (both/all require a plural complement). The
data in (113) and (114) illustrate that quantifier float is possible with epithets, (1 13b)/(1 14b) and
identical to Kayne's examples, it appears that the quantifier cannot be a part of the DP,
42 Of course, this depends largely on the properties of the individual languages.
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(1 13c)/(1 14c). The data can be easily explained if one assumes an analysis of epithets that I am
postulating; namely that in (113)/(114), there is a null pronoun heading the nominal appositive.
In examples (1 13c)/(1 14c), the epithet cannot combine with the quantifier for the following
reasons. If we attempt to insert the quantifier into the nominal appositive, this is not possible due
to an agreement mismatch between all/both and the scum, as shown in (1 13d)/(1 14d). If on the
other hand, we attempt to attach the quantifier outside of the nominal appositive, we run into the
problem that quantifiers cannot modify pronouns directly, as shown in (1 13e)/(114e); however
pronouns can license floating quantifiers, as given in (113f)/( 114f)13 .
(113) a. John, Bill and Jack were here. OK The scum have voted yes.
b. John, Bill and Jack were here. OK The scum have all voted yes.
c. John, Bill and Jack were here. * All the scum have voted yes.
Explanation:
d. John, Bill and Jack were here. * They, all the scum, have voted yes.(= (113c), opt. 1)
e. John, Bill and Jack were here. * All they, the scum, have voted yes. ( (113c), opt. 2)
f. John, Bill and Jack were here. OK They, the scum, have all voted yes. ( 113b))
(114) a. John and Jack were here. OK The scum have voted yes.
b. John and Jack were here. OK The scum have both voted yes.
c. John and Jack were here. * Both the scum have voted yes.
4 An indication that the scum does not license floating quantifiers in a non-epithet (i.e. non-evaluative) reading can
be argued for by the following data. As we see from the contrast between (i) and (ii)-(iv), scum seems to be singular
and does not license floating quantifiers by itself. Thanks to Philippe Schlenker (p.c.) for pointing this out to me.
i. OK The green scum has been removed from the pond.
ii. * The green scum has all been removed from the pond.
iii. * The green scum have been removed from the tub.
iv. * The green scum have all been removed from the tub.
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Explanation:
d. John and Jack were here. * They, both the scum, have voted yes. (= (114c), opt. 1)
e. John and Jack were here. * Both they, the scum, have voted yes. (= (114c), opt. 2)
f. John and Jack were here. O' They, the scum, have both voted yes. (= (114b))
An additional argument in favour of treating epithets as nominal appositives with a null anchor
comes from the fact that we only find epithets referring to arguments that are in the 3rd person;
this is illustrated by the examples in (115)-(116). We do not find epithets that refer to arguments
in the 1st or 2nd person, as illustrated in (117)-(118). This is compatible with a view where the
null anchor is a 3rd person pronoun.
(115) a. OK Mary lied to Johni, and [he, the idiot,]1 believed her.
b. OK Mary lied to Johni, and [the idiot]I believed her.
(= Mary lied to Johni, and [pro, the idiot,]1 believed her.)
(116)a. OK Mary lied to [John and Bill]1 , and [they, the idiots,]1 believed her.
b. OK Mary lied to [John and Bill]1 , and [the idiots]1 believed her.
(= Mary lied to [John and Bill]1, and [pro, the idiots,]I believed her.)
(117) a. OK Mary lied to mei, and [I, the idiot,]I believed her.
b. * Mary lied to me1 , and [the idiot]1 believed her.
* Mary lied to me1 , and [pro, the idiot,]1 believed her.)
(118) a. OK Mary lied to us1 , and [we, the idiots,]1 believed her.
b. * Mary lied to us,, and [the idiots]1 believed her.
(= * Mary lied to usi, and [pro, the idiots,]1 believed her.)
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To briefly conclude, the various diagnostics presented in this section show that epithets are
nominal appositives with a null anchor. The questions that comes to mind at this point is: Do
(nominal) appositives and their anchors form constituents or not? Potts argues that Nominal
appositives attach at the surface level inside of the DP, (1 19a). However, McCawley (1981), Del
Gobbo (2003), and most recently Schlenker (2010, to appear) argue that the appositive the idiot
attaches at a propositional level. Before I present my proposal, I would first like to outline the
semantics, as it will have consequences for the syntactic structure of nominal appositives. In
chapter 4, I return to this question and show how the proposed semantic analysis bears on the
question of constituency with respect to the appositive and its null anchor.
(119)a. Potts TP b. McCawley TP
DP TP
is VP
DP CP DP
A coming A is VP
John (who is) my John CP
neighbor coming
(who is) my
neighbor
At this point, it is worth re-evaluating den Dikken's analysis critically. Up to this point, the main
alternative analysis is that of Sauerland & Elbourne (2002). Sauerland & Elboume consider
similar facts to den Dikken's (2001), but argue for a feature-based analysis instead. The idea is
that pluringulars have two types of features that can take a singular value or a plural value:
Number (which encodes whether the DP denotes one or more referents) and Mereology (which
encodes whether the DP only contains one member or several). In example (120), set is argued
to have the feature values [Number: singular] (as we are dealing with one entity) and
[Mereology: plural] (as this entity has several members, e.g. the numbers 3, 9, 13 and 21).
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(120) a. O1 This set are all odd.
b. * These set are all odd.
(Sauerland & Elbourne 2002:290)
Sauerland & Elbourne assume that concord inside the noun phrase can only refer to the Number
feature, whereas verbal agreement can either refer to the Number feature or to the Mereology
feature. Verbal agreement involves agreement between T and the subject for phi-features such
as Number and Mereology. To derive differences such as (121b) versus (121d), which den
Dikken also observes, Sauerland & Elbourne argue that agreement for Mereology cannot be
established at a distance (which they analyse as covert feature movement), whereas agreement
for Number can.
(121) a. OK A committee was holding a meeting in here.
b. OK There was a committee holding a meeting in here.
C. OK A committee were holding a meeting in here.
d. * There were a committee holding a meeting in here.
(Sauerland & Elbourne 2002:292)
Overall, the two analyses of committee nouns, Sauerland & Elbourne (2002) and den Dikken
(2001) cover a similar empirical domain. However, at this point it is not clear how Sauerland &
Elbourne's analysis would account for the missing reading in (96b), which they do not address,
or, for the ungrammaticality of (112b), both of which follow from den Dikken's (2001) analysis.
Conversely, Sauerland & Elbourne argue that examples like (122a) argue against den Dikken, as
it is not clear what kind of pronoun could be the anchor for the appositive in (1 22a), as would be
required by the analysis in (122b).
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(122) a. OK Any committee worth their salt are going to have looked into that.
(Sauerland & Elbourne 2002:296)
b. Den Dikken-style analysis for (122a):
THEY, any committee worth their salt, are going to have looked into that.
However, it is not clear that examples like (122) really refute den Dikken (2001), as minimally
different examples given in (123a-b) seem (at least marginally) possible in British English,
which raises the question of how plural pronouns of this type are constrained to begin with. The
reader should be made aware of the fact that in example (123), (123b) involves a pronoun with
an appositive, whereas (123a) seems to involve some kind of left dislocation.
(123) a.?OK I think that any committee worth their salt, they're going to have looked into that.
b. OK I think that they, any committee worth their salt, are going to have looked into that.
Given that there are challenges for both types of analyses, we can conclude that the jury is still
out on which is correct. For now, it can be said that den Dikken (2001) is an analysis that makes
conclusive predictions on the behaviour of epithets, if epithets are analysed as appositives with a
null anchor; by contrast, Sauerland & Elbourne's (2002) analysis cannot be readily extended to
cover the behaviour of epithets.
2.4 Conclusion
The focus of this section has been the syntactic structure of epithets. Developing an idea that
goes back to Postal (1972), I conclude that epithets are null pronouns that are modified by a
nominal appositive. In other words, the sentence in (124b) has the structure in (124a).
(124) a. OK Mary lied to John,, and [he, the idiot,]1 believed her.
b. OK Mary lied to Johni, and [the idiot]1 believed her.
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This analysis is based on the observation that epithets, like pronouns can be syntactically bound
by a quantifier (chapter 2.2), and epithets exhibit several properties that we would expect from a
construction in which a nominal appositive modifies a null pronoun (chapter 2.3).
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Chapter 3: The Role of the Attitude Predicate
3.1 The Overview of the Proposal
In this section I propose that epithets can be analysed by assuming a two-dimensional semantics
(involving a truth-conditional dimension and a non-truth-conditional dimension) (cf. Schlenker
(2007), Sauerland (2007b)), and furthermore, by assuming that the at issue meaning (i.e. its
truth-conditional meaning contribution) and the evaluativity component of the epithet can be
analysed as follows. If we utter (125a), the analysis proposed in chapter 2 entails that the syntax
is the one in (125b); i.e. the idiot is actually a nominal appositive with a null anchor pro, and it is
this pro that is referential. How does (125b) get interpreted? We can follow Schlenker (2010, to
appear) in assuming that the appositive takes scope over the entire clause containing its anchor
and is semantically interpreted conjunctively (i.e. the clause containing the anchor is conjoined
with a clause in which the epithet's meaning is predicated of an e-type pronoun coindexed with
the anchor); this is sketched in (125c). Although it is vacuous to assume that Fritz is the most
salient individual, this will become relevant later (as we shall see); the idea then is that the
assertion is as given in (125d). The idea that epithets are presuppositional is motivated by the
fact that they do not contribute evaluativity to the at-issue content (cf. Potts (2005), (2007) and
Schlenker (2005), (2007)). I provide diagnostics below to further instantiate this claim. For
now, I give the presupposition in (125e). We will see the details below.
(125)a. Do you know Fritzi? John just met the idiot.
b. syntactic analysis: John just met proi(,) the idiot.
c. interpretation of appositive: John just metproi(,) and hei is the (most salient) idiot.
d. assertion: John just met Fritzi(,) and he is the (most salient) person.
e. presupposition: The speaker/John/a salient person believes that Fritz, is stupid.
This analysis is motivated by the empirical scope (which will be discussed in the next section);
the remainder of this chapter is concerned with the interaction between the role of the verb and
the epithet.
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3.2 The Problem
In the previous section, I argued that epithets pattern like pronouns. I presented a number of
arguments for this claim. In addition to this claim, I presented a series of diagnostics that
suggest that epithets are nominal appositives with a null (pronominal) anchor. These two claims
predict that epithets and pronouns should pattern alike in all environments; in other words, they
should have the same distribution. This is true for local contexts, where pronouns and epithets
are unacceptable (presumably due to Condition B); this is illustrated by the English examples in
(126). The same prediction also applies to restrictive relative clauses; the examples in (127)
show yet again, that pronouns and epithets pattern alike. The examples in (1 26a-b) and (1 27a-b)
illustrate the direct contrast between an epithet and a pronoun. Given that epithets are nominal
appositives, I include the minimal contrast in (126a) vs (126c), and (127a) vs (127c). What is
crucial is that (126a-c) pattern alike, and (127a-c) do so as well. Finally, (127d), the example
containing the R-expression, is unacceptable, whereas all of the other examples in (127a-c) are
acceptable. This is the prediction from treating epithets as pronominal in nature (as opposed to
treating epithets as R-expressions) 44.
(126) a.* Johni likes the idioti. Epithet
b.* John1 likes him 1. Pronoun
c.* Johni likes him, the idioti. Pronoun + nominal appositive (NA)
44 A question that naturally arises at this point is whether epithets behave on a par with pronouns if they are in the
scope of a focus-sensitive operator, where Condition B and Condition C can generally be obviated, as in (i)-(ii).
i. OK Only Felix voted for Felix
ii. OK Despite the big fuss about Felix's candidacy, when we counted the votes we found out that in fact
only Felix himself voted for him.
(Reinhart 1983:169)
If we construct examples with the idiot and him, the idiot, that are parallel to Reinhart's example with a pronoun in
(ii), these seem to be equally acceptable, as shown in (iii) and (iv).
iii. OK Despite the big fuss about Felix's candidacy, when we counted the votes we found out that in fact
only Felix himself voted for the idiot.
iv. OK Despite the big fuss about Felix's candidacy, when we counted the votes we found out that in fact
only Felix himself voted for him, the idiot.
A possible confound is that null pronouns (which I assume form the anchor for the epithet in the pro, the idiot,
construction, cannot be stressed, and epithets cannot be in the scope of only, given that their meaning is contributed
at an appositive level.
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d.* Johni likes the teacher,.
(127) a. Yesterday, Johni bumped into a fan who really likes the idioti. Epithet
b.OK Yesterday, Johni bumped into a fan who really likes him1. Pronoun
C. O Yesterday, John1 bumped into a fan who really likes him, the idiot. Pronoun + NA
d.* Yesterday, John bumped into a fan who really likes the teacher1 . R-expression
Note however, that we cannot expect epithets to always pattern exactly like overt pronouns that
are modified by a nominal appositive - even though I have argued that epithets are nominal
appositives with null anchors. The reason is that not all DPs can be nominal appositives that
modify a null pronoun. One generalisation seems to be that elements that are understood
evaluatively can be nominal appositives with null anchors, whereas, in general, non-evaluative
elements cannot, possibly with the exception of committee nouns (I will come back to this below;
the core assumption that I make is that there are different licensors of appositive constructions
with null anchors, and evaluativity is one of them, whilst a mismatch between grammatical
number and actual number may be another one). On the one hand, we see that (128a) must be
evaluative, whereas (128b) can be non-evaluative.
(128)a. pro(,) the idiot(,) has organised a rally. evaluative / epithet
b. He, the teacher, has organised a rally. non-evaluative / not an epithet
On the other hand, examples like (127d) improve if teacher is meant as a swear word, e.g.
representing a profession that the speaker looks down on; this evaluativity is necessary for
(127d) to improve. This is illustrated in (129); in (129a), teacher is intended to be evaluative
(e.g. meaning 'someone annoying or smart-alecky'; the demonstrative that enhances this
evaluative effect). Therefore, (129a) (where John appears to c-command the/that teacher)
improves significantly, which is not possible in (129b), where teacher is intended to simply
describes a profession. In light of the previous discussion, this means that (129a) can be
analysed as involving the/that teacher as a nominal appositive with a null anchor, whereas
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R-expression
(129b) cannot be analysed in this way. Whenever an appositive has a null anchor, it must
generally be understood evaluatively (with the obvious exception of den Dikken's 2001
committee nouns, which do not seem to be evaluative; this indicates that there are different
licensors for appositive constructions with null anchors - I come back to this later).
(129)a. ?OKYesterday, Johni bumped into a fan who really likes the/that teacher1 . evaluative
b. * Yesterday, Johni bumped into a fan who really likes the teacheri. non-evaluative
Structurally, the difference between (129a) and (129b) is given in (130). In the evaluative case,
teacher is used as a pejorative 'label', whereas in the non-evaluative case, teacher denotes an
occupation.
(130)a. ?OK Yesterday, Johni bumped into a fan who really likes [pro, the/that teacher]1. +eval
b. * Yesterday, Johni bumped into a fan who really likes [the teacher]i. -eval
We also observe a stress difference (see Beller 2011), as given in (131). If teacher is intended to
be an epithet, it cannot carry neutral stress, (13 1a), but if it is intended to describe an occupation,
it can carry sentential stress, as given in (13 1b).
(13 1)a. Yesterday, John bumped into a fan who really LIKES [pro, the/that teacher]. +eval
b. Yesterday, John bumped into a fan who really likes [the TEACHER]. -eval
The questions that arise at this point are the following: Why is it that epithets consist of a
nominal appositive with a null anchor? And why are such nominal appositives with a null
anchor generally (with the possible exception of committee nouns) only possible if they are
evaluative (i.e. if they are epithets)? The answer to these questions ultimately results from the
way pronouns are interpreted, and from the syntax-semantics interface of the appositive
construction.
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First, let me start by addressing the latter. When an epithet reading is intended, as in
(129a), the descriptive meaning of the DP contained in the epithet (e.g. the teacher interpreted as
a profession) cannot be a part of the truth conditions of the clause. The reason for this is that the
epithet only conveys (backgrounded) evaluation, and its descriptive content (e.g. teacher, idiot,
scum,fascist) merely adds a 'flavour' to this evaluation (cf. I dislike him because he 's afascist).
The non-truth-conditionality of the epithet is achieved by the proposed structure in (130a),
because when the epithet is treated as a nominal appositive, it is shifted to a non-truth-
conditional level (Cf. Potts' (2005, 2007) conventional implicature domain, or alternatively,
Schlenker's 2007 level of expressive presuppositions). Therefore, the epithet does not contribute
at-issue meaning, and its evaluative reading is contributed as backgrounded information.
Now I'd like to turn to the first part of the answer, namely the way pronouns are
interpreted. This addresses the question of why epithets have null anchors, and why null anchors
are licensed by evaluative appositives. Recall that in the case of the evaluative reading of the
teacher, (131 a), the DP is de-accented, whereas in the non-evaluative reading, the nominal part
of the DP the teacher is stressed, (131b). In the evaluative case, an overt pronominal anchor is
not needed, as the stress indicates that the DP the teacher isn't part of the truth-conditional
meaning (which is why it does not participate in the computation of information structure at the
clausal level). If we assume that English does allow for such null pronominals in limited
contexts, the general consideration comes into play that using a null pronominal anchor is
preferred over an overt pronominal anchor; this idea is based on Cardinaletti & Starke (1999),
who argue that a null pro is always preferred when there is a choice between a null pro and an
overt pronoun, which they attribute to general economy principles. In other words, the
possibility of null pronominal anchors is a consequence of the need to remove the epithet from
the truth-conditional level plus the fact that pro, the idiot and he, the idiot would have identical
meanings. Contrastively, in non-evaluative constructions, null pronominal anchors are typically
not licensed, because either (i) there is no need for using the more complex [pro, the teacher]
construction in an example like (129b), as it would have the same meaning as simply the teacher,
or (ii) the anchor plays a role for which it must be overt (as in Mozart, the composer, where
Mozart introduces a referent).
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It thus follows that nominal appositives with a null anchor tend to be evaluative, and
epithets are an example of this. However, Den Dikken (2001) argues that committee nouns are
also nominal appositives with null anchors; the problem here consists of the observation that
epithets have to be evaluative, whereas committee nouns do not have to be evaluative. It is an
open question whether nominal appositives with null anchors form a uniform class. It could
simply be that the reason evaluativity licenses (and requires) an appositive construction with a
null anchor is distinct from the reason why committee nouns can have such a structure. In any
case, the Condition C obviation effects that we find with epithets are a direct prediction of
treating them as (null) pronouns that are modified by a nominal appositive; future research is
needed to determine whether we find Condition C effects with committee nouns as well.
In brief, coming back to the comparison of epithets and pronouns, we can state the
following. Nominal appositives with a null anchor must be interpreted evaluatively. This does
not seem to be the case for nominal appositives with an overt anchor (e.g. John, the teacher or
he, the teacher). For this reason, we may expect epithets to sometimes behave differently from
overt pronouns that combine with nominal appositives. The latter should always pattern with
pronouns, but epithets may have a more special status; this is indeed what we find. Consider the
examples in (132). The data show that when epithets are in complement clauses, they sometimes
do not pattern like pronouns, but like R-expressions, i.e. (132a) patterns like (132d) and not like
(132c). This is the core problem that I address in the remainder of this dissertation.
(132) a. * Johni thinks that the idioti is smart. Epithet
b. OK Johni thinks that he, is smart. Pronoun
c. OK Johni thinks that he, the idiot,1 is smart. Pronoun + Nominal Appositive
d. * John thinks that the teacheri is smart. R-expression
The data in (132) immediately give rise to the question: If epithets are pronouns, why are they
unacceptable in cases where pronouns are acceptable? This question will be the focus of the
remainder of this section. I will outline the empirical scope, which focuses on the distribution of
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epithets in complement clauses, focusing on the role of the matrix predicate. The section that
follows contains my proposal that explains this empirical scope.
In many languages we find a contrast between the complement of think and the
complement of convince. The former generally cannot contain epithets that refer to the matrix
subject, whereas the latter can. This observation is illustrated by the English, Croatian, Hindi,
Russian and Slovenian examples given below in (133) - (137) respectively.
(133)a. * Johni thinks that the idioti is smart.
b.?0o Johni convinced Peter that the idioti is smart.
Croatian
(134)a. * Peter misli da je prokleti izdajniki
Peter thinks that AUX.3sg damn traitor
'Peteri thinks that the damn traitor1 is smart.'
b. ?'Peter je uvjerio predstavnike
Peter AUX.3sg convinced.ptcpl representatives
pametan.
smart
da de
that will.3sg
prokleti izdajniki rijesiti problem.
damn traitor solve problem.
'Peter convinced the representatives that the damn traitor would solve the problem'
(135)a. * Rinai soc-tii hai ki vo deshdrohiii
Rina think-Hab.f be.Prs.Sg that that traitor
'Rinai thinks that the damn traitor, is smart'.
buddhimaan
intelligent
Hindi
hai
be.Prs.Sg
Samir-nei pratinidhiyoN-ko2 samjhaa diyaa hai ki vo
Samir-Erg representatives-Dat explain give.Pfv is that that
deshdrohiii un-kaa kaam kar de-gaa
traitor they-Gen work do Give-Fut
'Samir 1 has convinced the representatives that that traitor will do their job'.
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b. ?OK
Russian
(136) a. * John1  dumaet, 6to etot idiot1 umjon.
John.NOM thinks that this traitor smart
'John thinks that this idiot is smart.'
b.?OK Johni ubedil sovet, cto etot idioti umjon.
John.NOM convinced panel that this idiot.NOM smart
'John convinced the panel that this idiot is smart'
Slovenian
(137) a. ?? Roslin1 misli, da je prekleta izdajalkai pametna.
Roslin thinks that is damn traitor smart.
'Roslin thinks that the damn traitor is smart.'
b. OK Roslin1 je prepriuala predstavnike, da bo prekelta izdajalkai
Roslin aux convinced representatives that would damn traitor
resila problem
solve problem
'Roslin convinced the representatives that the damn traitor would solve the problem.'
We can now summarise the problem that the examples in (133) - (137) pose as follows. We
have seen in chapter 2 that there are reasons to believe that epithets are pronouns (namely null
pronouns modified by a nominal appositive), and this is one of the fundamental claims that this
dissertation makes. Yet, in the cases with think, (133a), (134a), (135a), (136a) and (137a),
epithets appear to pattern like R-expressions. Do the data that clearly illustrate the contrast that
arises between think and convince challenge the view that epithets are pronouns? For instance, if
one were to pursue the idea that epithets are R-expressions, one might ask whether the examples
in (133b), (134b), (135b), (136b) and (137b) improve with convince, because there is more overt
material between the epithet and the antecedent. However, this does not seem to be the case.
What we see in (139b), (140b), (141b) and (142b) is that R-expressions in the complement of
convince are still ungrammatical. Therefore, if epithets were R-expressions, they should still be
unacceptable in the complement of convince. This difference between epithets and R-
expressions is shown by the contrasts in (138) - (142) from English, Croatian, Hindi, Slovenian
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and Russian (where the acceptable (138a)/(139a)/(140a)/(141a)/(142a) contain an epithet and the
unacceptable (13 8a)/(1 39b)/(1 40b)/( 141 b)/(1 42b) contain an R-expression).
(138)a.?OK John, convinced Peter that the idiot, is smart.
b. * Johni convinced Peter that the janitori is smart.
Croatian
(139)a.?0K Peter je uvjerio predstavnike
Peter AUX.3sg convinced.ptcpl representatives
da de
that will.3sg
prokleti izdajniki rijesiti problem.
damn traitor solve problem.
'Peter convinced the representatives that the damn traitor would solve the problem'.
b. * Bill je uvjerio predstavnike da de
Bill AUX.3sg convinced.ptcpl representatives that will.3sg
podvornik
janitor
rijesiti problem.
solve problem
'Bill, convinced the representatives that the janitor1 would solve the problem'.
Hindi
(140) a.?OK Samir-nei
Samir-Erg
pratinidhiyoN-ko2 samjhaa diyaa
representatives-Dat explain give.Pfv
ki vo deshdrohiii un-kaa
that that traitor they-Gen
kaam kar de-gaa
work do give-Fut
'Samiri has convinced the representatives that that traitor will do their job'.
b. * Samir-nei pratinidhiyoN-ko 2
Samir-Erg representatives-Dat
ki vo jamaadaari un-kaa
samjhaa diyaa hai
explain give.Pfv is
kaam kar de-gaa
that that sweeper they-Gen work do give-Fut
'Samir 1 has convinced the representatives that that sweeper, will do their job'.
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hai
is
Slovenian
(141)a. OK Rosilin je preprieala predstavnike, da bo prekelta izdajalka resila
Roslin aux convinced representatives that will damn traitor solve
problem.
problem
'Roslini convinced the representatives that the damn traitor1 would solve the
problem.'
b. * Bill je prepri'al predstavnike, da bo hignik resil problem.
Bill aux convinced representatives that will janitor solve problem
'Billi convinced the representatives that the janitor would solve the problem.'
Russian
(142) a.?OK Vladi ubedi-l deputat-ov, chto ch'ortov predatel'i reshit
Vlad convince-PST.M MP-PL.GEN that devil's traitor solve-PRS.3SG
problemu.
problem-ACC
'Vladi convinced the representatives that the damn traitor1 would solve the problem.'
b. ?* Vas'ai ubedi-l deputat-ov, chto vakht'ori reshit problemu.
Vas'a convince-PST.M MP-PL.GEN that janitor solve-PRS.3SG problem-ACC
'Vas'ai convinced the representatives that the janitor would solve the problem.'
In the section that follows, I present my proposal accounting for the contrast between
complements of think and complements of convince. This proposal draws on Stephenson's
(2007) analysis of think and convince. It is worth pointing out that think and convince differ in
many respects, which means that they do not form a minimal pair: For instance, think takes one
NP argument, whereas convince takes two NP arguments. However, a more minimal pair is hard
to construe (at least in terms of different verbs, as most attitude predicates with a single NP
argument behave like think); I have attempted to construct a more minimal pair that shows the
same effect in eliciting examples (143) (from English), (144) (from French) and (145) (from
Dutch). What we find here is that an epithet in the complement of not know is more acceptable
than an epithet in the complement of know. As we will see in Chapter 3.3.5, this is predicted by
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the analysis that I will propose, as that the subject of know believes the proposition expressed in
the embedded clause, whereas the subject of not know does not.
(143)a. * Neroi knows that the damn traitori should invite Sarkozy to the peace talks.
b. ?OK Nero doesn't know that the damn traitor should invite Sarkozy to the peace talks.
French
(144)a. * Nero sait que le sale traitrei devrait inviter Sarkozy aux. negociations
Nero knows that the damn traitor should invite Sarkozy to.the talks
de paix.
of peace
'Nero knows that the damn traitor should invite Sarkozy to the peace talks.'
b. ?ONeroI ne sait pas que le sale traitrei devrait inviter Sarkozy aux
Nero not knows neg that the damn traitor should invite Sarkozy to.the
negociations de paix.
talks of peace
'Nero doesn't know that the damn traitor should invite Sarkozy to the peace talks.
Dutch
(145)a. ?* Nero1 weet dat de verrekte eikeli
Nero knows that the damned jerk
Sarkozy moet
Sarkozy must
vredesbesprekingen
peace-talks
'Nero knows that the damn traitor should invite Sarkozy to the peace talks.'
b. ?ONero1 weet niet dat de verrekte eikeli
Nero knows not that the damned jerk
Sarkozy zou moeten
Sarkozy will must
uitnodigen
invite
voor de vredesbesprekingen
for the peace-talks
'Nero doesn't know that the damn traitor should invite Sarkozy to the peace talks.'
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uitnodigen
invite
voor de
for the
To conclude this section, it is worth pointing out that verbs with two DP arguments do not
behave uniformly, i.e. the presence of a second DP argument does not automatically make a
construction well-formed. In a survey of different predicates, the average judgments were as
given in (146). In comparison to the well-formed (146a), example (146b) is judged to be slightly
less acceptable, and example (146c) even less so. I will mainly focus on convince (as in (146a)),
the reasons for which will become clearer in the following section.
(146) a. 0' John convinced the panel that the stupid idioti would get the grant.
b.?oK Johni told the panel that the stupid idiot would get the grant.
c. 99 John, reminded the panel that the stupid idioti would get the grant.
The following section presents my solution for the difference between think and convince on the
one hand, and for the difference between know and not know on the other hand.
3.3 My Solution
3.3.1 The Anti-Judge Constraint in a Nutshell
Before outlining the various aspects of my proposal in detail, I would like to begin by presenting
an overview. The basic idea here will be that epithets are evaluated with respect to an evaluator
(cf. Potts (2005), (2007), Harris (2009), (2012)). My proposal can be broken down into the
following four components. First, I follow Lasersohn (2005), who argues that some utterances
must be evaluated from the perspective of a given individual, which he calls the judge
(corresponding to my evaluator); in particular, so-called predicates of personal taste (tasty, fun,
beautiful) cannot be interpreted without such an evaluator. Second, I propose that epithets are
also evaluated with respect to such an individual, as shown in various works by Potts and Harris;
this evaluator is typically (in the case of epithets) the speaker of the utterance, but it does not
have to be (cf. Potts and Harris (2009), Harris (2009), (2012)). Third, I focus on predicates such
as think and convince, introduced in section 3.2, and adopt Stephenson's (2007) view on the
difference between such predicates. Stephenson observes that, generally, in complements of
attitude predicates, the contextual judge parameter of the embedded clause (i.e. the index that
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encodes the preferred judge/evaluator with respect to which predicates of personal taste in the
embedded clause are interpreted) is set to one of the matrix arguments. Stephenson (2007)
shows that this is the case with complements of think and convince; moreover, she argues that, in
the case of think, the individual associated with the judge parameter corresponds to the matrix
subject, whereas in the case of convince, it corresponds to the matrix object. Fourth, to account
for the difference between think and convince with respect to epithets, I argue that epithets
cannot occur in a proposition that has the epithet's c-commanding antecedent as the individual
associated with its judge parameter; when the judge parameter of a clausal complement that
contains an epithet is identical to the epithet's c-commanding antecedent, the construction
becomes unacceptable, for reasons that I explore further in chapter 4. In other words, when an
epithet is in an embedded clause, the antecedent cannot be the judge of that embedded clause.
This is very much in the spirit of Dubinsky & Hamilton (1998); I come back to a discussion of
their proposal in chapter 4. In section 3.3.2, I discuss general background on the idea that some
utterances involve an evaluator/judge and a judge parameter. In section 3.3.3, I introduce the
idea that epithets are interpreted with respect to an evaluator. Section 3.3.4 discusses the idea
that different matrix predicates differ with respect to the meaning of the judge parameter of their
complement proposition. Finally, section 3.3.5 connects the judge/evaluator-sensitivity of
epithets to the anti-judge constraint on their distribution.
3.3.2 Introducing the Judge Parameter
Standard views on sentence meaning assume that sentences denote propositions, e.g. sets of
worlds; in other words, they are interpreted with respect to a world of evaluation (cf. Heim &
Kratzer (1998)). I now discuss Lasersohn (2005), (2009) and Stephenson (2007), who assume a
Kaplanian approach to meaning (e.g. Kaplan 1989), where a sentence is evaluated according to a
world, w, a time, t and a context parameter, c. A set of worlds and situations (which are
identified by means of w, t and c) form the intension of a sentence, or, put differently, the
proposition. In other words, a proposition is the set of possible worlds and/or situations in which
a sentence is true. These basic semantic primitives allow us to derive the truth conditions of a
sentence; namely that a sentence or utterance is true if and only if a world (or situation) satisfies
the requirements for the proposition expressed to be true in it. Consider the examples in (147).
87
The example sentence in (147a) denotes the set of worlds where the capital of Germany is
Berlin. Note that the actual world, where Berlin is in fact the capital of Germany, is included in
this set of possible worlds. In contrast, the meaning of the utterance in (147b) concerns a
different set of possible worlds, namely the worlds where Tuebingen is the capital of Germany.
In this case, the meaning for the sentence in the actual world would be false, because the actual
world is not part of this set. Under such a view, we only need to see what the facts are in the
actual world in order to determine whether a sentence is true or false.
(147)a. The capital of Germany is Berlin.
b. The capital of Germany is Tuebingen.
Lasersohn (2005), (2009) points out that the above (somewhat simplified) picture, is at odds with
sentences such as those provided in (148); it is not clear whether these sentences can be true or
false in an absolute way. Although initially the examples in (148) appear not too different from
those in (147), it is unclear how the semantic theory sketched above could derive the truth
conditions of the sentences in (148). The reason behind this is because the sentences in (148) are
a matter of opinion; although two people may disagree whether Berlin is the capital of Germany
(Speaker A may believe Berlin is the capital of Germany, whereas speaker B might disagree), in
the actual world the meaning of the utterance in (147a) would still be true, and (147b) false.
However with the examples (148), it is hard to see what the meaning of the utterance would be in
the real world, because speaker A may think that the cake is tasty, speaker B may disagree, and
both would be making a true statement in the actual world. In other words, whether
(148a)/(148b) are true or false depends on the perspective from which they are evaluated. We
cannot know whether something is tasty without taking into consideration for who it is tasty.
Clearly, (148a) cannot be true without such an individual, as it would be too presumptuous (and
false) to assume that the cake can be tasty for everybody. In addition to this observation, (148b)
shows that in one sentence, there can be two possible individuals for who something (here: the
catfood) may be tasty; in this case: the speaker or the speaker's cat. The most natural reading of
(148b) seems to be that the catfood is tasty for the cat and not the speaker; for instance, one can
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derive a reading where the speaker thinks the cat food is tasty based on how the cat takes to the
food. However, it could also be the case that the speaker actually tried the catfood and liked it.
(148) a. This cake is tasty.
b. This catfood is tasty.
(adapted from Stephenson 2007:30,39)
Predicates such as tasty, illustrated in the sentences in (148), are known as predicates ofpersonal
taste. Lasersohn (2005) argues that with predicates of personal taste, the information of who the
cake is tasty for (e.g. in (148a)) is encoded in terms of a contextually assigned judge (which I
will more descriptively call the evaluator). This question, of "who" the cake is tasty for, is
reminiscent of epithets; here also we can ask in whose view the antecedent of the epithet is the
idiot, i.e. who is the evaluator? I will discuss this in the following section (section 3.3.3), when
discussing Potts (2005) and subsequent works.
In the remainder of this section, I first discuss Stephenson's (2007) analysis of predicates
of personal taste, and then discuss how they interact with attitude predicates such as think. We
come back to other attitude predicates in section 3.3.4. Lasersohn's (2005) proposal for the
semantics of predicates of personal taste is that such predicates have an individual parameter,
which is known as the judge parameter. Thus in addition to assuming a proposition to denote a
set of possible worlds that are evaluated against a world of evaluation and a time of evaluation,
the proposition is also evaluated against a judge.
I'd like to briefly discuss Lasersohn's assumptions and outline the underpinnings of the
system. Lasersohn (2005) assumes a Kaplan (1989) style view of sentence meaning, where a
sentence (a proposition) is a function from world-time pairs <w,t> to truth values. The world of
evaluation and the time of evaluation make up a so-called index. By adding the judge parameter,
sentences are now interpreted with respect to a <w,tj> index, where w is a world, t is a time, and
j is an individual (the judge). Put differently, the judge, j, is the individual whose taste or
experience is the belief or opinion being expressed. The denotation of an expression a can now
be written as [[ a ]]c; "i where c is the context (I will omit this below), and w, t andj are the
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world time and judge parameter. The meanings of predicates of personal taste can now be given
as in (149).
(149)a. [[ fun ]] w'tj = [Axe. x is fun for j in w at t]
b. [[tasty ]] w'td = [AXe. x tastes good to j in w at t]
(Stephenson 2007:34)
As discussed, to analyse such predicates of personal taste, Lasersohn (2005) adds a judge j to the
index; Lasersohn's judge is the person whose opinion is relevant for predicates of personal taste
(the evaluator); the denotations of the sentences in (148) are given in (150). The meaning ofj is
provided by the context. In (150a),j most likely corresponds to the speaker; however, in (150b),
given our world knowledge about catfood,j is more likely to correspond to the cat (though it can,
of course, correspond to the speaker).
(150)a. [[this cake is tasty ]] "i = 1 iff this cake tastes good to j in w at t
b. [[this catfood is tasty ]]'; ',ti = 1 iff this catfood tastes good to j in w at t
Stephenson (2007) modifies Lasersohn's proposal as follows. Whilst (149) assumes that
predicates of personal taste are inherently dependent on a judge (which I call the evaluator), she
assumes that the judge/evaluator is introduced as a (first) argument of the predicate, given in
(151). In this system, the evaluator (which corresponds to the first argument of a predicate of
personal taste) is dissociated from the judge parameter. From now on, I will only use judge to
refer to the judge parameter, and I will use evaluator for the individual in whose mind
something is fun/tasty/etc.
(151)a. [[ fun ]]w'' tj = [Xxe. [ye. y is fun for x in w at t]]
b. [[ tasty ]]''id= [Axe. [Xye. y tastes good to x in w at t]]
(Stephenson 2007:41)
90
Stephenson (2007) aims to unify predicates of personal taste and existential modals. She makes
these modifications to Lasersohn's system to account for the fact that existential modals more
rigidly refer to the current judge parameter then predicates of personal taste, which can be
evaluated with respect to a salient individual different from the judge parameter. For this reason,
(1 52a) cannot mean that the speaker thinks that it is a possibility from the dog's perspective that
the dog food consists of table scraps, whereas (152b) can mean that the speaker thinks that the
dog food is tasty for the dog. The idea is that the judge parameter in a complement of think
corresponds to the matrix subject (i.e. the speaker in (152a-b)); whilst might in (152a) must be
evaluated with respect to the knowledge states of the individual associated with the judge
parameter (here: the speaker and not the dog), tasty in (152b) can be evaluated with respect to
another evaluator that is not associated with the judge parameter (here: the dog). Stephenson
(2007) achieves this by making might inherently judge-(parameter-)dependent, whereas tasty has
an open argument slot for the evaluator. I will come back to this in Section 3.3.5.
(152) a. Mary: Wow, the dog really likes the dog food you're feeding him.
b. Sam: (#)Yeah, I think it might be table scraps.
(Stephenson 2007:39)
c. Sam: Yeah, I think the dog food is tasty.
Another motivation for Stephenson's modification of the system is that it allows us to have a
uniform analysis for the examples in (153). In (153a), the evaluator argument position offun is
filled by a null pronoun, whereas in (1 53b) it is filled by the PPfor Sam.
(153) a. The roller coaster is fun.
b. The roller coaster is fun for Sam.
(Stephenson 2007:20,25)
Stephenson assumes that the evaluator argument position of a predicate of personal taste can still
be filled by the judge, which however has to be done through a null PRO, with the meaning in
(154). Furthermore, Stephenson allows for null pro, which refer directly to an individual.
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(154) [[PROs ]]w't= j
(Stephenson 2007:41)
So, the different readings for (155a) (a speaker-oriented reading and a reading that takes the cat
as the evaluator) can be derived by assuming that tasty combines with PRO- in one case, (1 55b),
and with prothe-cat in the other case, (1 55c).
(155)a. This catfood is tasty.
b. [[tasty PRO ]]w tj= [Aye . y tastes good to j in w at t]
c. [[tasty prothe-cat = [Aye . y tastes good to the cat in w at t]
(based on Stephenson's 2007:49 examples (70) and (71))
The difference between PRO,, which always refers to the judge, and pro, which freely refers to a
salient evaluator, plays an additional role in Stephenson's system, as she argues that PRO1 also
interacts with de se readings. This is orthogonal to the present discussion, so I will not discuss
additional motivations for the changes that Stephenson proposes, but refer the reader to her
dissertation, Stephenson (2007).
Stephenson (2007) observes that predicates of personal taste exhibit a particular behaviour
when embedded under an attitude predicate like think. As an illustration, consider the examples
in (156); in these examples, the most salient reading is one where the subject of think, namely
Sam, is linked to the predicate of personal taste; it is in Sam's view that the dip is tasty in (1 56a),
and that the rollercoaster is fun in (156b). A reading where Sam thinks that it is the speaker's
view that the dip is tasty or the roller coaster is fun seems less salient (if not impossible). If the
evaluator by default corresponds to the current judge (via PRO), and the judge j in a matrix
clause refers to the speaker by default, this suggests that the judge parameter in an embedded
clause must have shifted (here to the matrix subject).
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(156)a. Sam thinks the dip is tasty.
b. Sam thinks that the roller coaster is fun.
Stephenson (2007:24)
Stephenson (2007) points out further that with multiple embedding, the predicate of personal
taste is interpreted with respect to the subject of the think clause that most immediately embeds
it. What the examples in (157) seem to show, is that "when a predicate of personal taste is
embedded in an attitude report, the attitude holder becomes the person whose knowledge or taste
is relevant" (Stephenson 2007:28).
(157) a. Mary thinks that Sam thinks the dip is tasty.
b. Mary thinks that Sam thinks that the roller coaster is fun.
Stephenson (2007:25)
Stephenson thus assumes that verbs such as think shift the judge parameter of their complements,
and gives the lexical entry in (158). The idea is that think combines with a proposition p (e.g. the
dip is tasty in (156a)) and an individual x (e.g. Sam in (156)), and asserts that in all of the belief
worlds of x (which have x as their judge y), p is true.
(158)a. [[think ]]wtj= [AP<s,<i,et . [kxe . V<w',t',y> E Doxw,t,x : p(w')(t')(y) = 1]]
b. Doxw,t,x = {<w',t',y> : it is compatible with what x believes in w at t that he/she/it is y
in w' at t'}
(Stephenson 2007:43)
As a consequence, think asserts that its subject believes in the truth of the complement
proposition with the subject of think as the judge. I will come back to the role of think in section
3.3.3, and particularly in section 3.3.4.
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3.3.3 Epithets Have an Evaluator
Having outlined the basics of judge-based / evaluator-based analyses, I now discuss epithets
from this perspective. The obvious similarity between predicates of personal taste and epithets
(that in both cases, there is an individual from whose perspective the predicate or epithet is
evaluated) resulted in the evaluator-based approaches being extended to epithets, most recently
by authors such as Potts (2007) and Schlenker (2007), which I discuss in this chapter. I will
follow in the same vein and also propose that epithets make use of an evaluator argument
(though my analysis will differ from Potts 2007 and Schlenker 2007; the differences will be
mentioned at the relevant parts in Chapters 3 and 4). Reconsider Stephenson's entry for tasty, in
(159).
(159) [[tasty ]]w'tj = [Xxe . RYe . y tastes good to x in w at t]]
(Stephenson 2007:41)
The idea that I pursue is that idiot has the denotation in (160); here, the evaluative component (x
believes that y is stupid in w at t) of the noun phrase contained in an epithet is a presupposition,
whereas at the level of assertion, the noun phrase simply corresponds to person (or something
along these lines).
(160) [[idiot ]]wtj = Xx . Xy : x believes that y is stupid in w at t . y is a person in w at t
presupposition of 'idiot' at-issue content of 'idiot'
The distinction between presupposition and at-issue content that is assumed in (160) is based on
Schlenker's (2007:238) entry for honky, given in (161). In this lexical entry, Schlenker uses the
concept agent of c instead of evaluator/judge (where c is a context of evaluation); apart from this
difference, (160) and (161) are largely analogous".
45 Collapsing agent of c with judge / evaluator glosses over a controversy that is orthogonal to the present debate.
While the judge parameter, which often correlates with the evaluator, is designed to shift in embedded contexts (e.g.
the judge in a complement to think would be the subject of think), the agent of c may (depending on other aspects of
the analysis) stay constant, referring to the speaker of the utterance. In this sense, agent of c is not equivalent to
judge / evaluator, but this difference is not crucial for the analysis that I propose.
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(161) [[ honky ]]cw is defined iff the agent of c believes in the world of c that white people are
despicable. If defined, [[ honky ]]'"= [[ white ]]'"
(adapted from Schlenker 2007:238)
A core argument for treating the evaluative component as a presupposition stems from the
following observation. Consider the statement in (162a); what we notice is that the evaluative
component of the epithet does not seem to enter the truth conditions of the utterance. In the
scenario in (162b), the intuition is clear: (162a) is false if the speaker never received an email
from John. However, in the scenario in (1 62c), the intuition is less clear; if the speaker does not
think that John is a jerk, it is hard to evaluate whether (162a) is false or true - in a way it simply
seems infelicitous. This pattern is typical for presuppositional content (or conventional
implicatures in the sense of Potts 2005, 2007).
(162) a. Have you seen John? I just got an email from that jerk.
b. Situation 1:
The speaker did not get an email from John, but the speaker believes that John is a
jerk. ((1 62a) is judged to be a false statement)
c. Situation 2:
The speaker did get an email from John, but the speaker does not believe that John is
a jerk. ((162a) is judged to be neither false nor true, but infelicitous)
If we negate the relevant sentence (e.g. by replacing the adverb just with the adverb never), the
pattern stays the same, as shown in (163).
(163) a. Have you seen John? I never got an email from that jerk.
b. Situation 1:
The speaker did get an email from John, but the speaker still believes that John is a
jerk. ((1 63a) is judged to be a false statement)
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c. Situation 2:
The speaker never got an email from John, but still the speaker does not believe that
John is a jerk. ((163a) is judged to be neither false nor true, but infelicitous)
Having combined Stephenson's analysis of predicates of personal taste with Schlenker's analysis
of honky, we arrived at the semantics for idiot in (160), repeated in (164); the first argument x is,
once again, the one that serves as evaluator. (Note that stupid is an abbreviation for stupid to a
salient degree d, as idiot can be used mildly or more aggressively, which I assume involves a
smaller or larger degree of stupidity. Sauerland (2007b) assumes something similar for damn.)
(164) [[idiot ]]wtj = Xx . Xy : x believes that y is stupid in w at t . y is a person in w at t
presupposition of 'idiot' at-issue content of 'idiot'
The analysis of epithets as presuppositional elements is also related to Potts's (2003, 2005, 2007)
analysis of epithets, as summarised by Demirdache and Percus (2011) in (165).
(165) a. the donkey (an epithet) selects semantically for an individual.
b. [[ [ [ X ] the donkey ] ]]9 = [[ X ]]g.
c. When X doesn't contain a bound variable, [[X ] the donkey ] contributes to
the common ground the information that the speaker doesn't think highly of [[ X ]]9.
d. When X contains a bound variable, the contribution to the common ground exhibits a
"projection behaviour" analogous to what we find for presuppositions.
(adapted from Demirdache & Percus 2011 a: 19)
We can now give examples that contain a noun phrase such as (162). First consider an example
that involves the indefinite noun phrase some idiot, in (166). The idea is that (166a) has the
assertion in (166b) and the presupposition in (166c) (the judgments are even clearer with some
jerk). This follows directly from (162); as we will see below, nothing hinges on calling (166c) a
presupposition; what is relevant for my analysis is that it is not part of the assertion; this can also
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be done in terms of Potts's (2003), (2005), (2007) distinction between at-issue meaning and
conventional implicature meaning. The phenomena that I discuss do not bear on the question of
whether a separate conventional implicature dimension is needed or not, which is at the core of
the debate in Potts (2007) versus Sauerland (2007) and Schlenker (2007)).
(166) a. Some idiot asked for you on the phone.
b. assertion: Someone asked for you on the phone.
c. presupposition: I (or some salient person) believe(s) that this person is stupid.
If we use idiot as an epithet (i.e. as a nominal appositive with a null anchor), we need to go a step
further and address the process by which an appositive combines with its anchor. We will then
see, in section 3.3.4 and 3.3.5, how the apparent locality effects with epithets seem to be
connected to constraints on the current judge parameter in a clause that contains an epithet. I
assume that appositives are interpreted in terms of clausal conjunction (cf. Schlenker (2010), to
appear), i.e. (1 67a) would have the interpretation in (1 67b). Given the lexical entry in (162),
(167b) would assert (167c) (vacuously asserting that Fritz is a person/somebody), and (167b)
would presuppose (1 67d).
(167)a. Do you know Fritz,? I just met proi(,) the idiot.
b. proposed interpretation (Schlenker 2010, to appear): I just met pro1 and he1 is an idiot.
c. assertion: I just met Fritz, (and Fritzi is a person).
d. presupposition: I (or some salient person) believe(s) that Fritz, is stupid.
At this point, it is worth observing that we have to be careful to control for the difference
between the evaluative reading of idiot in (164) and the non-evaluative reading of idiot in (168).
(168) [[ idiot ]]wtj = kx . x is an ignorant, uneducated person in w at t
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For instance, a sentence like (1 69a) seems to be ambiguous between the meaning in (1 69b) and
the meaning in (169c).
(169) a. I just met an idiot.
b. I just met a person, and I believe that that person is stupid. (evaluative)
c. I just met an ignorant, uneducated person. (non-evaluative)
A similar question that arises at this point is how to interpret (170a). Whilst (170b) asserts that
John is white and presupposes that the speaker does not like white people, it seems that (1 70a)
actually asserts that the speaker does not like John / that the speaker thinks that John is stupid.
(170) a. John is an idiot.
b. John is a honky.
It is not clear that the lexical entry in (164) derives the correct meaning for (170a), as the
assertion would only be that John is a person. One could pursue the idea that (170a) uses the
lexical entry in (168), i.e. (170a) would have the meaning in (171). The evaluativity in (170a)
may then arise as a Gricean implicature from (171), in the same way in which (172a) implicates
(172b).
(171) John is an ignorant, uneducated person.
(172) a. Why do you want to marry John? He's a janitor.
b. You should not marry a janitor.
Alternatively, one possible modification to the system would be to assume the lexical entry in
(173) for the evaluative use, and assume that the presuppositional (or in Potts's terms:
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conventional implicature) nature of epithets arises from the fact that they have the structure of
nominal appositives with a null anchor (cf. Potts (2003, 2005))".
(173) [[idiot ]]w" = x . ? y . x believes that y is stupid in watt
In Potts's system, a COMMA operator (which is a feature on the appositive NP) shifts truth-
conditional meaning (marked by a superscripted a for at issue) to the conventional implicature
dimension (marked by a superscripted c for conventional implicature). This is illustrated by
Potts's example in (174). Here, the determiner a is uninterpreted in Potts's system, so a cyclist
corresponds to the predicate be a cyclist. After the COMMA operator applies to cyclist, it results
in comma(cyclist), which combines with an individual (here: lance) in the at-issue dimension,
and the result is the same individual in the at-issue dimension (above the bullet -), and the
proposition Lance is a cyclist (i.e. cyclist(lance)) in the conventional implicature dimension
(below the bullet -).
(174) Lance, a cyclist,
DP lance : ea
DP NP cyclist(lance) : tc
I COMMA
Lance lance : ea comma(cyclist) : (ea, t)
Do NP
cyclist : (ea, ta)
a cyclist
(Potts 2003:86)
46 1 would like to point out that Potts (2003), (2005) argues for a multi-dimensional semantics. The reader should
bear in mind that this differs from a uni-dimensional semantics in that the expressive can enter the common ground
in an alternative fashion. Potts (2003) proposes two semantic dimensions of meaning, the at-issue dimension and
the C-I (conventional implicature) dimension. The at-issue content enters the common ground after being
acknowledged by the participants of the communicational exchange. The information in the C-I dimension is
considered secondary, and not under discussion. It is under debate whether a uni-dimensional semantics can cover
the same facts as a multi-dimensional semantics, as argued by Schlenker (2007), who proposes that 'expressive
presuppositions' can cover the same empirical ground as conventional implicatures (see also Sauerland 2007).
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For my analysis of epithets, an analysis that uses the COMMA operator can be given as in (176),
based on the entry in (175). Following Stephenson (2007), I assume that the first argument of
such a 'predicate of personal taste' is satisfied by a null pronoun, which may refer to the speaker,
written as prothe-speaker, see section 3.3.5.
(175) [[idiot ]]w tj = Xx. ky . x believes that y is stupid in w at t
Following Potts, the idea would be that we have the syntax in (176b) for the phrase in (176a),
and at the at-issue level, the phrase will simply refer to the referent of the null anchor pro,, as
given above the bullet - in (176c); the contribution of the appositive (i.e. that the speaker
believes the referent of the null anchor proi to be stupid) will be added to the conventional
implicature level, as given below the bullet - in (176c). On a par with Potts I assume that the
determiner in a nominal appositive is not interpreted.
(176) a. pro, the idiot,
b. DP
DP NP
COMMA
proi
Do NP
the idiot
(to) prothe-speaker
4 The question that this raises is why can determiners such as a, this, the and that stay uninterpreted in appositives.
This needs to be clarified in future research. One possible view could be that the determiners still make their regular
contribution, and the fact that they seem uninterpreted is due to the construction that they are in (cf. Aoun, Choueiri
and Hornstein (2001) who assume that examples like he, the idiot are interpreted as he, who is the idiot, identiflying
the referent with the most salient idiot in the context.
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g(1) : ea
believes-to-be-stupid(speaker)(g(1)) : t'
g(1) : ea comma(believes-to-be-stupid(speaker)) : (ea, t,)
believes-to-be-stupid(speaker) : (ea, t4)
a a abelieves-to-be-stupid: (ea, (ea, ta)) speaker : e
Instead of (167), the meaning of a statement that contains an epithet would then be as in (177).
(177)a. Do you know Fritz,? I just met proi(,) the idiot.
b. assertion: I just met FritzI.
c. conventional implicature: I (or some salient person) believe(s) that Fritz is stupid.
It is an open question whether it is better to explain the epithet data in a uni-dimensional
semantics (as in Sauerland 2007, Schlenker 2007) or in a multi-dimensional semantics (as in
Potts 2003, 2005, 2007); also, to conclude this discussion, it is an open question at this point
whether idiot in the evaluative reading should be analysed on a par with Schlenker's (2007)
honky, which in its lexical entry has evaluativity in the presupposition, or whether it is better
analysed as asserting evaluativity and combining with a COMMA operator. What argues for an
analysis that dispenses with the COMMA operator seems to be examples like (166), repeated in
(178), where the presupposition of some idiot seems to be that the speaker believes this person to
be stupid, whereas the assertion is simply equivalent to someone. Under an analysis with the
COMMA operator, this use of some idiot would also require an appositive structure, which here
does not seem plausible, as he, some idiot seems ill-formed.
(178) a. Some idiot asked for you on the phone.
b. assertion: Someone asked for you on the phone.
c. presupposition: I (or some salient person) believe(s) that this person is stupid.
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C.
At this point it is worth pointing out that Stephenson (2007) does not discuss nouns that behave
as predicates of personal taste. However, whilst Stephenson focuses on adjectives and verbs, it is
easy to see that nouns can also be predicates of personal taste. If we consider the examples in
(179), indulgence can be analysed as the nominal counterpart of tasty, and pleasure as the
nominal counterpart of enjoyable (or fun). Both cases clearly have a reading where they are
interpreted with respect to an evaluator (which can be made overt by the PPfor Ursula).
(179) a. This cake is an indulgence (for Ursula).
b. The boat ride was a pleasure (for Ursula).
Furthermore, the idea of analysing epithets as evaluator-dependent entities goes back to Potts
(2007), who adopts Lasersohn's notion of judge. However, Potts (2007) does not give a
denotation for an epithet like the idiot, but instead focuses on expressive adjectives such as damn
(as in the damn dog), for which he formalises the meaning that he first informally states as in
(180), where d is the referent (i.e. the dog referred to by the damn dog) and cj is the judge.
(180) In a context c, an utterance of damn with the entity d as its semantic argument creates a
context c'that is just like c except that it registers that cj regards d negatively somehow.
(Potts 2007)
Recall that my entry for idiot in (160) is based on Schlenker's (2007) entry for honky in (161).
A question that arises for Potts at this point is how epithets manage to refer to their
antecedent. Similar to my own proposal (worked out in chapter 2), Potts (2005) (who does not
yet assume a judge-based / evaluator-based approach to epithets) proposes that epithets have the
structure of names that are modified by an appositive (Huddleston and Pullum 2002:447-448), as
in (18 1a), where the stupidjerk is an appositive modifier on Eddie. When the name is absent, a
free variable is adopted in its place, (181b). Notably, Potts's proposal differs from mine in that
he assumes the structure [the stupid jerk [x25]] and does not assume the structure [[pro], the
stupid jerk], which makes a difference in the same way in which the composer Mozart and
Mozart, the composer, do not seem equivalent.
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An argument against the specific analysis in (181) (as opposed to my own analysis, which
posits pro, the stupidjerk) may be that it is possible to say he, the stupidjerk (in analogy to pro,
the stupidjerk) whereas it is impossible to say *the stupidjerk he, making it implausible that we
find constructions such as (181 b).
(181)a. {that/the} stupid jerk Eddie
b. {that/the} stupid jerk x25
(Potts 2003:232)
Another argument against Potts's analysis in (181) comes from German, where we find case-
marking on the anchor without case-marking on the appositive. The opposite is not possible; this
is illustrated by the example in (182)48. In (182a), Indiana is commonly assumed to be an
appositive modifier on the DP der Staat 'the state'. As shown in (1 82b), a possible (and attested)
genitive form is des Staat-es Indiana 'of the state Indiana', here, only the anchor is inflected. In
contrast, if we turn to the example in (182c), it is not acceptable for only the appositive to be
inflected. A form where both the appositive and the anchor are inflected is also possible, this is
given in (1 82d) (but irrelevant for this discussion).
German
(182) a. der Staat Indiana 'the state Indiana' (nominative)
b. des Staat-es Indiana 'of the state Indiana' (genitive)
c.* des Staat Indiana-s 'of the state Indiana' (genitive)
d. des Staat-es Indiana-s 'of the state Indiana' (genitive)
By contrast, Onkel Otto 'uncle Otto' behaves differently. Here, Onkel 'uncle' is an appositive
that modifies the name Otto. The observed pattern is given in (183); here, only the anchor can be
inflected, i.e. only (1 83c) is a possible genitive form.
4 8Thanks to Patrick Grosz (p.c) for pointing this out.
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German
(183) a. (der) Onkel Otto '(the) uncle Otto' (nominative)
b.* (des) Onkel-s Otto 'of (the) uncle Otto' (genitive)
c. (des) Onkel Otto-s 'of (the) uncle Otto' (genitive)
d.* (des) Onkel-s Otto-s 'of (the) uncle Otto' (genitive)
What we find in the German translation of a Potts-style example, is that the expressive noun
phrase Idiot 'idiot' can be inflected without inflection on the name; the data are given in (1 84b).
Observe that the opposite is not possible, this can be shown by the examples in (1 84c). The
pattern in (184) is exactly like the pattern in (182), and unlike the pattern in (183). We can
conclude that the phrase der Idiot Otto 'the idiot Otto' actually has der Idiot 'the idiot' as its
anchor and Otto as the appositive, in the same way in which der Staat Indiana 'the state Indiana'
has der Staat 'the state' as its anchor and Indiana as the appositive. These facts go against the
analysis that Potts suggests in (181); in particular, (181b) would involve that stupid jerk as its
anchor and the free variable X25 as an appositive modifier, which seems problematic in its own
right.
German
(184) a. der Idiot Otto 'the idiot Otto' (nominative)
b. des Idiot-en Otto 'of the idiot Otto' (genitive)
c.* des Idiot Otto-s 'of the idiot Otto' (genitive)
d. des Idiot-en Otto-s 'of the idiot Otto' (genitive)
Concluding this discussion, it is worth pointing out that the type of construction that I argue for
exhibits a third pattern, where both the anchor and the appositive must be inflected; this is
illustrated in (185) and explains why epithets with null anchors always carry full case marking in
German. A non-evaluative nominal appositive with this structure behaves the same (cf. (186)).
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(185) a. Otto, der Idiot
b. * Otto-s, der Idiot
c.* Otto, des Idiot-en
'Otto, the idiot' (nominative)
'of Otto, the idiot' (genitive)
'of Otto, the idiot' (genitive)
d. Otto-s, des Idiot-en 'of Otto, the idiot' (genitive)
German
(186) a. Otto, der Philosoph
b.* Otto-s, der Philosoph
c.* Otto, des Philosoph-en
'Otto, the philosopher' (nominative)
'of Otto, the philosopher' (genitive)
'of Otto, the philosopher' (genitive)
d. Otto-s, des Philosoph-en 'of Otto, the philosopher' (genitive)
Naturally, we now expect that a phrase such as the stupid jerk Eddie, in which I argued that
Eddie is an appositive modifier on the stupidjerk, can also be an appositive in turn, modifying a
pronoun. This seems possible as shown in (187).
(187) He, that stupid jerk Eddie, really thinks that he will win this contest.
Finally, we have seen in section 2.2.2 that epithets can be syntactically bound in many
languages. Whilst there is much inter-speaker variation with respect to English data, some
speakers accept examples such as (188) (and we have seen that cross-linguistically, the
possibility of similar constructions is widely attested).
(188)a.?? Every boyi convinced Mary that the bastard1 is smart.
b. ?? Every tenant in this house1 convinced Peter that the idiot is smart.
My proposal can easily account for such constructions, by assuming that (1 88a) is interpreted as
in (189a), with the meaning in (189b).
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German
(189)a. Every boyi convinced Mary that proi, the bastard, is smart.
b. Every boy1 convinced Mary that heI, the bastard, is smart.
It is much less clear that the analysis in (181 b) can be applied to such constructions, as shown in
(190). Neither (190a) nor (190b) seems to capture the meaning of (188a).
(190) a. #Every boyi convinced Mary that the bastard boy1 is smart.
b.* Every boyi convinced Mary that the bastard hei/him1 is smart.
I will not expand further on Potts's system, for the following reason. Although I adopt the
notion of judge (or rather: evaluator) from Lasersohn and apply it to epithets, I assume that the
individual who provides the evaluation / the perspective fills the first argument slot of the
predicate, very much in the spirit of Stephenson (2007) who proposed this for predicates of
personal taste. Turning to my own proposal, which treats epithets as nominal appositives with a
null anchor, the question arises of how the epithet's meaning enters the computation. In (167),
repeated in (191), I assume that the nominal appositive that surfaces as the overt part of the
epithet is interpreted conjunctively, as in (191b).
(191)a. Do you know Fritzi? I just met proi(,) the idiot.
b. proposed interpretation (Schlenker 2010, to appear): I just met proi and he1 is an idiot.
c. assertion: I just met Fritzi (and Fritz is a person).
d. presupposition: I (or some salient person) believe(s) that Fritzi is stupid.
This idea goes back to Lakoff & Ross (1966), who assumes that (192a) has the interpretation in
(192b).
(192) a. The officer arrested Clyde, who was the subject of a long manhunt, before he could
strike again.
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b. The officer arrested Clyde before he could strike again and Clyde was the subject of a
long manhunt.
(Potts 2003:263, attributing the idea to Lakoff & Ross 1966)
Potts (2003, 2005) points out that the main question is where the and comes from that seems to
occur in the semantics. While he considers possible objections (as pointed out by Ross 1967,
Pullum 1979), he argues that coordination is needed in any case to make the semantics work49.
Having introduced my semantic analysis for epithets, the remainder of this dissertation
focuses on the apparent Condition C effects that we find with such constructions. As discussed,
these are surprising from a perspective that treats epithets as a type of pronoun.
3.3.4 Attitude Predicates Differ in Terms of the Complement's Judge
In this section, I would like to introduce the core asymmetry that is needed to explain the
empirical scope presented in the earlier section in this chapter. Given Lasersohn's judge
parameter, and the connection between epithets and predicates of personal taste with respect to
perspective, the explanation, which I provide in section 3.3.5, will be reasonably straightforward.
To briefly recap, the general observation was that epithets in the complements of think behave
differently from epithets which are located in the complements of convince. The core contrast is
repeated in (193).
(193)a.* John, thinks that the idioti is smart.
b.?oK Johni convinced Peter that the idiot, is smart.
What we have seen in section 3.3.2, is that Stephenson (2007:42) assumes that think and similar
predicates obligatorily shift the judge parameter of the embedded clause to the matrix subject.
49 Potts assumes a non-at-issue conventional implicature analysis. For the classical adjunction analysis of
appositives, he discusses the possibility that appositives can only adjoin at the root-level, which would allow for
'wide-scope conjunction' and thus avoid the original problems with a conjunction analysis. For present purposes,
this may mean that interpretation of appositives in embedded contexts is restricted to embedded clauses that exhibit
'embedded root clause phenomena'.
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This is done by means of lexical entries such as (194), repeated from above. What the reader
should focus on is the fact that the variable y, which represents the judge parameter of the
embedded proposition, is shifted to correspond to the matrix subject x, given that y is identical to
x in all of x's belief worlds (cf. (194b)).
(194)a. [[think ]]wtj = [Rp<s,<i,et>> . [Xxe . V<w',t',y> E Doxwt,x : p(w')(t')(y) = 1]]
b. Doxw,t,x = {<w',t',y> : it is compatible with what x believes in w at t that he/she/it is y
in w' at t'}
(Stephenson 2007:43, slightly adapted)
In contrast, with convince, it is the object of convince that becomes the judge of the embedded
clause. If we assume Stephenson's lexical entry in (195), convince combines with two nominal
arguments, the person who does the convincing (x) and the person who is being convinced (z),
and a proposition p. Here, the idea is that as a result of the communication between x and z, z
ends up believing that p is true with z as its judge. In other words, it is the object of convince
(i.e. the person who is being convinced), who corresponds to the judge of the embedded clause.
(195) [[convince ]]'wj = [XZe . [XP<s,<i,et>> . [Xxe . x communicates with z in a way that causes it
to be the case that V<w',t',y> E Doxw,t,z : p(w')(t')(y) = 1]]]
(Stephenson 2007:149, slightly adapted)
In brief, we can observe that in (196a), the judge parameter of the embedded clause (that the
idiot is smart) is shifted to the matrix subject (John). In contrast, in (196b), the judge parameter
of the embedded clause (that the idiot is smart) is shifted to the matrix object (Peter). As we will
see in more detail in section 3.3.5, this already suggests that the person from whose perspective
an epithet is evaluated (the evaluator) does not need to be the judge of the sentence, as (1 96b)
has a reading where it is not Peter (but the speaker or some other salient person) who dislikes
John. The difference in grammaticality indicates that epithets cannot occur in an embedded
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clause where the judge (parameter) is identical to their antecedent. I elaborate on this
observation in section 3.3.5.
(196)a.* John, thinks that the idiot, is smart.
b. ?OK John, convinced Peter that the idiot is smart.
3.3.5 Connecting the Dots
In the following sections we have seen that some propositions (those that contain predicates of
personal taste) are interpreted with respect to an evaluator, which often interacts with a
contextually givenjudge parameter. We have also seen that epithets, like predicates of personal
taste, seem to be interpreted with respect to such an evaluator, though their evaluator rarely
corresponds to the judge parameter. Finally, we have seen that think and convince differ in terms
of their judge parameter, and that this difference seems to correlate with the acceptability of
epithets. We can posit the constraint in (197); this constraint is similar to Dubinsky &
Hamilton's (1998) Anti-logophoricity constraint (which will be reviewed in Chapter 4).
(197) The Anti-Judge Constraint
An epithet cannot occur in a sentence s if (i) the sentence is interpreted with respect to a
judge j that is identical to the epithet's antecedent, and (ii) the antecedent c-commands
the epithet.
Clause (i) of (197) derives the pattern in (198), repeated from above.
(198)a. * John thinks that the idioti is smart.
b. ?OK John1 convinced Peter that the idioti is smart.
Clause (ii) of (197) seems to be required, given that epithets seem fine in utterances like (199),
where the epithet's antecedent does not seem to c-command the complement clause, (cf. (200)),
repeated from Chapter 1.2.
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(199) OK Peter convinced Johni that the idioti is smart.
(200) a. * The director convinced John that the directori is smart.
b. OK John convinced the director1 that the director is smart.
The Anti-Judge Constraint also makes predictions that seem to follow through on the distribution
of epithets in other clausal complements.
First, it is relevant to see how we can detect the judge (parameter) of an embedded clause.
Stephenson observes that epistemic modals seem to be judge-dependent too, and they seem to be
more rigidly judge-dependent than predicates of personal taste, in the sense that their evaluator
has to be the individual associated with the current judge parameter. In example (201 a), the
belief that rain is possible is ascribed to John (the judge of the complement to thinks), whereas in
(20 1b), it is ascribed to Peter (the judge of the complement to convinced).
(201) a. John thinks that it might rain on Sunday.
b. John convinced Peter that it might rain on Sunday.
It is not possible for an embedded epistemic modal to express a belief that is ascribed to someone
other than the judge. Stephenson observes that Sam's utterance in (202) cannot mean that Sam
thinks that the dog believes it to be possible that the dog food is table scraps.
(202) Mary: Wow, the dog really likes the dog food you're feeding him.
Sam: (#)Yeah, I think it might be table scraps.
(Stephenson 2007:39)
Therefore, we can use epistemic modals to detect who is the judge in an embedded clause. The
fact that might in (202a) reflects a belief of John's indicates that the matrix subject is the judge;
the fact that might in (202b) reflects a belief of Peter's indicates that the matrix object is the
judge. If we now turn to predicates such as know and not know, we observe the following: in
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(203a), we notice that the belief of possible rain is shared by the speaker and by John. It is
plausible that the judge parameter of the embedded clause in (203a) shifts to John (see also
Stephenson's 2007:63 discussion of believe). However, in (203b), it is not plausible that the
proposition that it might rain on Sunday expresses a possibility with respect to John's knowledge
states, i.e. it seems as though the judge in (203b) cannot be John.
(203) a. John knows that it might rain on Sunday.
b. John does not know that it might rain on Sunday.
What we find in these cases is that (at least in languages such as Dutch, English and French),
these predicates pattern along the lines of the Anti-Judge Constraint. The Dutch examples are
repeated from above in (204). With know, an epithet that refers to the matrix subject cannot
occur in the complement clause, (204a), but with not know, this is possible, (204b).
Dutch
(204)a. ?* Nero1 weet dat de verrekte eikeli Sarkozy moet uitnodigen voor de
Nero knows that the damned jerk Sarkozy must invite for the
vredesbesprekingen
peace-talks
'Neroi knows that the damn traitori should invite Sarkozy to the peace talks.'
b. ?KNero weet niet dat de verrekte eikeli Sarkozy zou moeten uitnodigen
Nero knows not that the damned jerk Sarkozy will must invite
voor de vredesbesprekingen
for the peace-talks
'Neroi doesn't know that the damn traitor, should invite Sarkozy to the peace talks.'
Examples (205) and (206) illustrate the corresponding English and French examples.
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(205) a. * Nero knows that the damn traitori should invite Sarkozy to the peace talks.
b. ?OK Neroi doesn't know that the damn traitori should invite Sarkozy to the peace talks.
(206)a. * Neroi
Nero
French
sait que le sale traitrei devrait inviter Sarkozy aux negociations
knows that the damn traitor should invite Sarkozy to.the talks
de paix.
of peace
'Neroi knows that the damn traitori should invite Sarkozy to the peace talks.'
b.?OKNeroI ne sait pas que le sale traitre1 devrait
Nero not knows neg that the damn traitor should
ndgociations de paix.
talks of peace
inviter Sarkozy aux
invite Sarkozy to.the
'Neroi doesn't know that the damn traitor should invite Sarkozy to the peace talks.'
Another prediction from the Anti-Judge Constraint that is boume out through is that the
constraint is local; i.e. if we have an attitude predicate in the scope of another attitude predicate,
only the subject of the lower attitude predicate is barred from being an antecedent of an epithet
that is contained in its complement. This is shown in (207).
(207) a. 70K Neroi thinks that Sarkozy thinks that the damn traitor should attend the peace talks.
b. * Sarkozy thinks that Nero1 thinks that the damn traitor should attend the peace talks.
For the initial relative clause example, we can also show that their acceptability is compatible
with the Anti-Judge Constraint. Consider the examples in (208). Here, the Anti-Judge
Constraint indicates that if John c-commands the idiot / the great man, which I have been
arguing for, then John cannot be the judge of the clause that contains the epithet (i.e. the relative
clause).
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(208) a. OK Yesterday John1 bumped into a fan who really loves the idiot1 .
b. OK Yesterday John1 bumped into a fan who really loves the great man.
This seems to be the case, because if we apply the test from Stephenson (2007), we find the
contrast between (209a) and (209b). In (209a), the proposition it might be table scraps (where it
refers to the dog food) is acceptable in the scope of thinks, because according to Stephenson, the
judge of the complement to thinks is its subject (here: our dog). In other words, the possibility
that the dog food is table scraps is evaluated from the dog's perspective. Contrastively, in
(209b), the proposition expressed by the relative clause that might be table scraps, which
modifies dog food, seems contradictory, indicating that might cannot be interpreted from the
dog's perspective. This means that the judge of the relative clause is not shifted; it is still the
speaker, and the Anti-Judge Constraint is not violated. This explains why epithets in relative
clauses can be c-commanded by their antecedent, as in (208).
(209) a. OK Our dogi loves this dog food 2. Hei thinks it 2 might be table scraps.
b. # Yesterday our dog devoured the dog food that might be table scraps.
The question is how to derive the Anti-Judge Constraint. Consider first the derivation of an
example with a predicate of personal taste. Stephenson (2007) argues that predicates with
personal taste can combine with PRO1 (as their evaluator argument), which picks out the judge,
or with a referential pro. Given that the judge j of a complement to think corresponds to the
matrix subject, tasty is interpreted from Sue's perspective in (210); in this example, tasty
combines with the current judge via PRO1 , and thus ends up being interpreted from Sue's
perspective.
(210) a. [Sue [thinks [[this cake] [is tasty PROS]]]]
b. [[Sue thinks this cake is tasty PROS ]]'' =
= 1 iff V<w' ,t',x> E Doxw,t,sue : the cake tastes good to x in w' at t'
(abbreviated, omitting the intermediate steps, from Stephenson 2007:48)
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Contrastively, in (211), tasty is not judge-dependent, as it combines with a referential prosam.
Therefore, the judge of the embedded clause, which is Sue, is not identical to the person from
whose perspective tasty is evaluated (the evaluator).
(211)a. [Sue [thinks [[this cake] [is tasty prosam]]]]
b. [[Sue thinks this cake is tasty proSam ]]''=
1 iff V<w',t',x> E DOxw,t,sue : the cake tastes good to Sam in w' at t'
(abbreviated, omitting the intermediate steps, from Stephenson 2007:48)
For convince, we can derive both readings as well, as given in (212) and (213), simply by
adapting the derivations in (210) and (211) for the entry for convince in (195). In (212), we have
the judge-dependent reading, where the cake tastes good to Mary, whereas in (213), we have the
judge-independent reading, where the cake tastes good to someone else, here: Sam.
(212) a. Sue convinced Mary that this cake is tasty PROS
b. [[Sue convinced Mary that this cake is tasty PROS ]]w'=
= 1 iff Sue communicates with Mary in a way that causes it to be the case that
V<w',t',x> E Doxw,t,Mary : the cake tastes good to x in w' at t'
(213) a. Sue convinced Mary that this cake is tasty prosam
b. [[Sue convinced Mary that this cake is tasty prosam ]]'' W=
= 1 iff Sue communicates with Mary in a way that causes it to be the case that
V<w',t',x> E DOxw,t,Ma y : the cake tastes good to Sam in w' at t'
If we now consider epithets, what we know is that epithets are generally speaker-oriented (with
rare exceptions), (cf. Potts (2007), Harris (2009, 2012)). In particular, for all the grammatical
examples of epithets that I discuss, such as (214b), it seems to be the case that it has to be the
speaker who thinks that the referent of the epithet is stupid (i.e. the evaluator has to be the
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speaker). Even the ungrammatical examples, such as (214a), were evaluated with this reading in
mind.
(214) a. * Johni thinks that the idioti is smart.
b. ?OK John, convinced Peter that the idioti is smart.
Therefore, epithets cannot be judge-dependent as part of their lexical entry (in the way in which
Stephenson (2007) argues that epistemic modals are judge-dependent); on a par with predicates
of personal taste, the individual whose evaluation they reflect (the evaluator) is an argument of
the epithet in Stephenson's (2007) sense. Recall the interpretation of idiot in (43), repeated from
above.
(215) [[idiot ]]w"t = x . ky : x believes that y is stupid in w at t . y is a person in w at t
We need to have an LF as in (216) and (217), where the first (evaluator) argument slot of idiot is
filled by a pronoun that refers to the speaker. Crucially, in (216), the judge of the embedded
clause is shifted to John, whereas in (217), it is shifted to Peter. This seems to be what is
responsible for the ill-formedness of (216), and the well-formedness of (217). In (216) and
(217), the idea is that a null pro that refers to the speaker (prothe-speaker) satisfies the first argument
slot of the epithet.
(216) * Johni thinks that proi, [the idiot prothe-speaker], is smart.
(217) ?OK Johni convinced Peter that proi, [the idiot prothe-speaker), is smart.
Note that in both cases, we want the contribution of the epithet to be as in (218). The question
that underlies the Anti-Judge Constraint is why (216) should be ruled out if (217) is possible.
This question will be addressed in the following chapter.
(218) the speaker believes that John is stupid in w at t
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To conclude this chapter, we may conjecture that the reason (216) is ungrammatical has
something to do with the distribution of speaker-oriented pro elements. However, in chapter 4,
we will see a different approach to the constraints on epithets, which also covers the contrast
between (217) and (218), and sheds new light on the Anti-Judge Constraint.
3.4 Conclusion
Chapter 3 explored the idea further that epithets are null pronouns that are modified by a nominal
appositive. I focused on constructions in which epithets do not seem to pattern like pronouns
and argued that their behaviour seems to be connected to the notion of judge (or evaluator). I
introduced Lasersohn's and Stephenson's idea that predicates of personal taste involve an
individual whose perspective is adopted (the evaluator). I showed that epithets seem to be
sensitive to an evaluator in the same way, which typically corresponds to the speaker. I argued
that epithets seem to exhibit a ban against occurring in a clause that has their antecedent as its
judge. For now, it is unclear how this ban comes about, but chapter 4 sheds light on this 'anti-
judge constraint'. At the end of this section, it is worth pointing out that the role of c-command
between an epithet and its antecedent generally reduces to the fact that an epithet's antecedent
only becomes the judge of the embedded clause if it is the subject of the matrix predicate, which
entails that it c-commands the epithet.
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Chapter 4: The Nature of Anti-Locality Effects
In chapter 2, I proposed a syntax for epithets, namely that they are nominal appositives with a
null anchor. This was followed by a semantic proposal in chapter 3 which treats epithets as
presuppositional elements that convey that a salient evaluator (typically the speaker) holds a
certain negative (or positive) evaluation towards the epithet's referent.
Since the birth of contemporary Binding Theory (cf. Chomsky (1981)), the status of
epithets has been greatly disputed (as we saw in chapter 2), and so have the constraints that apply
to them. For example, Reinhart (1983a) (who treated epithets as R-expression) argued that
Condition C of the Binding Theory was not a part of the grammar50 . Her main line of
argumentation was that there are many counter-examples to Condition C of the Binding Theory
that concern not just epithets, but most types of R-expressions . She proposed to remove
Condition C from the syntax and propose a somewhat similar, though not identical constraint in
the pragmatics; she argues that the relevant constraint should be concerned with the descriptive
content of R-expressions, and not the structural and locality configurations, which is the case for
pronouns and anaphors.
Since Reinhart (1983a), there have been perhaps two influential interface approaches to
epithets: Dubinsky & Hamilton (1998), and Schlenker (2005). I will discuss these approaches
below. There are two points I would like to make in this chapter. The first point is that the
observations I will present in this chapter (bearing in mind Reinhart's 1983a proposal to remove
Condition C from the grammar) beg the following question: What is the division of labour
between the syntax on the one hand, and the semantics and pragmatics on the other? In this
section, I present a novel observation which suggests that there is a general tendency in some
languages for an epithet in subject position to be worse then an epithet in object position; I show
that this observation is connected to constraints that are reminiscent of the Condition on
5 Recall that the Binding Principles were not construed at the same point in time. Principles A & B were proposed
first. Principle C was proposed later in order to account for strong cross over effects. When the syntactic machinery
changed and Government and Binding was introduced, strong cross-over could be accounted for. It should be
pointed out that Chomsky was the first to question whether Condition C was really truly a part of the grammar,
given that strong cross over could be accounted for by the mechanisms present in the newer syntactic theory.
Further proposals by Lasnik resulted in Condition C being reinstated as a part of the Binding Theory on empirical
grounds.
51 Cf. Heim (1998), and Schlenker (2005) who also follow suit.
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Extraction Domains (CED) first observed by Huang (1982). This observation suggests that
epithets are subject to locality constraints in the syntax. In this chapter I present how the
semantics sketched above interfaces with the syntactic argumentation that I develop in this
chapter; finally, I try to show for epithets that we cannot remove Condition C from syntax, but
rather we must try to understand how the locality constraint on their distribution interacts with
the expressive properties that epithets possess. The second point I would like to make in this
section concerns Reinhart's (1983a) original claim of proposing a Condition C-like constraint in
the pragmatics. In this vein, I discuss Schlenker (2005),, a paper that develops Reinhart's ideas,
and attempts to explain Condition C effects through a Gricean maxim which Schlenker calls
Minimize Restrictors! In the discussion part of the section, I will show that when we remove
Condition C from the grammar, and attempt to explain Condition C effects, Condition C
violations and Condition C obviation effects through a constraint in the pragmatics, this
constraint is something that looks like Condition C, but is not Condition C proper. This has a
number of consequences, which will be discussed along the way.
This chapter is structured as follows. In chapter 4.1, I first outline an observation which
suggests that we cannot simply remove Condition C from the syntax. In chapter 4.2, I proceed to
show how the subject-object asymmetry can be explained in terms of syntactic constraints that
interact with the semantics proposed in chapter 3. In chapter 4.3, I briefly review two proposals
which (i) discuss the interaction between epithets, attitude predicates and locality (Dubinsky &
Hamilton 1998), and (ii) a proposal which argues that the locality constraint that is applicable to
epithets should be semantic and pragmatic in nature (Schlenker 2005). I conclude that these
proposals do not provide the necessary means to derive the patterns that I observe.
4.1 A New Problem for Locality: The Subject-Object Asymmetry
In chapter 3, I argued that epithets cannot occur in an embedded clause if the null anchor pro of
the epithet is referentially dependent on the current judge; i.e. the judge parameter cannot select
the antecedent of the epithet's pro anchor. This derives the fact that epithets cannot be in the
subject position of complements to think, while they can be in the subject position of
complements to convince. However, we notice that this constraint only applies to epithets in
subject position. A new puzzle arises when we look at epithets in object position.
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Looking at different languages, we find that epithets in the complement of think are only
ungrammatical when referentially dependent on the matrix subject if they are in the subject
position, and not if they are in the object position. Examples like the ones that we saw in section
3, where such an epithet is ungrammatical in the subject position of a complement to think are
given in (219) for English, (219a), French, (219b), and Czech, (219c).
(219)a. * Nero1 thinks that [the damn traitor1] should invite [Sarkozy] to the peace talks.
b. ** Nero, pense que [le sale traitre]i
Nero thinks that the dirty traitor
French
devrait inviter [Sarkozy] aux pourparlers
should invite Sarkozy to.the talks
de paix.
of peace
'Neroi thinks that [the damn traitor1] should invite [Sarkozy] to the peace talks.'
c.* Nero
Nero
si mysli, ie by ten
refl thinks that sbj.3 that
zatracenf
damn
zridcei
traitor
Czech
mel prizvat Sarkozyho
should invite Sarkozy.acc
k mirovfm rozhovoro'm.
to peace talks
'Nero thinks that [the damn traitor1] should invite [Sarkozy] to the peace talks.'
The data in (219) sharply contrast with those in (220), where the epithet is in the object position.
While (219a-c) are ungrammatical, (220a-c) seem to be perfectly grammatical.
(220) a. OK Nero, thinks that [Sarkozy] should invite [the damn traitor,] to the peace talks.
b. OKNero,
Nero
pense que
thinks that
[Sarkozy] devrait
Sarkozy should
inviter [le sale traitre]i aux
invite the dirty traitor to.the
French
pourpalers
talks
de paix.
of peace
'Nero thinks that [Sarkozy] should invite [the damn traitori] to the peace talks.'
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c. OK Neroi si mysli, ze by Sarkozy mel toho zatracendho zridcei
Nero refl thinks that sbj.3 Sarkozy should that damn traitor.acc invite
k mirovjm rozhovorn'm.
to peace talks
'Neroi thinks that [Sarkozy] should invite [the damn traitor1 ] to the peace talks.'
We find a similar contrast (though the examples differ less minimally) in (221) versus (222).
Again, we reproduce the above observation. The data in (221) show an epithet that refers to the
subject of think, which is ungrammatical in the subject position of the complement.
(221) a. * Nero, thinks that [the damn traitor,] will solve [the problem].
French
b. *(*) Nero, pense que [le sale traitre,] rdsoudra [le probleme].
Nero thinks that the dirty traitor will.solve the problem
'Nero, thinks that [the damn traitor] will solve [the problem].'
c. * Neroi denkt dat de verdomde verrader1 het probleem zal
Nero thinks that the damned traitor the problem will solve
'Nero, thinks that [the damn traitor,] will solve [the problem].'
Dutch
d. * Jan denkt dat de verrekte eikeli het probleem zal oplossen.
J. thinks that the damned jerk the problem will solve
'Jan, thinks that [the damn traitor] will solve [the problem].'
Czech
e. * Nero si myslif, le ten zatracenf zrdidce vy'esi
Nero refl thinks that that damn
ten problem.
traitor solve.pfv that problem
'Nero, thinks that [the damn traitor,] will solve [the problem].'
By contrast, (222) shows an epithet that refers to the subject of think, which is grammatical in the
object position of the complement.
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Czech
prizvat
Dutch
oplossen.
(222) a. OK Nero, thinks that [everyone] fears [the damn traitor,].
French
b. ??) Nero, pense que [tout le monde] a peur [du sale traitre]1 .
Nero thinks that all the world has fear of.the dirty traitor
Nero thinks that [everyone] fears [the damn traitor].
French
c. OK Nero pense que [tout le monde] a peur [de ce sale traitre],.
Nero thinks that all the world has fear of that dirty traitor
Nero, thinks that [everyone] fears [the damn traitor1 ].
Dutch
d.?? Jan denkt dat iedereen de verrekte eikeli vreest.
J. thinks that everyone the damned jerk fears
'Jan thinks that [everyone] fears [the damn traitor1].'
Czech
e. OK Nero, si mysli, ie se toho zatracendho zrddce kaidf1 obdivsa.
Nero refl thinks that refl that damn traitor.gen everyone.nom fears
'Nero, thinks that [everyone] fears [the damn traitor1].'
The problem can be stated as follows: The subject and object in a complement to think should be
interpreted with respect to the same judge parameter setting, i.e. these contrasts are not predicted
by the anti-judge constraint as stated in chapter 3. In chapter 4.2, I refine my proposal to account
for these more fine-grained differences. To conclude, it is worth considering other approaches to
the distribution of epithets, which I do in chapter 4.3; as we will see, these fare no better than the
anti-judge constraint proposed in section 3.
4.2 My Claim: Explaining The Subject-Object Asymmetry
4.2.1 Introducing the De Se vs De Re distinction
To begin this section, it is worth briefly pointing out another connected and problematic
phenomenon, which will be relevant for our analysis of epithets, namely de se interpretations of
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attitude reports. De se attitude reports are a concern because they involve a sense of self-
reference to be explained (cf Lewis (1979), Perry (1979) and Chierchia (1989)). Consider the
following example from Perry (1979), discussed in Stephenson (2007). A person called Rudolf
Lingens has amnesia. He is lost in the Stanford library. He doesn't know his own identity, nor
does he know where he is. Even if he came across an article in the library where he learns that
there is an amnesiac named Rudolf Lingens lost in the Stanford library, he might not realize that
the individual being discussed in the article is he himself. In this scenario, he could only utter
Lingens is lost in the Stanford library (and not I am lost in the Stanford library). Now consider a
contrasting scenario. Whilst Lingens is in the library reading the article, he suddenly regains his
memory; in this case, he could say I am lost in the Stanford library. This is a de se belief
(attitude) report, as Lingens consciously expresses knowledge that is about himself (i.e. he
knows that this proposition involves him). The classical de se problem can be stated as follows.
If we view propositions as sets of worlds, how do we tease apart these two sets of beliefs?
Furthermore, de se attitudes are problematic because particular constructions are obligatorily
interpreted de se, in particular attitude reports involving embedded infinitives and subject control
(Morgan, 1970; Chierchia, 1989). Consider the Italian example in (223). In this case, the
sentence could only be true if Pavarotti himself utters I am a genius. The example could not be
true in a scenario where Pavarotti hears himself on the Radio, and, without recognising his own
voice, utters this singer is a genius.
Italian
(223) Pavarotti crede di essere un genio.
Pavarotti believes coMP be a genius.
'Pavarotti believes that he's a genius.' (literal reading: Pavarotti believes to be a genius)
(From Stephenson (2007), Anand, (2006:1), based on Chierchia, (1989))
In the literature, it is controversial as to whether de se LFs also exist for English finite clauses
such as (224a), uttered to describe the situation in (224b).
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(224) a. John thinks that he is smart.
b. John's thought: "I am smart."
In the following section I will introduce Percus and Sauerland (2003a), (2003b), who argue that
in English, de se readings for examples like (224) have an independent logical form in the
semantics. I will adopt this core idea and show how their system can explain the behaviour of
epithets with respect to think. The crux of the explanation is that when an epithet is contained in
the complement proposition of think, and a de se interpretation is intended, the epithet cannot be
interpreted in its surface position - following Demirdache & Percus (2011 a), (2011 b), I assume
that the use of epithets in such construction involves a movement link between the surface
position of the epithet and the position of its antecedent; the subject/object asymmetry then
follows from the subject/object asymmetry in movement (subjects being islands). In sections
4.2.2 and 4.2.3, I introduce the Percus & Sauerland system, and in 4.2.4 and 4.2.5, I show how
we can derive the subject/object asymmetry in their system.
4.2.2 Percus & Sauerland (2003a), (2003b): The Case for De Se LFs
Recall the contrast under investigation, repeated in (225). In order to explain the contrast in
(225), I now focus on analogous examples from Percus & Sauerland (2003a), which share
properties with the examples in (225).
(225) a. * Nero1 thinks that [the damn traitor,] should invite [Sarkozy] to the peace talks.
b. O' Neroi thinks that [Sarkozy] should invite [the damn traitor1] to the peace talks.
Percus & Sauerland (2003a) discuss the example in (226a), and argue that it can be used to
describe both the de se belief in (226b) and the de re belief in (226c).
(226) a. John thinks that he will win the election.
(Percus & Sauerland 2003a)
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b. de se belief
John thinks: "I will win the election."
c. de re belief
John is drunk and sees someone giving a speech on TV; not recognizing that it is he
himself, John thinks: "This guy (on TV) will win the election."
The question that Percus & Sauerland (2003a) address is whether (226b) and (226c) have the
same logical form. Percus & Sauerland (2003b) discuss parallel facts for dream reports. The
idea is that (227a) can describe two different situations; it can describe a dream of John's in
which his dream-self wins the election, (227b), but it can also describe a dream of John's in
which he is someone else (in this example: Fred) and Fred sees John winning the election,
(227c).
(227) a. John dreams that he will win the election.
b. embedded subject = dream self (parallel to de se)
In John's dream, the dream-self (John) is giving an acceptance speech at his victory
party.
c. embedded subject # dream self (parallel to de re)
John dreams that he is Fred. In John's dream, the dream-self (Fred) is watching TV,
and sees John giving an acceptance speech at his victory party.
The difference between the (226b) and (226c) is parallel to the difference between (227b) and
(227c). In (227b), the embedded pronoun that corefers with John is identical to his dream self,
whereas in (227c), it is different from his dream self. Similarly, in the de se case (226b), we
could say that the embedded pronoun that corefers with John is identical to his beliefself (i.e. the
individual identical to John in all of John's belief worlds), whereas in (226c) it is different from
his belief self. The main proposal of Percus & Sauerland (2003a), (2003b) is that these two
constructions actually have different LFs. To understand this, we need to consider the lexical
entry that they assume for predicates such as think/dream. Their lexical entry for dream is given
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in (228a); as we see, dream does not combine with propositions, but with properties, and the first
argument of the property is satisfied by the dream-self A similar lexical entry can be given for
think in (228b)".
(228) a. [[dream]]g = XP<e,<s,t>> . %x . kw. For all <y, w'> in DREAMx,,, P(y)(w') = 1
(DREAM,, stands for the set of pairs <y, w'> such that w' is a world compatible
with x's dream in w, and y is the individual in w' who x, in w identifies as himself.)
Percus & Sauerland (2003b)
b. [[think]]g = kP<e,<s,t>> . x. %w. For all <y, w'> in DOXx,,, P(y)(w') = 1
(DOXx,, stands for the set of pairs <y, w'> such that w' is a world compatible with
x's beliefs in w, and y is the individual in w' who x, in w identifies as himself.)
Given that complements of dream and think are analysed as properties, the first argument of
which is filled by the dream-self / belief-self, we need a way of turning propositions into
properties. In the de se cases, Percus & Sauerland (2003a), (2003b) assume that this is done by
lambda abstraction over the pronoun that apparently refers to the matrix subject. This is
illustrated in (229). The pronoun he* is assumed to be uninterpreted and serve to create an
additional argument slot; I come back to this in section 4.2.3. (Note that in (229), as we see
below, John does not bind or corefer with the embedded subject he, but the embedded subject is
identified with the belief-self / dream-self of thinks /dreams; see (230).)
(229) de se LF
John thinks/dreams that (he*) X2 [t 2 will win the election].
The meaning of this LF is derived as in (230). Starting bottom up, we start with the proposition
in CP 2 , t2 will win the election, from which we derive the property in CP1 by lambda abstraction
over the subject of CP 2, which is the trace of the uninterpreted pronoun he*. In the next step of
52 The entry on (228b) is based on (228a), as the entry that Percus & Sauerland (2003a) assume, involves the
additional notion of concept-generators, which is irrelevant for present purposes.
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the derivation when thinks combines with CPI, the subject of the embedded predicate will win the
election is identified with the belief-self. This is due to the fact that it is a part of the lexical
entry of thinks, that the first argument of its complement is identified with the belief-self. Once
the resulting V' is applied to John, we derive the meaning that in all of John's belief worlds,
John's belief-self wins the elections.
(230) de se LF
VP
[[John thinks (he*) X2 t2 will win the election ]]9 =
= Xw. For all <y, w'> in DOXJohnw, y will win the election in w
where y is John's belief-self in w'
DP V'
[[John]]9 = John [[thinks (he*) X2 t2 will win the election ]]9 =
= Xx.kw.For all <y, w'> in DOX,,, y will win the election in w'
where y is x's belief-self in w'
V
[[thinks]]g =
= XP<e,<,t>> . Xx . Xw.
For all <y, w'> in DOXx,w, P(y)(w') = 1
where y is x's belief-self in w'
CP1
[[(he*) X2 t2 will win the election ]]9 =
= kx.kw.x will win the election in w
X2 CP 2
[[t 2 will win the election ]]g =
= Xw.g(2) will win the election in w
For the de re LF, Percus & Sauerland (2003a), (2003b) do not assume that the property is
derived by lambda abstraction. To create a property from a proposition, they posit a 'type-
shifter', given in (231). This type-shifter creates a property from a proposition, where the first
argument (the x slot in (231)) is vacuous. The reader should be aware that I am using a
simplification of the Percus & Sauerland system, which leaves certain aspects of the semantics
open. The PROP operator as it stands is a vacuous abstractor. The crucial insight in that de se
LFs of the Percus and Sauerland type shed light on the behaviour of epithets. Therefore, I will
not be concerned with aspects of the system such as the question of the vacuous quantification of
the PROP operator. I leave this open for future research, and refer the reader to Percus &
Sauerland (2003a), (2003b) for the details.
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(231) [[PROP]] = Xp<st> . x . p
(Percus & Sauerland 2003a)
Percus & Sauerland (2003a) explore two possible de re Ls, given in (232). They assume that
the relevant relationship between the matrix subject John and the embedded subject he may be
construed via accidental coreference and via binding. However, in neither case is the embedded
subject identified with the belief-self.
(232) a. de re LF with accidental coreference.
John thinks/dreams that PROP [he 2 will win the election]. where: [2 -- John]
b. de re LF with binding.
John Xi ti thinks/dreams that PROP [hei will win the election].
The denotation of (232a) is given in (233). Starting in a bottom up fashion again, we create a
property from the proposition g(2) will win the election by means of the type shifter PROP,
which derives CP 1. Next, the verb thinks combines with the resulting property, as a consequence
of which g(2) will win the election is true in all belief worlds of the subject. In this case, the
belief-self does not become part of the embedded proposition; the referent for g(2) is inserted by
means of the variable assignment function (in this case, the pronoun he2 has the index 2, which is
mapped to John by the assignment function). When we combine the V' node with John we
derive the meaning where John is the individual who will win the election in all of John's belief
worlds, but at the same time, the individual who will win the election is not identified with
John's belief-self; this is the difference between (233) and (230).
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(233) de re LF with accidental coreference
VP
[[John thinks PROP he2 will win the election ]]9 =
= Xw . For all <y, w'> in DOXJohn,w, g(2) will win the election in w' =
= Xw. For all <y, w'> in DOXJohn,w, John will win the election in w'
where y is John's belief-self in w'
DP V
[[Joh
[[thi
= XP
For
whei
n]]g= John [[thinks PROP he2 will win the election ]]g =
= Xx.Xw.For all <y, w'> in DOXx,,, g(2) will win the election in w'
where y is x's belief-self in w'
VCP1
nks]] [[PROP he2 will win the election ]]g =
<e,<s,t Xx. Xw. = Xx.Xw.g(2) will win the election in w
ill <y, w'> in DOXx,W, P(y)(w') = 1
e y is x's belief-self in w' [[PROP]]9 = CP 2
= Xp.Xx.p [[he2 will win the election ]]9 =
= %w.g(2) will win the election in w
We can also derive the meaning of the de re LF that involves binding, given in (232b). The
derivation is given in (234), using a Heim & Kratzer (1998) semantics for binding. The first step
is the same as above, we create a property from the proposition g(1) will win the election by
means of the type shifter PROP, which derives CP 1. Next, thinks combines with CP1 ; as a
consequence of which g(1) will win the election in the belief worlds of the subject. In the next
steps, the trace of John, t, satisfies the subject argument slot of thinks, and by lambda abstraction
over the index 1, the subject of thinks and the subject of will win the election end up being co-
bound. The resulting predicate combines with John, so that John is the subject of thinks and the
subject of will win the election at the same time. Again, identification of the subject of will win
the election with John does not involve John's belief-self. This is the difference between (234)
and (230).
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(234) de re LF with binding
VP
[[John X1 ti thinks PROP he2 will win the election ]]9 =
SXw. For all <y, w'> in DOXhon,,, John will win the election in w'
where y is John's belief-self in w'
DP [[ Xi ti thinks PROP hei will win the election ]]9=
[[John]]g = John = kx.Xw.For all <y, w'> in DOXx,,, x will win the election in w'
where y is x's belief-self in w'
X1 [[t, thinks PROP hei will win the election ]]9 =
= kw.For all <y, w'> in DOXg(1),,, g(l) will win the election in w'
where y is g(1)'s belief-self in w'
ti V'
[[ thinks PROP he, will win the election ]]9 =
= kx.Xw.For all <y, w'> in DOXx,,, g(1) will win the election in w'
where y is x's belief-self in w'
V CP 1
[[thinks]]g = [[PROP hei will win the election ]]9 =
= kP<e,<s,t . Xx. Xw. = Xx.%w.g(1) will win the election in w
For all <y, w'> in DOXX,W, P(y)(w')= 1
where y is x's belief-self in w' [[PROP]]g = CP 2
= Xp.kx.p [[ he, will win the election ]]g =
= Xw.g(1) will win the election in w
In brief, both de re LFs of Percus & Sauerland (2003a) give rise to the denotation in (235a),
whereas their de se LF gives rise to the denotation in (235b). The difference is marked by bold
type. The difference between the two denotations ultimately comes down to that fact that
(235b), the subject of will win the election is identified with John's belief-self. By contrast, in
(235a), the subject of will win the election is identified with John in the actual world. The idea
that I will pursue is that (235a) is only a possible LF when John is not aware of the fact that he
himself is the subject of will win the election (e.g. if he is drunk and does not recognize himself
giving a speech on TV). First, I will review the arguments from Percus & Sauerland (2003a) for
the existence of de se LFs.
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(235) a. denotation of think-statement with de re LF
Xw. For all <y, w'> in DOXJohnw, John will win the election in w =
where y is John's belief-self in w'
b. denotation of think-statement with de se LF
Xw. For all <y, w'> in DOXJhn,w, y will win the election in w'
where y is John's belief-self in w'
One alternative way of thinking about de se readings (which does not assume de se LFs) could
be to assume that de se readings are a subset of de re readings, and that we only have one LF,
namely de re one as in (232a) or (232b) with a denotation as in (235a) (there is a person x such
that John thinks that x is smart, and x happens to be John). Percus and Sauerland (2003a)
challenge this view, and argue that in English, de se readings for such examples have an
independent logical form in the semantics, as in (229) with the denotation in (235b).
Percus and Sauerland (2003a) argue that thinks in English can have a separate de se LF,
based on the fact that (236b) seems to be true in the context described in (236a), even though it
should be false if we assume the LF in (232a) or the LF in (232b). The important parts of their
argument can be summarised as follows. First, in (236a), there are two people who think that
John will win the election, namely John (who thinks "I'll win") and Peter (who thinks "the third
candidate will win", which is John). Second, there are three people in (236a) who happen to
think (two of them in a non-de se way) that they will win, namely John (who thinks "I'll win", a
de se reading), Bill (who thinks "the first candidate will win", not knowing that this is Bill) and
Sam (who thinks "the second candidate will win", not knowing that this is Sam). The last two
people, Bill and Sam think these thoughts in a non-de se way (i.e. they do not think that their
belief-selfs will win). Thirdly, John is the only person who thinks "I'll win", i.e. who has a de se
belief (meaning that he thinks that his belief-self will win). Percus & Sauerland argue that the
true statement in (236b) in the context (236a) shows that there is a separate de se LF, as they
argue that (236b) should be false if only de re interpretations were possible (as there are two
people who think that John will win, and there are three people who, partly unknowingly, think
that they themselves will win). I now go through the details of their argument.
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(236)a. Scenario: A group of drunken election candidates watching campaign speeches on
television do not recognize themselves in the broadcast. John, the only confident one,
thinks "I'll win," but does not recognize himself in the broadcast. Bill and Sam, both
depressive, think "I'll lose" but are impressed by the speeches that happen to be their
own and are sure "that candidate" will win. Peter, also depressive, happens to be
impressed not by his own speech but by John's.
b. Only John thinks that he will win the election.
(Percus & Sauerland 2003a:234)
The full argument of Percus & Sauerland can be summarised as follows. If we assume a de re
LF, we can either have the pronoun that is construed 'de re' accidentally corefer with John, as in
(232a), or alternatively, this pronoun can be bound by John, as in (232b), even though it is still
interpreted de re. The two possible de re readings are given in (237) and (238), based on Percus
& Sauerland (2003a). First, we observe that (237a) is a false statement with the de re LF that
involves accidental coreference, the denotation of which is repeated in (237b); this is due to the
fact that Peter happens to think that John will win the election.
(237)a. Only John thinks that he will win the election. (de re LF and he corefers with John)
b. [[thinks PROP he2 will win the election ]]9 =
= Xx.Xw.For all <y, w'> in DOXX,W, g(2) will win the election in w'
(where g(2) = John)
c. presupposes: John thinks (de re) that John will win the election.
asserts: Bill doesn't think (de re) that John will win the election, and = TRUE
Sam doesn't think (de re) that John will win the election, and = TRUE
Peter doesn't think (de re) that John will win the election. = FALSE
Second, we observe that (238a) is a false statement with the de re LF that involves binding, the
denotation of which is repeated in (238b), as both Bill and Sam happen to think (unknowingly, as
they do not recognise themselves) that they will win the election.
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(238)a. Only John thinks that he will win the election. (de re LF and he is bound by John)
b. [[k, ti thinks PROP hei will win the election ]]9 =
= kx.kw.For all <y, w'> in DOXx,,, x will win the election in w'
c. presupposes: John thinks (de re) that John will win the election.
asserts: Bill doesn't think (de re) that Bill will win the election, and = FALSE
Sam doesn't think (de re) that Sam will win the election, and = FALSE
Peter doesn't think (de re) that Peter will win the election. = TRUE
Percus & Sauerland's argument for a de se LF is based on the fact that (236b) still seems to be a
true statement, which follows from assuming a de se LF, as in (239b), repeated from (230).
(239) a. Only John thinks that he will win the election. (de se LF)
b. [[thinks (he*) X2 t 2 will win the election ]]g =
= kx.kw.For all <y, w'> in DOXx,,, y will win the election in w'
where y is x's belief-self in w'
c. presupposes: John thinks (de se) that John('s belief-self) will win the election.
asserts:
Bill doesn't think (de se) that Bill('s belief-self) will win the election, ad = TRUE
Sam doesn't think (de se) that Sam('s belief-self) will win the election, and = TRUE
Peter doesn't think (de se) that Peter('s belief-self) will win the election. = TRUE
In the remainder of chapter 4, I will use some of the ideas present in Percus and Sauerland
(2003a), specifically, I will argue that in line with Percus and Sauerland, think can have an
independent de se logical form; I also assume that this de se LF must be used whenever the
subject of think has a belief that involves that subject's belief-self. I contrast this with the case of
convince, where only a de re interpretation is possible; I will then show how this analysis can
derive the subject/object asymmetry.
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4.2.3 The Role of Uninterpreted Pronouns in De Se LFs
After arguing that the complement of English think can have a de se LF, Percus & Sauerland
(2003a) argue that such de se LFs are derived by leaving a pronoun inside the complement CP
uninterpreted; as already indicated above, this is the pronoun that apparently 'corefers' to the
matrix subject. This is illustrated in (241); here, he is the uninterpreted pronoun. (241a) is from
Percus & Sauerland (2003a); (241b) is a simplified version of the analysis in Percus & Sauerland
(2003a), as given in section 4.2.2.
(240) a. John thinks he will win the election.
b. de se LF: John thinks (he*) X2 t2 will win the election.
In what follows, I will focus on the notion of such uninterpreted pronouns. The core idea is
illustrated in (241). If a sentence like (241a) is interpreted de se, the pronoun he remains
uninterpreted, which Percus & Sauerland (2003a) mark by the asterisk '*'. The purpose of using
an uninterpreted pronoun such as he* is for this pronoun to move up, leave a trace, generate a
binder operator, and thus turn the complement of think into a property. As shown in section
4.2.2 above, what (241c) eventually means is that John self-attributes the property" of winning
the election in all of his belief worlds (i.e. John has a de se belief). It is important, that he* is not
interpreted, and simply serves to create a trace and trigger lambda abstraction (by moving up).
(241)a. John thinks [he* will win the election].
b. LF: John thinks (he*) X2 [t2 will win the election].
c. [[thinks (he*) X2 t2 will win the election ]]g =
= Xx.Xw.For all <y, w'> in DOXx,W, y will win the election in w'
where y is x's belief-self in w'
(adapted from Percus & Sauerland 2003a:241)
SCEf. Quine's (1982) notion of exportation in belief sentences, mapping a proposition into a property and a de re
belief.
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For object pronouns, Percus & Sauerland (2003a) assume a similar configuration, given in (242).
Here, the object is identified with the belief-self of the matrix subject; the derivation is analogous
to (230).
(242) a. John thinks [Mary will vote for him*].
b. LF: John thinks (him*) X2 [Mary will vote for t2].
c. [[thinks (him*) k2 that Mary will vote for t2 ]]g =
= kx. Xw. for all <y, w'> in DOXX,W, Mary votes for y in w'
where y is x's belief-self in w'
(adapted from Percus & Sauerland 2003a:241)
Developing the idea from chapter 3, I propose that the predicates in which the matrix subject is
the judge of the embedded clause are the same predicates that allow for such de se LFs. We can
thus restate (and derive) the Anti-Judge Constraint in terms of the null anchor: The proposal is
that epithets cannot combine with null anchors that consist of uninterpreted pronouns (in Percus
& Sauerland's sense); this idea is based on Demirdache & Percus (2011 a), (2011 b). Of course
this entails that complements of think must (rather than may) take complements with de se LFs in
the cases in which epithets are unacceptable. I come back to this later.
For think versus convince it can be shown that this is on the right track. Recall the
judgments in (243). If the constraint on epithets is a constraint that epithets cannot modify
uninterpreted pronouns, the contrast between (243a) and (243b) follows if (243a) involves an
uninterpreted pro* as the null anchor of the idiot, whereas (243b) does not.
(243) a. * Johni thinks that the idiot is smart.
b.?oK Johni convinced Peter that the idiot is smart.
This seems correct. Reconsider Stephenson's (2007) entries for think and convince, in (244a)
and (244b), repeated from (194) and (195).
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(244)a. [[think ]]W'tj= [Ap<s,<i,et>> . [kxe. V<w',t',y> E Doxw,t,x: p(w')(t')(y) = 1]]
b. [[convince ]]'' = [kze. [Xp<s,<i,et,> . [kxe . x communicates with z in a way that causes
it to be the case that V<w',t',y> E Doxw,t,z : p(w')(t')(y) = 1]]]
(Stephenson 2007:43,149, slightly adapted)
If we use the Percus & Sauerland (2003a) notation instead, we can adapt (244b) as in (245a), by
analogy with (245a), repeated from (228b). As the complement proposition of convince in
(245b) is interpreted with respect to the object DP's belief worlds and belief-self, a de se
interpretation is only conceivable with respect to the object and not with respect to the subject of
convince.
(245) a. [[think]]g = kP<e,<s,t>> . kx . kw. For all <y, w'> in DOXx,w, P(y)(w') = 1
(DOXx,w stands for the set of pairs <y, w'> such that w' is a world compatible with
x's beliefs in w, and y is the individual in w' who x, in w identifies as himself.)
b. [[convince]]g = kZe . P<e,<s,t>> . Xx. kw. x communicates with z in a way that
causes it to be the case that for all <y, w'> in DOX,w, P(y)(w') = 1
(DOX,w stands for the set of pairs <y, w'> such that w' is a world compatible with
z' s beliefs in w, and y is the individual in w' who z, in w identifies as himself.)
As convince is not interpreted with respect to the subject's beliefs, a de se reading cannot pick
out the subject's belief-self, which derives the fact that (243b) is acceptable, in contrast to the
unacceptable (243a). Naturally the question arises whether a de se reading can be construed with
respect to the object of convince. To test this, we have to modify Percus & Sauerland's scenario
in (236), as given in (246). Whilst this context is evidently more difficult to judge, and
judgments are hazy, the judgments that I collected indicate that (246b) cannot be true in this
context, due to the fact that Mary also convinced Peter that John will win, and it does not matter
that she only convinced John to think "I'll win". By Percus & Sauerland's logic, the fact that
(246b) has to be false in the context (246a) indicates that there is no de se LF available in (246b).
This may be due to the fact that the object of convince does not c-command the complement
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proposition (see chapter 4.2.4 for the idea, proposed in Percus & Sauerland 2003b, that the
uninterpreted pronoun must syntactically agree with the antecedent, i.e. the person whose belief-
self enters the de se interpretation). This is compatible with the fact that some speakers accept
the example in (247)54.
(246)a. Scenario: A group of drunken election candidates watching campaign speeches on
television do not recognise themselves in the broadcast. Mary talks to each of them. In
a long conversation, she convinces John to think "I'll win"; at the same time, John does
not recognise himself in the broadcast. She also convinces Bill and Sam to think "I'll
lose" but she argues that the speeches that happen to be their own are great and makes
Bill think "the second candidate" will win (which happens to be Bill though he does not
recognise himself), and makes Sam think "the third candidate" will win (which happens
to be Sam though he does not recognise himself either). Finally, she convinces Peter
that John will win.
b. Mary convinced only John that he will win the election.
(247) ?? Mary convinced Johni that the idioti will win the election.
We have found that the possibility of de se LFs with think and the lack of such de se LFs with
convince correlates with the acceptability of epithets in the complements of these predicates.
This suggests that the possibility of a de se LF with think is responsible for the ungrammaticality
of epithets in (the subject position of) the complement of think that corefer with the matrix
subject. In contrast, the unavailability of a de se LF with convince entails the grammaticality of
such epithets in (the subject position of) its complement. The question to be addressed in the
remainder of this chapter is how to derive this.
5 Similar difficulties in evaluating the relevant examples arise in evaluating (ii) in the scenario in (i). Preliminary
intuitions indicate that (ii) is also a false statement in this scenario. Further testing is necessary in this respect.
i. Scenario: A group of drunken election candidates watching campaign speeches on television do
not recognize themselves in the broadcast. John, the only confident one, convinces himself "I'll
win," but does not recognize himself in the broadcast. Bill and Sam, both depressive, think "I'll
lose" but are impressed by the speeches that happen to be their own and end up convincing
themselves that "that candidate" will win. Peter, also depressive, happens to be impressed not by
his own speech but by John's and convinces himself that John will win.
ii. Only John convinced himself that he will win the election.
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Also, one more assumption that is necessary for explaining this distribution is that think
must combine with de se LFs whenever the reported context is one where the actual belief is best
characterized as a de se belief. This will be the case in most circumstances, as (248a) is typically
understood to mean (248b), and not (248c).
(248) a. John thinks that he is smart.
b. John thinks: I am smart.
c. John thinks: That guy on TV who I don't recognise is smart.
The assumption that a de se LF (where an argument of the embedded proposition is identified
with the belief-self) must be used when a de se belief is described is supported by Percus &
Sauerland's (2003b) idea that dream reports that are about the subject's dream-self also require
such an LF. In a situation, in which John describes a dream in which he is Bill, the dream report
sentence in (249) can only have the readings in (250a), (250b) and (250d), but not the reading in
(250c). Percus & Sauerland derive the unavailability of (250c) from the assumption that the first
occurrence of the dream-self in the embedded clause requires movement of the respective he* or
his* to derive the 'de se'-like LF, and in (250c), his* cannot move across he, due to a syntactic
superiority violation. See Percus & Sauerland (2003b) for the details. For my purposes I take
this to indicate that identification of an argument in the embedded clause with the dream-self or
belief-self of the matrix predicate (as Percus & Sauerland (2003a), (2003b) analyse dream and
think in parallel) requires such a de se LF (otherwise, (250c) should still be a conceivable de re
interpretation - which it is not, as it is unacceptable).
(249) John dreamed that he was marrying his grand-daughter.
(Percus & Sauerland 2003b)
(250) a. OK In John's dreams, the dream-self (Bill) marries the dream-self s (Bill's) grand-daughter.
b. OK In John's dreams, the dream-self (Bill) marries John's grand-daughter.
c. # In John's dreams, John marries the dream-self s (Bill's) grand-daughter.
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d. O' In John's dreams, John marries John's grand-daughter.
(Percus & Sauerland 2003b)
To summarise this section, I have argued that think must combine with a de se LF whenever it
reports on a de se belief (e.g. if we use (248a) to describe (248b)). Furthermore, in de se LFs, the
pronouns that co-refer with the matrix subject are uninterpreted, following Percus & Sauerland
(2003a), as their only purpose is license a binder operator that turns the complement of think into
a property (rather than a proposition), creating the de se LF. And finally, nominal appositives
cannot modify null anchors that are uninterpreted pronouns of this type; as we will see in section
4.2.4, this idea is inspired by Demirdache & Percus (2011 a, 2011 b), who make the same
assumption for Jordanian Arabic. For now, we can motivate this as follows. A nominal
appositive, such as the farmer in (251 a) is interpreted as in (251 b), as part of the predicate is
a/the farmer; the question is where the subject of this predicate (i.e. he in (25 1b)) gets its
meaning from. We can assume, that it gets its meaning from the appositive's anchor, which
means that the anchor must be interpreted. (See also Potts (2003, 2005), where appositives are
analysed as compositionally predicating over the anchor.)
(251) a. John, the farmer, visited the pub.
b. John visited the pub, and he is a/the farmer.
This derives the Anti-Judge Constraint on epithets for the most simple case. The relevant
contrast is given in (252).
(252) a. * Johni thinks that the idioti is smart.
b.?oK Johni convinced Peter that the idiot is smart.
The explanation for the contrast in (252) is as follows. Example (252a) requires a de se LF, i.e.
the null pro anchor of the epithet is uninterpreted (written as pro*), given in (253a), which makes
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(252a) ungrammatical. In contrast, (252b) cannot have a de se LF; it must have a de re LF,
(253b), and is thus grammatical.
(253)a.* John thinks that pro*, the idiot, is smart. (de se LF)
b. ?OK John, convinced Peter thatproi, the idioti, is smart. (only de re LF)
An prediction at this point is that an epithet in the subject position of thinks becomes better if a
de re LF is enforced by the context, as in (254). The prediction is that (254b) is acceptable in the
context in (254a); preliminary judgments indicate that this is indeed the case.
(254) a. Context: John is completely drunk and does not recognise himself. He sees someone
give an election speech on TV, and thinks that this person will win the election.
b. John thinks that the idiot will win the election.
Coming back to examples from chapter 3, repeated in (262) from (207) and in (256) from (205),
the prediction arises that the unacceptable examples (262b) and (256b) allow (and require) a de
se LF, whereas the acceptable examples (262a) and (256a) do not allow for such a de se LF.
(255) a. ?OK Neroi thinks that Sarkozy thinks that the damn traitori should attend the peace talks.
b. * Sarkozy thinks that Neroi thinks that the damn traitori should attend the peace talks.
(256) a. ?OK Neroi doesn't know that the damn traitori should invite Sarkozy to the peace talks.
b. * NeroI knows that the damn traitor, should invite Sarkozy to the peace talks.
For (262), it can be shown that this is the case. Using the simplified contexts in (264a) and
(25 8a), given that judgments are difficult as it is, and it is enough for present purposes to control
for the coreferential de re interpretation, we notice the following asymmetry. (264b) seems to be
a true statement, even though in Sarkozy's thoughts Nero is not the only one who thinks that
Nero should attend the peace talks. Contrastively, (258b) seems to be a false statement. This
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contrast is predicted if (264b) allows for a de se LF and (258b) does not. If (258b) did allow for
such a de se LF, (258b) should also be true, as Nero is the only one who beliefs that Sarkozy will
invite Nero's belief-self to the peace talks.
(257) a. Context:
Sarkozy thinks: "Nero thinks: 'I should attend the peace talks' ".
Sarkozy thinks: "Bill thinks that Nero should attend the peace talks".
b. Sarkozy thinks that only Nero1 thinks that hei should attend the peace talks. (TRUE)
(258) a. Context:
Nero thinks: "Sarkozy thinks that I (=Nero) should attend the peace talks."
Bill thinks: "Sarkozy thinks that Nero should attend the peace talks."
b. Only Nero, thinks that Sarkozy thinks that he, should attend the peace talks. (FALSE)
This indicates that (262b) can (and must) have a de se LF, whereas (262a) cannot. The
unacceptability of (262b) and the acceptability of (262a) are thus correctly predicted. Future
research has to explore whether the same argument can be made for (256); the main issue at this
point, which is why I leave this an open question, is that knowledge is much more difficult to
describe in a context than thought, i.e. it is not immediately clear what the relevant contexts
would be to test for a de se LF.
Notice that we have not solved the subject/object asymmetry in complements of think, as
the analysis in (241) and (242) does not differentiate between the two types of arguments. I will
now outline a first sketch of a solution for this asymmetry in section 4.2.3 and then refine it in
section 4.2.4.
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4.2.4 A First Attempt based on Percus & Sauerland (2003a), (2003b)
Consider the problematic contrast in (259a) versus (259b). Both examples seem to express a de
se report, as in (260). This suggests that the embedded clause should (obligatorily) have a de se
LF. The question is then why (259b) is acceptable if (259a) is not.
(259) a. * Nero, thinks that [the damn traitor1] should invite [Sarkozy] to the peace talks.
b. OK Neroi thinks that [Sarkozy] should invite [the damn traitori] to the peace talks.
(260) a. OK Nero1 thinks: "I should invite Sarkozy to the peace talks."
b. OK Neroi thinks: "Sarkozy should invite me to the peace talks."
Let me first explore if this contrast follows directly from Percus & Sauerland (2003a), (2003b).
To account for the facts, one could assume that (259a) allows for a de se LF, whereas (259b)
disallows for such a de se LF. As we have seen in (242), this is problematic to begin with, as
pronouns in object position of a complement to think can remain uninterpreted, giving rise to a
de se interpretation. However, for the sake of the argument, let us assume that such an
asymmetry can still be maintained. In section 4.2.5 I present the final proposal, which explains
the subject/object asymmetry. If this asymmetry was due to (259b) not allowing for a de se LF,
we could pursue the following line of argumentation. Under the assumption that de se LFs are
required whenever they are possible, (259a) becomes ungrammatical, but (259b) remains
possible. We may implement this by assuming that null pronouns in English must enter an
agreement relation with an antecedent in order to be uninterpreted. Percus & Sauerland (2003b)
assume such a relation to account for phi-agreement in (261).
(261) a. Intended reading: In my dream, the dream-self was sick.
b. Possible form: I dreamed [ 1* [ki ti was sick] ]
c. Impossible form: I dreamed [ he* [k1 ti was sick]]
(Percus & Sauerland 2003b)
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The idea for deriving the contrast between (259a) and (259b) would then be that such an
agreement relation is necessary in order for a pronoun to remain uninterpreted, and move up to a
position below the attitude predicate to create a binder operator. We could assume this
movement requires an agreement relation between the antecedent and the pronoun, which seems
plausible, since de se LFs are only ever created when the matrix subject is co-referent with the
pronoun.
To account for the subject-object asymmetry that we observe, we can assume that this
syntactic relation is disrupted by an intervening DP due to Relativized Minimality. Therefore,
(259a) allows (and consequently requires) the null pro to be uninterpreted, as illustrated in
(262a), which in turn makes (259a) ungrammatical. In contrast, (259b) does not allow this, as
illustrated in (262b), which means that (259b) must have a de re LF, and no problem arises.
(262)a.(*) Neroi thinks that pro*1, the damn traitor, should invite Sarkozy to the peace talks.
I AGREEMENT => de se LF possible
b. NeroI thinks that Sarkozy should invite pro*1, the damn traitor 1, to the peace talks.
) X I AGREEMENT NOT POSSIBLE => de re LF
This predicts that such utterances with epithets must have a de re reading, and at first sight, this
prediction seems to follow through, as the statement in (263b) seems false in the scenario in
(263a) (based on Percus & Sauerland's 2003a:234), which one might take to indicate that (263b)
does not have a de se reading. However, this can be shown to be problematic, as (263c) also
appears to be false in this scenario, indicating that the appositive somehow affects the truth
conditions in ways that are currently unclear. In brief, it is not possible to conclude from the
perceived falsity of (263b) that (263b) does not have a de se LF, as it could be perceived to be
false for independent reasons.
(263) a. Scenario: A group of drunken election candidates watching campaign speeches on
television do not recognise themselves in the broadcast. John, the only confident one,
thinks "Mary will vote for me," but does not recognise himself in the broadcast. Peter,
who is depressive, happens to be impressed not by his own speech but by John's, and
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thinks "Mary will vote for him".
b. Only Johni thinks that Mary will vote for the idioti.
c. Only [John, the idiot,]1 thinks that Mary will vote for him 1.
To recapitulate, the first idea laid out here is that epithets in the subject position of complements
of think are unacceptable when referentially dependent on the matrix subject, because their null
anchor pro ends up uninterpreted, making a de se LF obligatory. Contrastively, such epithets
may be acceptable in the object position of complements of think, because their null anchor pro
is barred from being uninterpreted; a de se LF would here be blocked and a de re LF would be
required. While this analysis is clearly on the right track, it contains assumptions that are difficult
to argue for, and there is no clear evidence to confirm this approach. In section 4.2.4, I refine
this analysis by taking a more uniform approach as follows. I assume that (259a) and (259b)
both require the embedded pronoun to remain uninterpreted, maintaining that the judgment in
(263b) is confounded and we can still have de se LFs even with epithets; the difference is then
connected to a separate issue: When can the nominal appositive in an epithet construction
combine with an uninterpreted pronoun and when is this impossible?
4.2.5 Explaining the Subject/Object Asymmetry - The Final Result
In section 4.2.4, I outlined a first, 'naive' approach to deriving the contrast between (264a) and
(264b). In this section, I propose that the difference between (264a) and (264b) arises from
interactions between the LF interface and the PF interface. To be specific, the basic idea here is
that in such constructions, movement of the epithet is required by the semantic analysis
discussed in chapter 3 and refined in sections 4.2.1-4.2.4. The subject/object asymmetry then
follows from the subject/object asymmetry on extraction.
(264) a. * Nero1 thinks that [the damn traitor1] should invite [Sarkozy] to the peace talks.
b. OK Nero1 thinks that [Sarkozy] should invite [the damn traitor1] to the peace talks.
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Demirdache and Percus (201 la, 201 1b) develop ideas from Percus and Sauerland (2003a). They
assume that semantic binders only ever arise by movement (in the spirit of Heim and Kratzer
1998). Focusing on Jordanian Arabic, the authors make an assumption similar to what I argued
for in chapter 2, and propose that epithets (i.e. the nominal appositive) cannot be attached to a
trace (a constraint that they call * [t expressive]). This is similar to my claim in sections 4.2.2-
4.2.4, where I argue that the nominal appositive cannot modify uninterpreted pronouns. The core
idea that I will adapt from Demirdache & Percus is as follows: I propose that constructions in
which an epithet occurs in the location of an uninterpreted null anchor can be 'saved' by what
they call epithet float - an epithet can be interpreted in a position other than where it is
pronounced. Their core example is (265). Note that in Jordanian Arabic epithets occur with an
overt anchor, the pronoun ha 'he' (see also section 2.2.1 for the same element in Lebanese
Arabic). This pronoun corresponds to the null anchor that I argued for in languages such as
Czech, Dutch, English, French, and Russian. In (265), which , ha 'he' is used resumptively, i.e.
it picks up the referent of the NP Xaled.
Jordanian Arabic
(265) xaled, fakartu ?innu ha-l-Hmar bi-l-bajat
Xaled you.thought that pro-the-donkey at-the-house
lit. 'Xaled, you thought that this donkey is at home.'
('Xaled, you thought that he is at home, the donkey.')
(Demirdache & Percus 2011 a: example (1 5b-ii))
In the spirit of Percus & Sauerland (2003a), Demirdache & Percus assume that ha 'he' is
uninterpreted, and serves to create a binder and a trace. They assume a Potts structure and argue
that for the sentence in (265), which has the pronounced shape in (266a), two LFs are
conceivable. The LF that reflects the surface position of the epithet is given in (266b); this is
ungrammatical, as the epithet modifies a trace, t2, of the uninterpreted pronoun. In contrast, the
LF in (266c) involves epithet float, i.e. the epithet is actually in a position where it is not
interpreted; it is interpreted as a modifier on the antecedent. They argue that this LF is
grammatical; as they define it, epithet float is a process of covert LF movement that derives
(266c) from (266a) (rather than interpreting (266a) as (266b)).
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a. Xaled, you thought that ha-the donkey is at home.
b. LF without epithet float
* [ Xaled [ (ha*) [ 2 you thought that [t2-the-donkey] was at home ] ]]
c. LF with epithet float
OK [ [Xaled-the-donkey] [ (ha*) [ k2 you thought that t2 was at home ] ]]
(adapted from Demirdache & Percus 201 la: example (27b))
Their definition of epithet float is given in (267).
(267) Epithet float
On the way to LF, an epithet's expressive term can float away from its host pronoun and
combine with the pronoun's "antecedent".
(Demirdache & Percus 2011 b:382)
Demirdache & Percus (2011 a, 2011 b) motivate epithet float by means of examples like (268a)
(which they acknowledge is sometimes called PF extraposition of expressives in English);
following Potts (2005, 2007), they argue that (268a) has the LF in (268b), drawing on Potts et al.
(2007).
(268) a. That boy left, the bastard.
b. LF: [ [[that boy]-[the bastard]] left]
(Demirdache & Percus 2011 a: example (30a))
My own proposal and data above raise the following question: How is the pronounced position
of an epithet (as in (266a) or (268a)) related to its interpreted (LF) position (as in (266c) or
(268b)). I follow Demirdache & Percus in assuming that epithetfloat is a type of movement. The
idea that I pursue is that epithets can generally undergo such movement, but this movement is
constrained by familiar locality constraints, such as islandhood; I come back to this property of
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(266)
epithet float at the end of this section. First, let us reconsider the contrast that we want to
explain, in (269).
(269)a. * Nero1 thinks that [the damn traitor1 ] should invite [Sarkozy] to the peace talks.
b. OK Nero1 thinks that [Sarkozy] should invite [the damn traitor1] to the peace talks.
I argued that in both cases the structure is roughly the one in (270), where the epithet is a
nominal appositive with a null anchor.
(270)a. * Nero, thinks that [proi, the damn traitor,] should invite [Sarkozy] to the peace talks.
b. OK Nero, thinks that [Sarkozy] should invite [proi, the damn traitor,] to the peace talks.
If we assume that both instances of pro must be uninterpreted, given that the complement of
think may have a de se LF, we can now pursue a different explanation for the subject/object
asymmetry. First, observe that both examples in (271) should be ungrammatical, as indicated, if
epithets cannot modify uninterpreted anchors.
(271)a. * Nero thinks that [pro*, the damn traitor,] should invite [Sarkozy] to the peace talks.
b. * Nero thinks that [Sarkozy] should invite [pro*, the damn traitor,] to the peace talks.
To be precise, these examples are ungrammatical, as the uninterpreted pro* moves to generate
the binder and trace necessary for de se LFs, as given in (272). The idea is (a view I share with
Demirdache and Percus 201 la, 2011 b), that the nominal appositive in epithets cannot modify a
trace, which is why (272a) and (272b) are ungrammatical; see my discussion above (251) for
arguments.
(272)a. * Nero thinks pro* X2 that [t 2 the damn traitor] should invite [Sarkozy] to the p.t.
b. * Nero thinks pro* X2 that [Sarkozy] should invite [t2 the damn traitor] to the p.t.
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The question is now whether epithet float can save these constructions. I propose that epithet
float can save (272b), but not (272a). I will start with the grammatical example. First, assume
that epithets can undergo covert LF movement from their surface position to a position adjacent
to the antecedent, as argued by Demirdache & Percus (2011 a), (2011 b). The idea would be that
(273a) actually has the LF in (273b), which is generated by the covert movement in (273c).
(273) a. OK Neroi thinks that [Sarkozy] should invite [the damn traitori] to the peace talks.
b. OK LF: [Nero, the damn traitor,] thinks (pro*) ki [Sarkozy] should invite ti to the p.t.
c. epithet float of 'the damn traitor' at LF:
Nero the damn traitor thinks (pro*) Xi Sark should invite [ti the damn traiter] to the p.t.
Epithet float is also similar to operations proposed by Hale (1975) (see also (28 1b) below, which
is the structure proposed by McCawley 1982). He proposes that relative clauses adjoin in a
position other than their surface position, and then move into the surface position that is adjacent
to a noun phrase by an attraction rule (which would be the opposite of analysing epithet float as
covert LF movement).
The question now arises why we cannot do the same in (274). Again, (274a) would have
the LF in (274b); this is generated from the syntactic structure that is spelled out by covert
movement as in (274c). The idea is that (274c) should be grammatical if epithet float is
unconstrained.
(274)a. * Nero, thinks that [the damn traitor,] should invite [Sarkozy] to the peace talks.
b.* LF: [Nero, the damn traitor,] thinks (pro*) ki ti should invite [Sarkozy] to the p.t.
c. epithet float of 'the damn traitor' at LF: (predicted to be grammatical, but it is not)
* Nero the damn traitor thinks pro* ki [ti the damn traiter] should invite Sark to the p.t.
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I propose that the difference between (273) and (274) is related to the fact that subjects are
islands for extraction, whereas objects are not5 5 . The core idea is that epithet float in these cases
has to move the epithetfrom the object position (in (273)) or subject position (in (274)). While
this is possible in the object case, it is impossible in the subject case.
Note that this analysis does not predict all constructions with pronouns to behave the same
way. In example (45) (repeated in (275a) and (275b)), we saw an asymmetry, which may seem
puzzling under a perspective that analyses them as in (276).
(275) a. * Johni thinks that the idioti is smart. Epithet
b. OK Johni thinks that he, the idiot,1 is smart. Pronoun + Nominal Appositive
(276) a. * John thinks that pro, the idiot,1 is smart. Null Pronoun + Nominal Appositive
b. OK John thinks that he, the idiot,1 is smart. Overt Pronoun + Nominal Appositive
However, upon closer investigation, we notice that he in the grammatical case in (275b) and
(276b) must be stressed, as in (277a); it cannot be unstressed or even deaccented, as in (277b).
(277) a. OK John thinks that HE, the idiot, is smart.
b. * John thinks that he, the idiot, is smart.
This suggests that (277b) is the example that we need to compare to the unacceptable case in
(275a) and (276b). The relevant prediction is that (277b) allows for (and requires) a de se LF,
whereas (277a) disallows a de se LF; this clearly follows from the fact that a stressed pronoun is
interpreted in a way that is characteristic of stressed noun phrases, whereas a 'de se pronoun'
must be uninterpreted. The following intuitions confirm the impossibility of a de se LF in
(277a), and the possibility of a de se LF in (277b). While (278b) seems to be true in the context
" The following example further supports my proposal:
(i) OKNero thinks that Sarkozy should invite the damn traitor's mother to the peace talks.
Epithet float is only necessary if the epithet would have to combine with an uninterpreted pronoun if it is interpreted
in its surface position. However, in (i), a de se LF does not seem possible, indicating that a pronoun in a possessor
position may not be uninterpreted. Thanks to Norvin Richards (p.c.) for the example and comments regarding it.
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in (278a), reflecting Percus & Sauerland's original judgment, (278c) appears to be false,
indicating that a stressed pronoun cannot remain uninterpreted to generate a de se LF.
(278)a. Scenario: A group of drunken election candidates watching campaign speeches on
television do not recognise themselves in the broadcast. John, the only confident one,
thinks "I'll win," but does not recognise himself in the broadcast. Bill and Sam, both
depressive, think "I'll lose" but are impressed by the speeches that happen to be their
own and are sure "that candidate" will win. Peter, also depressive, happens to be
impressed not by his own speech but by John's.
(Percus & Sauerland 2003a:234)
b. Only John thinks that heunstressed will win the election. (TRUE => de se LF possible)
c. Only John thinks that HE will win the election. (FALSE => de se LF impossible)
At this point the question naturally arises whether islands interfere with the acceptability of
epithets in other constructions; for instance, are epithets barred from occurring in complex NPs
or in adjuncts? Given that we have already seen that epithets can occur in restrictive relative
clauses, which are generally assumed to be islands, they do not seem to be the barred from
islands. However, this is unsurprising if there is the modified pronoun in a relative clause (or
other island) does not get a de se construal. If we take a simple case like (279), there is simply
no attitude predicate that would introduce a belief-self or dream-self as required to construe a de
se LF.
(279) OK Yesterday John1 bumped into a fan who really loves the idiot1.
Another acceptable example from English is given in (280), for which similar considerations
hold; here, the idiot is in an adjunct island, and its antecedent John is outside of this island.
(280) OK John1 left because the idioti got bored by the president's speech.
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Furthermore, Aoun, Choueiri & Hornstein (2001) show that epithets in Lebanese Arabic can
actually occur more freely in islands than in constructions where the antecedent is not separated
from the epithet by an island.
I now return to the question of how the nominal appositive combines with its null anchor,
in section 4.2.6.
4.2.6 On the Relationship between the appositive and its anchor
One question that I raised earlier in this dissertation is the question of whether the right structure
for nominal appositives is the one in (28 1a) or the one in (28 1b).
(281) a. Potts TP
DP
is VP
DP CP
A coming
John (who is) my
neighbor
b. McCawley
TP
DP
A
John CP
(who is) my
neighbor
TP
is VP
coming
I proposed in section 4.2.4 that the core problem with examples like (282) is that the null anchor
of the epithet must be uninterpreted to generate a Percus & Sauerland (2003a) style de se LF, and
that epithets cannot modify null anchors. Thus the example in (282) is ill-formed.
(282) * Neroi thinks that [pro the damn traitor,] should invite [Sarkozy] to the peace talks.
I have further argued that (283a) can be derived by LF movement (epithet float) from (283b),
which saves (283a) from ungrammaticality. Notably, (283a) cannot be a grammatical LP (even
though it is a grammatical 'surface string'); as an LF, (283a) would be as ungrammatical as
(282). The example (283a) can only be generated by PF movement.
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(283) a. Neroi thinks that [Sarkozy] should invite [proi, the damn traitor,] to the peace talks.
b. [Neroi, the damn traitor,] thinks that [Sarkozy] should invite [proi] to the peace talks.
The important point is that an LF as in (283a) (which is ungrammatical) and an LF as in (283b)
(which is grammatical) clearly differ under a Potts view, (281a), but it is not clear how they
could differ under a McCawley view, (28 1b), given that the nominal appositive would be able to
adjoin in the same adjunction sites in (283a) and (283b). This analysis thus strongly favours a
Potts view as in (28 1a).
4.3 Previous approaches to epithets
Now that I have presented my own proposal for the syntactic distribution of epithets, it is worth
showing that previous approaches to epithets cannot account for the data that I discussed.
4.3.1 Dubinsky & Hamilton
Dubinsky and Hamilton (1998) propose a view that is a precursor of the anti-judge constraint
(which is discussed in chapter 3), but stated in a more loose way. Let me briefly review their
proposal; we will see that it does not derive the subject-object asymmetry either. Dubinsky and
Hamilton's (1998) anti-logophoricity constraint is given as in (284).
(284) Antilogophoricity Constraint for Epithets
An epithet must not be anteceded by an individual from whose perspective the attributive
content of the epithet is evaluated.
Dubinsky & Hamilton (1998:689)
It is worth pointing out that this constraint is phrased more loosely than the anti-judge constraint.
The anti-judge constraint posits that an epithet is ungrammatical in a clause that has the epithet's
antecedent as its judge. The idea was that (285a) is ungrammatical, because the semantics of
think requires John (the epithet's antecedent) to be the judge of the complement clause.
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Contrastively, (285b) is grammatical, because the semantics of convince requires Peter (and not
John, i.e. someone who is not the antecedent of the epithet) to be the judge of the complement
clause. What is crucial is that the intuitions for (285a) and (285b) hold under a reading where the
epithet is speaker-oriented, i.e. it is the speaker of the sentence who thinks that John is an idiot.
In other words, even if Mary utters the sentence in (285a), and the sentence is intended to convey
that Mary thinks that John is an idiot, (285a) is still ungrammatical; under the same reading,
(285b) is possible.
(285) a. * Johni thinks that the idioti is smart.
b.?OK Johni convinced Peter that the idiot, is smart.
Dubinsky & Hamilton do not tease apart the notion of (i) who thinks that the referent of the
epithet is stupid (which in (285a) and (285b) would be the speaker), and (ii) whose mental state
embeds the clause that the epithet occurs in (which would be John in (285a) and Peter in (285b)).
In this sense, it is less clear what their approach predicts. Let us review the original data that
they discuss. Their core data include the examples in (286) and (287), where the antecedent c-
commands the epithet. The idea is that the relative clause in (286b) and the embedded clause in
(287b) are embedded in a proposition that describes a belief / mental state of the antecedent. In
(286b), the epithet is contained in a noun phrase that describes what John was saying; this is not
the case in (286a). It is worth emphasizing that Dubinsky & Hamilton do not give a precise
definition of their notion of what describes a belief / mental state of the antecedent. In (286b),
the idea seems to be that everything in the scope of told is part of John's mental state.
(286)a. OK Johni ran over a man (who was) trying to give the idioti directions.
b. * Johni told us of a man (who was) trying to give the idioti directions.
Dubinsky & Hamilton (1998:688-688)
Similarly, in (287b), the epithet is contained in a clause that describes what John was asking his
students for; again, this is not the case in (287a).
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(287) a. OK Through an accumulation of slipups, Johni (inadvertently) led his students to
conclude that the idioti couldn't teach.
b. * Despite an accumulation of slipups, Johni asked his students to conclude that the
idioti could teach.
Dubinsky & Hamilton (1998:687-688)
Notably, D&H's approach is confounded by the fact that all of the ungrammatical examples that
they attribute to the anti-logophoricity constraint involve verbs of communication (or at least
phrases that indicate a communicative act, such as according to), as in (288).
(288) a. * It was said by John that the idiot lost a thousand dollars on the slots.
b. * According to John, the idiot is married to a genius.
c. * Johni told us of a man (who was) trying to give the idioti directions
d. * Despite an accumulation of slipups, Johni asked his students to conclude that the
idioti could teach.
Dubinsky & Hamilton (1998:688)
To understand whether this constraint really works, we need to consider examples with more
minimal differences. In terms of the extent to which the embedded clause that contains the
epithet is embedded in the matrix subject's mental state, the examples in (289) differ. In (289a),
the embedded proposition should be clearly embedded in John's mental state in the same way in
which it is in (288) according to Dubinsky & Hamilton. In (289b-c), this is much less clear, as
denying implies not believing and not saying something does not entail anything with respect to
what one believes. Finally in (289d-e), the embedded clause is clearly not embedded in John's
mental state, as not seeing and overlooking entails lack of awareness. As it is stated, Dubinsky
& Hamilton's anti-logophoricity constraint predicts a clear cut improvement in acceptability
from (289a) to (289b-e). As indicated, this does not seem to be the case; (289b-e) are still
deviant (though they may improve slightly with respect to (289a)). They are nowhere near to the
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acceptability that we would expect. This already suggests that Dubinsky & Hamilton's
constraint, which is essentially pragmatic (while the anti-judge constraint is based on the
compositional semantics), is not sufficient to derive the facts. Note that in other languages, such
as Croatian, Czech, Dutch, German and Russian, the counterparts of (289a-e) also do not show
any noticeable differences in acceptability.
(289)a. John said that OKhe/* the idiot had lost a thousand dollars on the slots.
b. John denied that OKhe/?*the idiot had lost a thousand dollars on the slots.
c. John did not say that OKhe/??the idiot had lost a thousand dollars on the slots.
d. John did not see that OKhe/?*the idiot had lost a thousand dollars on the slots.
e. John overlooked that OKhe/?the idiot had lost a thousand dollars on the slots.
This suggests that the property of being a perspective bearer is not sufficient to account for the
distribution 6.
Finally, it is not clear what we expect if there are more than two individuals, as in (290) (an
example similar to the cases that I discussed in chapter 3). In an example such as (290a), we
may expect that acceptability differs depending on whether John believes it himself and actively
tries to convince Mary that he is a great teacher (cf. (290c)) as opposed to unintentionally giving
her the idea that he is a great teacher (possibly without believing it himself), see the example in
(290b). The fact here seems to be that (290c) is as acceptable as (290b), and (290a) does not
differ in acceptability, depending on which reading is chosen. This is a further problem for
Dubinsky & Hamilton's anti-logophoricity constraint, because they seem to predict that there
should be a difference in acceptability between the (290b) and (290c) example.
56 Naturally, this brings us back to the question of why we did find such contrasts in (144) and (145). However,
this simply corroborates the insight that Dubinsky & Hamilton's system is too simple to account for the facts. One
clear difference between not say and not know is that the complement of not say may still have a de se LF, in the
sense in which (i) seems to describe a situation in which (ii) holds.
i. John did not say that he had lost a thousand dollars on the slots.
ii. John did not say: "I lost a thousand dollars on the slots."
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(290) a. OK John convinced Mary that the idiot was a great teacher.
b. OK Unintentionally, John convinced Mary that the idiot was a great teacher.
(context: John does not believe that he is a great teacher.)
c. OK John convinced Mary to share his belief that the idiot was a great teacher.
(context: John believes that he is a great teacher.)
What we do observe is that (290a) is significantly better than (291), no matter whether John
actively tries to make believe that he is a great teacher (and thus counts as a perspective bearer)
or not. This is one of the contrasts that I focused on in chapter 3 and in sections 4.1-4.2.
(291) * John thought/believed that the idiot was a great teacher.
These facts, which challenge Dubinsky & Hamilton's view, appear to support a view where
epithets are constrained in the grammar (plausibly in the semantics), and not in the pragmatics.
Finally, if we come back to the core data discussed in sections 4.1-4.2, we find that Dubinsky
& Hamilton do not clearly predict any difference in acceptability between the grammatical case
in (292a) and the ungrammatical case in (292b).
(292) a. OK Neroi thinks that [Sarkozy] should invite [the damn traitor1 ] to the peace talks.
b. * Neroi thinks that [the damn traitor1] should invite [Sarkozy] to the peace talks.
As Dubinsky & Hamilton's antilogophoricity constraint is stated, it is not entirely clear what
their predictions are for (292). However, in order for them to derive (292), the difference
between (292a) and (292b) would have to be that "the attributive content of the epithet is
evaluated" from the perspective of Nero in (292b) but not in (292a). It is not clear that this is the
case. We have seen that the same contrast surfaces in (293). Again, it is not clear that the
perspective bearer inside the complement clause is different in (293a) versus (293b).
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(293) a. OK Nero, thinks that [they] will invite [the damn traitori] to the reception.
b. * Nero, thinks that [the damn traitor] will be invited to the reception.
In terms of their interpretation, (293a) and (293b) should be roughly equivalent, i.e. there is no
reason why the "attributive content of the epithet" should be evaluated with respect to Nero in
(293b) but not in (293a). Therefore, it is not clear how Dubinksy & Hamilton could derive the
subject/object asymmetry in complements of think that I have discussed.
4.3.2 Reinhart (1983) & Schlenker (2005)
Let us now review Schlenker's (2005) approach to epithets. Schlenker's approach is one of the
first proposals that truly attempt to unify the semantic properties and syntactic behaviour of
epithets with respect to their distribution. However, we will see, once again, that Schlenker does
not derive the pattern discussed in this chapter of this dissertation.
As Schlenker (2005) shares Reinhart's (1983) view of the grammar, which is one where
Condition C strictly speaking is not a part of the syntax, but rather pragmatic in nature.
Although Reinhart does not address epithets, and focuses largely on proper names and definite
descriptions, which we come back to in Chapter 5, if one assumes that epithets are a type of R-
expression, and are subject to Condition C, then it should be possible to also extend Reinhart's
view to explain their behaviour.
Reinhart (1983) bases her discussion on the contrast between (294a) and (294b), which
illustrate Condition C as we know it. In (294a), her and Zelda can corefer, as her does not c-
command Zelda. In (294b), he and Felix cannot corefer, as he c-commands Felix.
(294) a. Those who know her respect Zelda.
b. He thinks that Felix is a genius.
(Reinhart 1983:164)
Reinhart (1983:166) proposes that Condition C is a pragmatic constraint and eludes to Gricean
maxims. She argues that (295a) is blocked by the possibility of (295b), as "bound anaphora [...]
156
is the most explicit way available in the language to express coreference, as it involves
referential dependency" (Reinhart 1983:167). Pronouns can be bound, but R-expressions cannot
be. Reinhart considers this a type of 'manner' maxim.
(295) a. He thinks that Felix is a genius. (he cannot refer to Felix)
b. Felixi thinks that hei is a genius. (he is bound by Felix)
(adapted from Reinhart 1983:167)
The obligatory disjoint reading of he and Felix in (295a) follows from the reasoning in (296). If
the speaker had intended coreference, she would simply have used (295b) instead of (295a)57.
(296) a. Speaker's strategy: Where a syntactic structure you are using allows bound-anaphora
interpretation, then use it if you intend your expressions to corefer, unless you have
some reasons to avoid bound anaphora.
b. Hearer 's strategy: If the speaker avoids the bound-anaphora options provided by the
structure he is using, then, unless he has reasons to avoid bound anaphora, he did not
intend his expressions to corefer.
(Reinhart 1983:167)
Exceptions to Condition C like (297a) 58, in which he can refer to Zelda's husband, are explained
by the examples in (297); (297a) does not mean the same as (297b), in which Zelda's husband
binds himself
5" In this section, I attempt to provide the reader with a brief picture Reinhart's proposal. One should observe that if
we remove Condition C from the syntax and adopt Reinhart's approach, it is not immediately clear how one could
account for examples like (i), without stipulating c-command and re-introducing Condition C (both of which appear
to be buried in the stipulation bound anaphora. Thanks to Noam Chomsky (p.c.) for pointing this out.
(i) * His mother likes Felix
58 It is not immediately clear whether Reinhart's example should be classified as an exception to Condition C, since
identity statements are not cases of referential dependence; (cf. the classic Fregean morning/evening star examples).
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(297) a. He is Zelda's husband.
b. Zelda's husband is himself.
(Reinhart 1983:168)
Schlenker (2005) departs from the view of Reinhart (1983) and posits a maxim of Minimize
Restrictors! instead, which requires definite descriptions to be as brief as possible. While it is
not one of the original Gricean conversational maximes, it seems to be based on maxims such as
the Maxim of Quantity59 (using an R-expression instead of a pronoun may simply be
unnecessarily informative). To illustrate, consider the contrast between (298) and (299). The
idea is that this contrast is simply due to violations of such a Gricean maxim in (299) but not
(298).
(298) 0' Johni ran over a man (who was) trying to give the idioti directions.
(Dubinsky & Hamilton 1998:687)
(299) * Johni ran over a man who was trying to give Johni directions.
In order to explain the role of the maxim in relation to the contrast between an epithet (298) and
a definite description (299), Schlenker (2005) argues that John in (298) violates Minimize
Restrictors!, as it does not contribute any information that a pronoun (such as he) does not
contribute as well; this assumes that pronouns are definite descriptions, and a pronoun like he is
more brief than a proper name like John. In the same vein, (298) does not violate Minimize
Restrictors!, as the epithet contributes evaluative (pragmatic) information, which a pronoun
would not. I now review Schlenker's proposal in more detail, and I will then show that it does
not derive the data discussed in this dissertation either.
Schlenker (2005) assumes that there is no fundamental difference between R-expressions,
epithets and pronouns; all of these are definite descriptions. Therefore, they should be subject to
59 Schlenker does not explicitly say which Gricean maxim his maxim of minimization is based on; Johnson (2012)
considers it to be based on the Maxim of Quantity, but it could also be a requirement for brevity, in which case it
would be based on the Maxim of Manner. Thanks to Martin Hackl (p.c.) for pointing this out to me.
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the same constraints (e.g. either Condition C or Condition B of the Binding Theory). He starts
by outlining two core questions with respect to Condition C, which he aims to explain. First,
there have been several examples in the literature illustrating cases of Condition C obviation with
respect to epithets, such as (298), i.e. cases where an epithet is referentially dependent on a c-
commanding antecedent. From the perspective of classical Binding Theory (Chomsky e.g.
1981), this should trigger a Principle C violation and give rise to unacceptability of the utterance,
yet sentence like (298) are perfectly acceptable. Schlenker asks why epithets can often escape
Condition C, and whether it is their expressive component that makes Condition C obviation
possible. We have already seen ample evidence for Condition C obviation with epithets.
Second, looking beyond epithets, Schlenker points out that there are a number of examples
in the literature where other types of R-expressions do not trigger Condition C violations, (cf.
Reinhart (1983a)), Grodzinsky and Reinhart (1993). In all such cases, we would expect to find
Condition C violations, resulting in the majority of such exceptional illustrations being classified
as unacceptable. Schlenker's own example for such a Condition C obviation is given in (300a),
which contrasts with his ungrammatical examples in (300b) and (300c). On the one hand, the
difference between (300a) and (300b) is that (300a) contains two 3rd person DPs, whereas (300b)
only contains one 3 rd person DP and one 1't person DP. On the other hand, the difference
between (300a) and (300c) is that (300a) only repeats parts of its antecedent DP's descriptive
content (namely linguist), whereas (300c) repeats all of it (i.e. linguist working on Binding
Theory).
(300) a. OK A linguist working on Binding Theory; was so devoid of any moral sense that hei
forced a physicist working on particles to hire the linguisti's girlfriend in his lab.
b. * A linguist working on Binding Theory; was so devoid of any moral sense that hei
forced me to hire the linguisti's girlfriend in his lab.
c. ?? A linguist working on Binding Theory; was so devoid of any moral sense that hei
forced a physicist working on particles to hire a friend of the linguist working on
Binding Theory; in his lab.
(Schlenker 2005:387,390)
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In order to address the above two observations, Schlenker proposes the pragmatic principle in
(301), which states that a definite description the A B is well-formed if (i) A can disambiguate the
denotation of the description, and thus deriving the standard cases of Condition C, or (ii) if it
adds a pragmatic effect, thus deriving some of the Condition C obviation examples with respect
to epithets. The idea is that (301) derives Condition C obviation with epithets, as the evaluative
component of an epithet has a pragmatic effect, and it also derives Condition C obviations as in
(300a) above (with the linguist), as the repetition of parts of the antecedent has a disambiguating
effect.
(301) Minimize Restrictors!
A definite description the A B is deviant if A could be dropped without affecting
the (i) denotation of the description, and (ii) its various pragmatic effects.
(Schlenker 2005:3 85)
A simpler illustration of the principle at work is given in (302), which does not involve
Condition C obviation, as the examples in (302) show cases where there is no antecedent for the
definite description; the referent for the (green/stupid/round) tennis ball is simply given in the
context.
(302) a. OK Pass me the green tennis ball! (and not the red one)
b. OK Pass me the stupid tennis ball!
c. # Pass me the round tennis ball!
Given the definition of Minimize Restrictors! in (301), the acceptability of (302a) can be
explained by the fact that the modifier green disambiguates the meaning of the description by
picking out a specific tennis ball out of a comparative set; this is similar to the case with linguists
and physicists in (300a), which are both 3rd person referents. The well-formedness of (302b) is
also explained by Minimize Restrictors!, as the adjective stupid contributes a pragmatic effect, in
this case evaluativity; this is similar to the case with epithets in (298). The utterance in (302c) is
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unacceptable, for the modifier round neither disambiguates nor contributes any kind of pragmatic
effect; this is similar to (299) and (300b). It is worth pointing out here that the core idea is that
Condition C is part of a much broader range of phenomena, which involve the use of definite
descriptions that are larger than they need to be. For instance, in (302c), the round tennis ball is
blocked, as the briefer variant the tennis ball should be used due to Minimize Restrictors! This
predicts that the ungrammaticality of (302c) should reflect the same type of violation that gives
rise to Condition C effects; intuitively it is not clear that this is the case.
Let us now consider the cases where the definite description is referentially dependent on a
c-commanding antecedent, i.e. cases of Condition C. (This is relevant as Schlenker aims to have
a uniform treatment for Condition C violation and cases that do not involve c-commanding
antecedents, as in (302).) The same logic that applies to the examples in (302) also applies to the
examples in (303), based on examples such as (300a); linguist in (303a) contributes to the
denotation of the definite description by disambiguating it. The acceptability of (303b) parallels
the example in (302b), as the epithet idiot contributes a pragmatic effect by adding expressive
evaluativity; finally, the ungrammatical example in (303c) can be ruled out by Minimize
Restrictors!, for it does not make any kind of contribution to the definite description.
(303) a. OK The linguisti tried to convince the physicist to hire the linguisti's girlfriend.
b. OK The finguisti tried to convince the physicist to hire the idioti's girlfriend.
c. * The linguisti tried to convince the physicist to hire the mani's girlfriend.
Schlenker's proposal does not focus on the role of c-command between a definite description and
an antecedent that it referentially depends on (which is evidently absent in some examples that
violate Minimize Restrictors!, such as (302c)). Nevertheless, he does acknowledge the role of c-
command in standard Condition C cases such as (304).
(304)a. * Hei loves people who admire Johni.
b. OK [Hisi mother] loves people who admire Johni.
(Schlenker 2005:386)
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To account for such differences, Schlenker assumes a view where effects that involve c-
command are a consequence of top-down sentence processing. I limit the following (somewhat
simplified) discussion to simple cases such as Peter likes himself versus *Peter likes Peter.
Schlenker (2005) assumes that contexts contain a world of evaluation w, a speaker s and an
addressee h, and they can be written as in (305a) (based on Schlenker 2005:402). Super-salient
entities (e.g. entities that have been mentioned in the discourse) are added to this context in a
top-down (roughly left-to-right) manner. So, if Peter is made salient (e.g. by mentioning him),
the context (305b) would emerge, based on (305a) (cf. Schlenker (2005:403)).
(305)a. c = w^s^h
b. c = w^s^h^p
Two place predicates such as like are processed as follows. First, the subject and object are
added to the context, and then the relation expressed by the predicate is asserted to hold between
the two most salient entities (i.e. the two entities furthest to the right). For a sentence like (306a),
this means that the meaning is calculated as in (306b) (based on Schlenker's 2005:406 example
(54); note that Schlenker uses j(ohn) and m(ary) in all of these examples, instead of s(peaker)
and h(earer); his example (54) uses the verb criticize instead of the verb likes that I use).
(306) a. [Peter [likes Ann]]
b. [[Peter [likes Ann] ]]w^j^m = (add Peter to the context)
= [[likes Ann ]]w j mAp = (add Ann to the context)
= [[likes ]]w j mAp^a = (apply the predicate to the two most salient entities)
= 1 iff p^a E I(like) (true iff the predicate like holds betweenp and a)
The idea is now that in order to apply a transitive predicate to two arguments that refer to the
same individual, the same discourse entity must be added to the context sequence twice (i.e. the
two most salient context entities will have to correspond to one discourse entity). Minimize
Restrictors! is now formulated in such a way that it is more economical to do so by means of a
pronoun than to do so by means of a definite description; Schlenker does this by assuming that a
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pronoun denotes a negative index -i, which instructs the processing mechanism to pick the ith
entity from the right in the context, and add it again. This is more economical than reintroducing
the same entity from outside the present context (if doing so does not give rise to a pragmatic
effect and/or disambiguation). The difference between a pronoun and a definite description is
given in (307) (an adaptation of Schlenker's 2005 example (63)) versus (308) (an adaptation of
Schlenker's 2005 example (64)); example (308) is ruled out by Minimize Restrictors!, as (307) is
more economical. The core difference between the two examples is bold-typed. In the step from
(307c) to (307d), which corresponds to the step from (308c) to (308d), the question is whether
we pick out the entity referring to Peter by means of a pronoun, (307c), or by means of a proper
name, (308c). As both is possible, (307c) is more economical, and (308c) is blocked by
Minimize Restrictors!. Eventually, (307d) and (308d) are identical, and so are (307e) and (308e),
but crucially they are derived differently.
(307) a.OK [Peter [likes himself]]
b. [[Peter [likes pro.] ]]w^j^m =
c. = [[likes pro.1 ]]wjm p =
d. = [[likes ]]w^j m p^p =
e. = 1 iff p^p E Iw(like)
(308) a. ?? [Peter [likes Peter]]
b. [[Peter [likes Peter] ]]w^jm =
c. = [[likes Peter ]]wj m p =
d. = [[likes ]]wAjm p^p =
e. = 1 iff p^p E I,(like)
Schlenker
between a
(add p(eter) to the context)
(add the -1th entity from the context again)
(apply the predicate to the two most salient entities)
(true iff the predicate like holds between p and p)
(add p(eter) to the context)
* (add p(eter) to the context) =>
(apply the predicate to the two most salient entities)
(true iff the predicate like holds between p and p)
(2005) derives the c-command restriction as follows. If there is no c-command
DP and its antecedent, then the antecedent cannot be picked out at the point of the
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later DP by means of picking out a -ith entity; this holds because supersalient entities are not
decomposed, as given in (309). Consider the following example (based on Schlenker's example
(65)). Assume that Anna is Peter's mother. In (309c), Anna has been added to the context as a
super-salient entity, but Peter has not been. Therefore, in the step from (309c) to (309d), we
would not be able to pick out Peter by means of picking out the -ith entity from the context,
because Peter is not yet in the context (sequence), and Minimize Restrictors! cannot apply;
therefore, (309) is not in competition with a variant that contains a pronoun. This derives c-
command.
(309) a. O' [Peter's mother [likes Peter]]
b. [[Peter's mother [likes Peter] ]]w^j^m= (add a(nna) to the context)
c. = [[likes Peter ]]w j^m^a (add p(eter) to the context)
d. = [[likes ]]w^j^m^a^p = (apply the predicate to the two most salient entities)
e. = 1 iff a^p E I,(like) (true iff the predicate like holds between a and p)
I will now discuss why Schlenker's approach does not account for the pattern that I discussed.
Schlenker argues that apparent syntactic restrictions are simply symptoms of pragmatic
60 Oepe
restrictions . One prediction made by Minimize Restrictors! is that examples containing epithets
should always be acceptable, since they make a pragmatic contribution to the utterance. To
account for the fact that epithets are sometimes ruled out in the complements of attitude
predicates (which Schlenker acknowledges), Schlenker assumes Dubinsky & Hamilton (1998).
He discusses examples such as (31 Oa) and (31 Ob).
(310) a.# Melvini claims that [the bastard]; was honest.
(Dubinsky & Hamilton 1998:686)
b.# [Pope John Paul II], did not expect that the entire world would mourn [the great man]i.
(Schlenker 2005:397)
60 This observation was pointed out to Schlenker by Geurts (p.c.). See Schlenker (2005) for details of the discussion.
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He argues, on the basis of Dubinsky & Hamilton's findings, combined with observations made
by Clements (1975) from Ewe, that if a language in question has a logophoric (de se) pronoun,
then that pronoun should be preferred in logophoric contexts (such as in the complement of
claim or expect) over non-logophoric variants. Schlenker (2005) points out that English
pronouns such as he are ambiguous between a de re reading and a de se reading; he further
argues that epithets are de re, and cannot be de se, because they cannot be variables and thus
cannot be bound. The idea is that complements of verbs such as claim (in (31 Oa)) and expect (in
(310b)) are logophoric contexts, and thus epithets are banned, due to the preference for de se
anaphora.
The first problem for Schlenker's (2005) approach consists of the data that we have seen
above. In the examples that exhibit a subject/object asymmetry, there is no reason why the
context of the epithet in (311 b) should be more logophoric than the context of the epithet in
(311 a). Similarly, it is unclear that the context of the epithet in (312b) should be more
logophoric than the context of the epithet in (312a). In other words, we face the following
problem. First, Schlenker's Minimize Predictors! predicts that epithets are always acceptable, as
they have a pragmatic effect; this runs afoul of examples such as the examples in (310) above.
To get around this, Schlenker proposes that in logophoric contexts, logophoric de se pronouns
must be used, thus blocking epithets, which cannot have a de se reading. While this accounts for
the examples in (310) and the ungrammaticality of (311b) and (312b), it does not explain the
contrast in (311) and (312), as (311 a) and (312a) should be as ill-formed as (311 b) and (312b)
under such a view.
(311)a. OK Neroi thinks that [Sarkozy] should invite [the damn traitor1 ] to the peace talks.
b. * Nero1 thinks that [the damn traitor1] should invite [Sarkozy] to the peace talks.
(312)a. OK Nero, thinks that [they] will invite [the damn traitor] to the reception.
b. * Nero, thinks that [the damn traitor] will be invited to the reception.
We can now discuss a second argument against Schlenker's approach. In chapter 2, I presented
argumentation for the claim that epithets are in fact pronouns. To briefly illustrate my point
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here, we find many cases cross-linguistically where epithets can undergo quantifier binding; that
is, true syntactic binding under c-command, as shown by the Russian example in (313). In the
example, the DP containing the relative clause is presented as the answer to a who-question.
This suggests that the response is a restrictive relative clause; the relative clause serves to single
out a set of girls. In the example, this idiot co-varies with the quantifier every artist, and is
syntactically bound by it under c-command.
Russian
(313)A: Kakuju devusku privjol na prazdnidnyj prijom kaldyj xudoinik iz
which girl brought to festive reception each artist from
tvoego goroda?
your town
'Which girl did each of the artists from your town bring to the festive reception?'
B: OKSamo soboj, kaidyj xudoiniki privjol tu (samuju) devusku,
naturally each artist brought that very girl
kotoraja po-nastojaseemu ljubit etogo idiota1
that really loves this idiot
'Naturally, each/every artist brought the one woman who really loves the idiot'
Schlenker argues that epithets cannot have a de se reading, based on the assumption that de se
pronouns must be variables and epithets cannot be variables. However, given that epithets (or
rather: the null anchor that the 'epithet' nominal appositive modifies) can be syntactically bound,
epithets must be able to contain variables, i.e. Schlenker's argument does not succeed.
In sum, Schlenker assumes D&H and interprets their anti-logophoricity in terms of the
assumption that epithets are blocked by possible specialized de se pronouns. This does not seem
to derive the observed subject-object asymmetry either.
Finally, it is worth pointing out that Schlenker (2005) does observe 'distance' effects, but
only with respect to the disambiguation cases. His intuitions are summarized in example (314).
The observation is that (314b) seems to be worse than (314a), even though the second mention of
the linguist should still have the same disambiguating effect.
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(314) a. OK A linguist working on Binding Theory; was so devoid of any moral sense that hei
forced a physicist working on particles to hire the linguisti's girlfriend in his lab.
b.<?> A mathematician I once met at a party worked at a university where a linguist
working on Binding Theoryi hired the linguisti's girlfriend in his lab.
(Schlenker 2005:400)
Schlenker suggests that disambiguation is only sensitive to recent antecedents, and therefore, a
mathematician I once met at a party does not enter disambiguation considerations in (314b); it is
not close enough to the epithet to qualify as an antecedent, and therefore the sentence is already
unambiguous enough if the linguist's in (314b) is replaced by his, which blocks (314b). Note,
however, (314b) still seems to be more acceptable than (315), indicating that there is still some
disambiguating effect left.
(315) * A linguist working on Binding Theory; hired the linguisti's girlfriend in his lab.
The distance effects in (314) are reminiscent of what we found in our discussion of convince and
the role of the anti-judge constraint, as well as the subject/object predicates in the complements
of think. However, given Schlenker's reasoning, which ties them to disambiguation, we do not
expect such effects in the case of epithets. In other words, Schlenker cannot account for the
patterns discussed in this dissertation.
As a final remark, it should also be pointed out that findings from language acquisition /
learnability challenge a pragmatic approach to Condition C (and Binding Theory more
generally). Scholars such as Crain & McKee (1986) and Crain & Thornton (1998) argue that
children exhibit Condition C effects at a very early age, before pragmatic inferences are
acquired. This raises serious concerns for pragmatic analyses of Condition C effect.
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Chapter 5: Conclusion
5.1 Summary
In this dissertation I introduced an observation originally present in Schlenker (2005), namely
that an epithet can be referentially dependent on an antecedent under c-command. In chapter 2, I
outlined the controversial status of epithets in the literature; as a point of departure, I observed
that it remained unclear whether they should be treated as R-expressions or pronouns. In this
dissertation I presented various arguments from the literature, which support the view that they
are pronouns. In addition, I provided novel cross-linguistic empirical evidence showing that an
epithet can be truly syntactically bound by a quantifier, further supporting the proposal that
epithets are pronouns. Based on the insight that epithets are pronouns, I argued that they should
be analysed as nominal appositives with a null anchor. This claim was based on diagnostics
from den Dikken (2001) and Kayne (2010).
In the remainder of this thesis I focused on contrasts (not previously discussed in the
literature), such as (316a) versus (316b), and (316a) versus (316c). The contrast in (316a) vs
(316b) illustrates a kind of subject-object asymmetry. In (316a), the epithet is the subject of the
embedded clause, which is a complement to think, whereas in (316b), it is the object of the
corresponding embedded clause. Furthermore, the contrast between (316a) vs (316c) suggests
that the role of the matrix predicate must make some contribution to the ill-formedness, and
acceptability of the respective examples.
(316)a. * Nero, thinks that [the damn traitor,] will be invited to the reception.
b. OK Nero, thinks that they will invite [the damn traitor,] to the reception.
c. ? Johni convinced Peter that the idioti is smart.
In order to account for the above contrasts, I proposed that the contrast between (316a) and
(316c) is due to the fact that thinks and convinced behave differently with respect to the shifting
of the judge parameter in the embedded clause. In the case of convince, the judge parameter is
shifted to the matrix object, whereas in the case of thinks, it is shifted to the matrix subject. In
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chapter 4, I refined my proposal and argued that the cases in which the judge parameter is shifted
to the matrix subject have the property of selecting a de se LF; where pronouns in the embedded
clause that refer to the matrix subject are not interpreted. The consequence of this approach is
that the epithet cannot modify the uninterpreted pronoun. The difference between (316a) and
(316b) is that epithets can undergo covert LF movement (epithet float) to the matrix subject
position from within the embedded object, but not from within the embedded subject.
5.2 Implications for the Bigger Picture of Locality
To conclude this dissertation, I want to discuss the role of epithets in the bigger picture of
anaphora (i.e. referential expressions and their distribution). Given the current debate of the
status of epithets and the locality constraints that apply to them, the intention of this section is
thus to discuss some of the questions the analysis of epithets presented in this thesis raises for
locality, and the notion of Binding Theory.
Epithets (which have the form of R-expressions) are elements that do not seem to fit into
the familiar Binding Theory of Chomsky (1981). The data in (317) illustrate Principle A: A
reflexive (like himself) must be locally bound (as in (317c), but not (317a-b)).
(317) a. * Harry; ran over a man (who was) trying to give himselfi directions.
b. * Harry; claims that himselfi was honest.
c. OK Harry; is proud of himselfi.
The data in (318) illustrate Principle B; a non-reflexive pronoun (him) must be locally free (as in
(318a-b), not (318c)).
(318) a. OK Harry; ran over a man (who was) trying to give himi directions.
b. OK Harry; claims that hei was honest.
c. * Harry; is proud of himi.
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Principle C of Binding Theory states that R-expressions must remain free, as shown in (319).
(319) a. * Harry; ran over a man (who was) trying to give the actori directions.
b. * Harry; claims that the actori was honest.
c. * Harry; is proud of the actori.
If one assumes that epithets are R-expressions, then the data in (320) are surprising because
example (320a) seems to obviate Principle C; yet, epithet are subject to a special type of
Principle B, requiring them to be substantially non-local. In this sense, (320b) is too local,
whereas (320a) is non-local enough.
(320) a. OK Harry; ran over a man (who was) trying to give [the idiot]; directions.
(adapted from Dubinsky & Hamilton 1998)
b. * Harry; claims that [the bastard]; was honest.
(adapted from Postal 1972:247)
c. * Harry; is proud of [the idiot]i.
The special behaviour of epithets raises a general question, namely the question whether the
classical Binding Conditions are explanatory at all61. Specifically, what additional assumptions
would be needed in order to accommodate for the behaviour of epithets?
In this dissertation, I have argued that epithets are null pronouns that are modified by a
nominal appositive, and I have discussed their distribution throughout this thesis. They exhibit
graded acceptability that correlates with anti-locality, as in (321), which reflects the judgments
found in English and in other languages. At their core, these examples constitute the heart of the
vehicle change, (cf. Fiengo and May (1994)). The question that I addressed is the following: If
one believes that epithets are pronouns, then why do they appear to respect Condition C in some
61 Though it should be pointed out that there is no convincing alternative either.
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instances (and vice versa if one believes that epithets are R-expressions6 2)? While I have
proposed an analysis for the distribution of epithets, it is these types of data where the line
between pronoun and R-expression is murky63.
(32 1)a. * Nero, thinks that [the damn traitor] will be invited to the reception.
b. OK Nero, thinks that they will invite [the damn traitor] to the reception.
c.?OK Johni convinced Peter that the idioti is smart.
One insight that we get from these data is that a purely pragmatic approach to Condition C
effects (as in Grodzinsky & Reinhart 1993, Schlenker 2005) does not cover the complete
distribution of epithets. As we have seen, Schlenker (2005) proposes that epithets should always
be acceptable, due to their additional pragmatic content (regardless of the presence of c-
command), except in de se contexts, where they are blocked by co-existing de se pronouns. This
approach does not seem to account for differences such as (321a) versus (321b). The data
suggest that we need to make reference to syntax in order to account for subject-object
asymmetries in the acceptability of epithets.
The present insights have further implications for current theorizing. From the
perspective of Sauerland's (2007a) flat binding and Schlenker's (2005) Minimize Restrictors!,
there is no fundamental difference between pronouns, R-expressions and reflexives. In each
case, we are dealing with a type of definite description. As a consequence, the Binding
Principles must be explained without making reference to the notions of pronoun, R-expression
or reflexive. One question that needs to be addressed in further developments is whether such an
approach can be maintained when we take epithets into consideration. On the one hand, we see
that epithets are clearly subject to Principle B - an observation that goes back to Dubinsky &
Hamilton (1998). This is to be expected if epithets are (non-reflexive) null pronouns that are
modified by a nominal appositive. The question that we then need to address is whether
Principle B is a syntactic constraint or whether it can be explained at the level of semantics. A
62 Cf. Reinhart (1983a), Johnson (2012) and Schlenker (2003) for a greater discussion on vehicle change.
63 These effects only hold for nominal appositives with null anchors, not for nominal appositives with overt anchors,
such as he the idiot.
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related question concerns the nature of Principle C. As discussed above, a purely pragmatic
approach such as Schlenker's Minimize Restrictors! does not seem to capture the distribution of
epithets. As this approach is designed to account for Principle C effects and the cases of
obviation that we find, the fact that epithets seem to be sensitive to some notion of
structural/syntactic locality challenges the idea that Principle C can be explained away in such a
manner. The question then comes back to whether we need to assume that Principle C is a
syntactic constraint (or a constraint on the compositional semantics).
A related question is whether there are other types of 'R-expressions' that pattern like
epithets in exhibiting a more fine-grained locality constraint of this type. Given the similar
analysis, an obvious candidate would be so-called pluringulars (or committee nouns). Den
Dikken (2001) and Kayne (2010) assume that such nouns consist of a nominal appositive with a
null anchor. The question thus arises whether such nouns can obviate Condition C, and further,
why it is not possible for any noun to obviate Condition C? These are questions that need to be
addressed throughout the development of this research program.
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